What Happens During the Private Period?: Evidence from Public‐to‐Private Reverse LBOs

This study provides new evidence on the restructuring activities undertaken by public‐to‐private reverse leveraged buyouts (RLBOs) while owned by private equity firms. The authors' comprehensive sample of public‐to‐private LBOs that return to public ownership through IPOs enables them to observe changes in profitability, valuation, financial structure, operating structure, and cost structure from the time the firms go private through (and after) their emergence through (re‐) IPOs. With their exclusive focus on reverse LBOs involving public‐to‐private deals, the authors reach findings that contradict previous conclusions about RLBOs. At the time of the LBO, the target firms in reverse LBOs are more levered than their peers, pay higher dividends, and are more profitable than their peers. At the same time, however, they appear to have lower market valuations before the buyouts. During the private period, the target firms of reverse LBOs achieve significant increases in employee productivity, asset restructuring, and improved gross margins, while operating with substantially higher levels of debt financing, lower levels of cash and working capital, and greater concentration of equity ownership. After the companies return to public ownership through IPOs, such companies continue to operate with higher leverage and ownership concentration than their publicly traded peers while producing further increases in profitability, resulting in substantial increases in both enterprise and equity valuation. The authors' analysis also shows that higher debt levels from the buyout play an important role in increased enterprise values. The evidence suggests that possible undervaluation as well as expected efficiency gains from restructuring actions are the primary motives for such reverse LBOs.     

HRM Practices and the Within‐Firm Gender Wage Gap

The effect of HRM practices on the within‐firm gender gap in wages in manufacturing is investigated merging a 1999 survey on work practices among Danish firms to matched employer–employee panel data. Self‐managed teams, project organization and job rotation schemes are the most widely introduced practices. Accounting for non‐randomness in adoption, the pay gap is reduced among hourly paid workers but increases among salaried workers. Considering practices individually, wage gains from adoption accrue to males except for salaried workers in firms that adopt project organization and for hourly paid workers in firms that introduce quality control circles.     

Robust Hierarchical Bayes Small Area Estimation for the Nested Error Linear Regression Model

Standard model‐based small area estimates perform poorly in presence of outliers. Sinha & Rao ( 2009 ) developed robust frequentist predictors of small area means. In this article, we present a robust Bayesian method to handle outliers in unit‐level data by extending the nested error regression model. We consider a finite mixture of normal distributions for the unit‐level error to model outliers and produce noninformative Bayes predictors of small area means. Our modelling approach generalises that of Datta & Ghosh ( 1991 ) under the normality assumption. Application of our method to a data set which is suspected to contain an outlier confirms this suspicion, correctly identifies the suspected outlier and produces robust predictors and posterior standard deviations of the small area means. Evaluation of several procedures including the M‐quantile method of Chambers & Tzavidis ( 2006 ) via simulations shows that our proposed method is as good as other procedures in terms of bias, variability and coverage probability of confidence and credible intervals when there are no outliers. In the presence of outliers, while our method and Sinha–Rao method perform similarly, they improve over the other methods. This superior performance of our procedure shows its dual (Bayes and frequentist) dominance, which should make it attractive to all practitioners, Bayesians and frequentists, of small area estimation.     

Macrodynamics of debt-financed investment-led growth with interest rate rules

This article demonstrates the diverse dynamic possibilities arising out of a simple macroeconomic model of debt-financed investment-led growth in the presence of interest rate rules. We show possibilities of convergence to steady state, and growth cycles around it as well as various complex dynamics. We investigate whether, given this framework, the financial sector can provide endogenous bounds to an otherwise unstable system. The effectiveness of monetary policy in the form of an interest rate rule targeting capacity utilization is examined under this context.     

NAFTA and the Realignment of Textile and Apparel Trade: Trade Creation or Trade Diversion?*

A modified version of the partial‐equilibrium gravity model, originally proposed by Fukao et al. (2003 ), is employed to investigate the changing pattern of US textile trade. We use US Bilateral Manufacturing Imports and Exports data for 1989–2001 to assess the impact of labor wages, tariffs, and exchange rates on the composition of US textile imports before and after the creation of NAFTA. The analysis is performed at the SIC two‐digit industry level and the more disaggregated four‐digit sector level. We find little evidence of trade diversion in textiles frequently attributed to NAFTA, while trade creation is clearly present. Furthermore, lower wages in some textile‐exporting countries (e.g. countries in Asia) do not appear to significantly increase these countries' shares of US textile imports at the expense of other trading partners. However, variations in currency exchange rates and tariffs have substantial effects on the composition of US imports.     

