Determinants of Corporate Diversification: Evidence From the Property–Liability Insurance Industry

This article analyzes variations in line‐of‐business diversification status and extent among property–liability insurers. Our results show that the extent of diversification is not driven by risk pooling considerations; insurers operating in more volatile business lines do not diversify more. Diversification can rather be explained by the benefits of internal capital markets and barriers to business growth like market size and concentration. In our analysis, we distinguish between related and unrelated diversification. Using a measure of unrelated line‐of‐business diversification we find the first support for the diversification prediction of the managerial discretion hypothesis that mutual insurers should be less diversified than stock insurers. While mutual insurers tend to exhibit higher levels of total diversification, they engage in significantly less unrelated diversification than do stock insurers.     

A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Life Insurance

Prior research suggests that neither the choice to own life insurance nor the amount purchased is consistently related to the presence of children in the household. While these perplexing findings are based on a static framework, we alternatively examine life insurance demand in a dynamic framework as a function of changes in household life cycle and financial condition. Our results indicate both a statistically and economically significant relation between life events, such as new parenthood, and the demand for life insurance. We also provide new evidence in support of the emergency fund hypothesis: households in which either spouse has become unemployed are more likely than other households to surrender their whole life insurance.     

Competition for attention in the Information (overload) Age

The Information Age has a surfeit of information received relative to what is processed. We model multiple sectors competing for consumer attention, with competition in price within each sector. Sector advertising levels follow a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form, and within‐sector prices are dispersed with a truncated Pareto distribution. The “information hump” shows highest ad levels for intermediate attention levels. Overall, advertising is excessive, although the allocation across sectors is optimal. The blame for information overload falls most on product categories with low information transmission costs and low profits.     

Mastering the management system

Companies have always found it hard to balance pressing operational concerns with long-term strategic priorities. The tension is critical: World-class processes won't lead to success without the right strategic direction, and the best strategy in the world will get nowhere without strong operations to execute it. In this article, Kaplan, of Harvard Business School, and Norton, founder and director of the Palladium Group, explain how to effectively manage both strategy and operations by linking them tightly in a closed-loop management system. The system comprises five stages, beginning with strategy development, which springs from a company's mission, vision, and value statements, and from an analysis of its strengths, weaknesses, and competitive environment. In the next stage, managers translate the strategy into objectives and initiatives with strategy maps, which organize objectives by themes, and balanced scorecards, which link objectives to performance metrics. Stage three involves creating an operational plan to accomplish the objectives and initiatives; it includes targeting process improvements and preparing sales, resource, and capacity plans and dynamic budgets. Managers then put plans into action, monitoring their effectiveness in stage four. They review operational, environmental, and competitive data; assess progress; and identify barriers to execution. In the final stage, they test the strategy, analyzing cost, profitability, and correlations between strategy and performance. If their underlying assumptions appear faulty, they update the strategy, beginning another loop. The authors present not only a comprehensive blueprint for successful strategy execution but also a managerial tool kit, illustrated with examples from HSBC Rail, Cigna Property and Casualty, and Store 24. The kit incorporates leading management experts' frameworks, outlining where they fit into the management cycle.     

Pension Contributions and Firm Performance: Evidence from Frozen Defined Benefit Plans

We study the impact of freezing defined benefit (DB) pension plans and replacing them with defined contribution (DC) plans on liquidity, financial leverage, investment, and market value of a sample of firms over 2001‐2008. We find evidence that the pension freeze tends to attenuate the drain on corporate liquidity and relieve the pressure to borrow to pay for mandatory contributions (MCs) associated with underfunded DB plans. Although investors seem to favor the pension freeze as evidenced by positive announcement abnormal stock returns, there is little reliable evidence that the freeze increases investment efficiency and long‐term stock performance.     

Risk Management and Firm Value: Evidence from Weather Derivatives

This paper shows that active risk management policies lead to an increase in firm value. To identify the effect of hedging and to overcome endogeneity concerns, we exploit the introduction of weather derivatives as an exogenous shock to firms’ ability to hedge weather risks. This innovation disproportionately benefits weather‐sensitive firms, irrespective of their future investment opportunities. Using this natural experiment and data from energy firms, we find that derivatives lead to higher valuations, investments, and leverage. Overall, our results demonstrate that risk management has real consequences on firm outcomes.     

How Do Ex Ante Severance Pay Contracts Fit into Optimal Executive Incentive Schemes?

We analyze a sample of over 3,600 ex ante explicit severance pay agreements in place at 808 firms and show that firms set ex ante explicit severance pay agreements as one component in managing the optimal level of equity incentives. Younger executives are more likely to receive explicit contracts and better terms. Firms with high distress risk, high takeover probability, and high return volatility are significantly more likely to enter into new or revised severance contracts. Finally, ex post payouts to managers are largely determined by the ex ante contract terms.