FINANCING DECISIONS AND SIGNALING BY PARTIALLY ACQUIRED FIRMS

It is well documented that financing decisions by firms can signal valuable information about that firm. Our goal is to determine whether financing decisions by firms can signal valuable information about large stakeholders who have a substantial investment in those firms. In particular, we focus on financing decisions by firms after they had been partially acquired to determine whether these decisions signaled information that affected the values of their corresponding partial acquirers. We find that some financing policies by partially acquired firms may not only signal valuable information about themselves, but may also signal valuable information about their corresponding partial acquirers. We also find that the magnitude of the signal for the partially acquired firm that enacts a financing policy is dependent on the degree of monitoring imposed by the respective partial acquirer. JEL classification: G14, G34     

The role of economies of scale in justifying free trade: the Canada-USA Free Trade Agreement and Europe 1992 compared

In what way will the benefits of free trade emerge? This analysis looks at the role of economies of scale in justifying free trade. It takes the 1989 Canada-USA Free Trade Agreement and the European 1992 programmes as two recent examples of analyses in which economy of scale arguments were central to the economic evaluation of welfare gains. The official assessments of both policy moves are scrutinized and compared. It is suggested that the advantages of economies of scale are exaggerated in each account. The policy implications of the critique are drawn out for the case of both internal and external economies of scale. The argument is that a move away from traditional mass production process technologies and business strategies is underway, which requires a radically different approach to trade and scale issues.     

Consumer Welfare and the Loss Induced by Withholding Information: The Case of BSE in Italy

The paper develops a measure of consumer welfare losses associated with withholding information about a possible link between BSE and vCJD. The Cost of Ignorance (COI) is measured by comparing the utility of the informed choice with the utility of the uninformed choice, under conditions of improved information. Unlike previous work that is largely based on a single equation demand model, the measure is obtained retrieving a cost function from a dynamic Almost Ideal Demand System. The estimated perceived loss for Italian consumers due to delayed information ranges from 12 percent to 54 percent of total meat expenditure, depending on the month assumed to embody correct beliefs about the safety level of beef.     

MNEs and corruption: the impact of national institutions and subsidiary strategy

We argue that the pressure MNE subsidiaries face to engage in corrupt practices in their host country varies positively with the institutionalization of corrupt practices in both host and home country environments. We further argue that the relationship between an MNE's home country environment and the pressure it faces in the host country is moderated by its localization strategy. Results suggest a positive relationship between the host country corruption environment and the pressure subsidiaries face to engage in bribery locally. Mixed results emerged concerning MNEs from home countries participating in the OECD Convention for Combating Bribery. Results concerning the impact of the home country corruption environment are best viewed in light of significant moderating effects. When MNEs did not have local partners, firms from less corrupt home countries reported less pressure to engage in corrupt practices locally; however, the presence of local partners eliminated this relationship. Results will help managers understand the pressures their firm is likely to face when operating in corrupt host country environments, and also offer guidance concerning how the firm might reduce its exposure to those local institutional pressures. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS FOR NEW INVESTMENT AND THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF INSIDER TRADES

Significant negative valuation effects are widely acknowledged for firms announcing seasoned equity offerings. This result is consistent with theoretical models linking new equity issues to increased adverse-selection costs, lower management ownership in the firm, misuse of free cash flow, or expectations for earnings declines. Also increasingly evident, insiders trade around corporate announcements. We test the hypothesis that insider trading and announcements of new equity issues serve as joint signals in the market's evaluation of prospective capital investment projects. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that insider trading is related to market reaction to announcements of new equity issues.     

Do Wages Rise or Fall Following Merger?*

This paper provides a systematic empirical analysis of the effects of merger and acquisition activity on profitability and firm‐level employee remuneration in the UK, using a specially constructed database for the period 1979–91. It finds that both profitability and wages rise following acquisition, and firms that merge within the same industry division experience larger increases in profitability and pay their workers higher wages than those engaged in unrelated acquisitions; i.e. in part, the result of an increase in the efficiency with which labour is used following related acquisition.     

Do oil tariffs lower wages?

An oil tariff has potential to alter the pattern of production and income distribution across productive factors. This paper use a general equilibrium model of production and trade with inputs of capital, labor, and international energy to examine the effects of an oil tariff. Under a range of conditions, higher energy prices created by oil tariffs would lower the ratio of wages to capital rents, and production of labor intensive goods would fall. This paper concentrates on the potential of oil tariffs to alter patterns of production and income distribution.