THE MARKET'S PRICING OF DEBT IPOs

Based on the authors' recent study published in the Journal of Financial Economics , this article summarizes new evidence on the first-day and aftermarket price performance of a firm's first public offer of bonds after its equity IPO. Unlike equity IPOs, such bond IPOs are not underpriced on average. However, bonds that are more equity-like (junk bonds) are underpriced at the initial offer whereas high-grade debt is actually overpriced. This finding supports the view that riskier debt issues have a larger equity component and, as a consequence, a higher degree of information asymmetry.
The authors' study also showed that less prestigious underwriters are associated with more underpriced offers, and that the issuer's stock market listing plays an important role in determining the first-day price performance of bond IPOs. The degree of underpricing is lower for bonds issued by firms whose equity is listed on NYSE/AMEX than for bonds issued by firms listed on Nasdaq. Finally, the aftermarket performance for the full sample and various subsamples is consistent with bond market efficiency in the sense that, once prices adjust after the first day of trading, there are no clearly exploitable opportunities for excess returns.     

Contextual Influences on Executive Selection: Firm Characteristics and CEO Experience

This study examines the relationship between antecedent organizational characteristics and the pre-succession experience of individuals chosen as chief executive officer (CEO) – relationships that have received limited attention in past research. A sample of 214 CEO selection decisions was used to test hypothesized relationships between the firm characteristics of size, performance, growth, advertising intensity, risk and individual attributes pertaining to the experience of selected CEOs. Results indicate the following relationships: pre-succession profitability, size and advertising intensity are associated with the chosen executives' organizational tenure levels; pre-succession firm size and risk are associated with the age of selected CEOs; and, pre-succession profitability and advertising intensity are associated with type of functional background experience. Findings provide new insights into the relative importance of pre-succession experience associated with different organizational contexts in CEO selection decisions.     

Dissertation abstract: Essays on pricing in experimental duopoly markets

This dissertation comprises three independent essays that analyze pricing behavior in experimental duopoly markets. The first essay examines whether the content of buyer information and the timing of its dissemination affects seller market power. We construct laboratory markets with differentiated goods and costly buyer search in which sellers simultaneously post prices. The experiment varies the information on price or product characteristics that buyers learn under different timing assumptions (pre- and post-search), generating four information treatments. Theory predicts that price information lowers the equilibrium price, but information about product characteristics increases the equilibrium price. That is, contrary to simple intuition, presence of informed buyers may impart a negative externality on other uninformed buyers. The data support the model's negative externality result when sellers face a large number of robot buyers that are programmed to search optimally. Observed prices conform to the model's comparative statics and are broadly consistent with predicted levels. With human buyers, however, excessive search instigates increased price competition and sellers post prices that are significantly lower than predicted. The second essay uses experimental methods to demonstrate the anti-competitive potential of price-matching guarantees in both symmetric and asymmetric cost duopolies. When costs are symmetric, price-matching guarantees increase the posted prices to the collusive level. With asymmetric costs, guaranteed prices remain high relative to prices without the use of guarantees, but the overall ability of guarantees to act as a collusion facilitating device depends on the relative cost difference. Fewer guarantees, combined with lower average prices, suggest that cost asymmetries may discourage collusion. The third essay investigates the effect of firm size asymmetry on the emergence of price leadership in a homogeneous good duopoly. With discounting, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium predicts that the large firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader. Independent of the level of size asymmetry, the laboratory data indicates that price leadership by the large firm is one of the most frequently observed timings of price announcement. In most cases, however, it comes second to simultaneous price-setting. This tendency to wait for the other firm to announce its price is especially strong when the level of size asymmetry between firms is low. We attribute the lower than expected frequency of price leadership to coordination failure, which is further compounded by elements of inequity aversion. JEL Classification C91, D43, D83, L11 Dissertation Committee: Timothy Cason (Chair), Department of Economics, Purdue University Dan Kovenock, Department of Economics, Purdue University Stephen Martin, Department of Economics, Purdue University Marco Casari, Department of Economics, Purdue University     

In Defense of Incentive Compensation: Its Effect on Corporate Acquisition Policy

Financial economists have long recognized that compensation design, particularly the use of equity-based compensation, can provide strong motivation for corporate managers to make value-maximizing decisions. But the perception of excesses in equity-based pay for U.S. executives has become pervasive and has led many to question its efficacy. The fundamental problem is one of measurement–while it is relatively easy to measure the cost of equity-based compensation, it is difficult to determine the extent to which equitybased compensation actually causes managers to direct corporate resources into value-maximizing ventures.
The authors of this article focus on corporate acquisition policy and argue that if equity-based pay is an effective motivator, it should limit management's inclination to overpay for acquisitions and to make unwise acquisitions. In their study of 1,719 mergers and tender offers over the period 1993–1998, the authors found that bidding companies with higher proportions of equity-based pay paid lower takeover premiums, acquired targets with stronger growth opportunities, and undertook acquisitions that were received more favorably by the market both upon announcement and over time.