From Coping Strategies to Tactics: London's Low‐Pay Economy and Migrant Labour

This article examines the means by which low‐paid migrant workers survive in a rapidly changing and increasingly unequal labour market. In a departure from the coping strategies literature, it is argued that the difficulties migrant workers face in the London labour market reduces their ability to ‘strategize’. Instead, workers adopt a range of ‘tactics’ that enable them to ‘get by’, if only just, on a day‐to‐day basis. The article explores these tactics with reference to the connections between different workers’ experiences of the workplace, home and community, and demonstrates the role of national, ethnic and gender relations in shaping migrant workers’ experiences of the London labour market and of the city more widely.     

Dynamic Externalities and Policy Coordination

The paper introduces trade into dynamic models with externalities and capital accumulation, and evaluates the efficiency of the Cournot–Nash equilibrium. It considers mixed economies characterized by a blend of strategic and nonstrategic sectors. Also, there are two sources of interdependence: the existence of production externalities and the endogenous determination of market prices. It is shown that policy coordination is not needed when preferences are the same. In this case, the production externalities are internalized, so that an inefficient solution becomes the efficient integrated world equilibrium due to trade.     

The company you keep: Qualitative uncertainty in providing a club good

Clubs are typically experience goods. Potential members cannot ascertain precisely beforehand their quality (dependent endogenously on the club's facility investment and number of users, itself dependent on its prices). Members with unsatisfactory initial experiences discontinue visits. We show that a monopoly profit maximizer never offers a free trial period for such goods. For quality functions homogeneous of degree of at least minus one, a welfare maximizer, motivated by distributional concerns to mitigate disappointed consumers' losses, always does. We demonstrate the robustness of this finding by showing that (i) without qualitative uncertainty (thus, no disappointed customers), neither welfarist nor monopolist offers free trials; and (ii) if the planner pursues an objective mixing welfare maximization with profit maximization, the likelihood of free trials increases with the weight put on welfare maximization. Regarding club quality and usage, the monopolist provides a socially excessive level of quality to repeat buyers when the quality function is homogeneous of degree zero. With nonhomogeneous quality functions, the monopolist permits too little club usage; quality may or may not be socially excessive.     

Government Slows Economic Growth

For decades the conventional wisdom maintained that 'public' (a euphemism for government) expenditure was good for economic life Professors Datta and Gordon, of the Universities of Visra-Bhariti (West Bengal) and Southern California, claim that evidence from the Third World suggests how government retards economic growth and depresses living standards Their argument may be technical but their conclusions cannot be misinterpreted even by politicians     

Executive Compensation and Corporate Acquisition Decisions

By examining how executive compensation structure determines corporate acquisition decisions, we document a strong positive relation between acquiring managers' equity-based compensation (EBC) and stock price performance around and following acquisition announcements. This relation is highly robust when we control for acquisition mode (mergers), means of payment, managerial ownership, and previous option grants. Compared to low EBC managers, high EBC managers pay lower acquisition premiums, acquire targets with higher growth opportunities, and make acquisitions engendering larger increases in firm risk. EBC significantly explains postacquisition stock price performance even after controlling for acquisition mode, means of payment, and "glamour" versus "value" acquirers.     

An SVAR Approach to Evaluation of Monetary Policy in India: Solution to the Exchange Rate Puzzles in an Open Economy

Following the exchange-rate paper by Kim and Roubini (J Monet Econ 45(3):561–586, 2000), we revisit the questions on monetary policy, exchange rate delayed overshooting, the inflationary puzzle, and the weak monetary transmission mechanism; but we do so for the open Indian economy. We further incorporate a superior monetary measure, the aggregation-theoretic Divisia monetary aggregate. Our paper confirms the efficacy of the Kim and Roubini (J Monet Econ 45(3):561–586, 2000) contemporaneous restriction, customized for the Indian economy, especially when compared with recursive structure, which is damaged by the price puzzle and the exchange rate puzzle. The importance of incorporating correctly measured money into the exchange rate model is illustrated, when we compare models with no-money, simple-sum monetary measures, and Divisia monetary measures. Our results are confirmed in terms of impulse response, variance decomposition analysis, and out-of-sample forecasting. In addition, we do a flip-flop variance decomposition analysis, finding two important phenomena in the Indian economy: (i) the existence of a weak link between the nominal-policy variable and real-economic activity, and (ii) the use of inflation-targeting as a primary goal of the Indian monetary authority. These two main results are robust, holding across different time period, dissimilar monetary aggregates, and diverse exogenous model designs.