Zur Nachhaltigkeit der Generationenverträge: Eine Diagnose der Kranken- und Pflegeversicherung

Employing the generational accounting approach, this paper analyses the stance of fiscal policy in Germany. We find that fiscal policy is presently not sustainable, which is mainly due to pay-as-you-go financed social insurance systems. In order to illustrate the relative impact, we isolate the Public Health Insurance and the Public Long Term Care Insurance. Our findings suggest that without radical reforms the implicit debt burden for future generations might reach a magnitude of more than two times the annual GDP and contribution rates to both schemes will explode during the next three decades.     

Inequality, Crime and Economic Growth. A Classical Argument for Distributional Equality

This paper studies the dynamic general-equilibrium interactions between inequality, crime and economic growth by embedding the rational choice-theoretical approach to criminal behavior in a heterogeneous-agents endogenous-growth OLG model. Based on their respective opportunity costs, individuals choose to specialize in either legal or criminal activities. While legal households contribute to aggregate goods supply over time by either working or building human capital, criminals make a living by expropriating legal citizens of part of the latter's income. An increase in inequality lowers the economy's growth rate and possesses negative welfare effects for all agents with endowments equal to or above average and for agents with endowment below average that are born sufficiently far in the future.     

Constitutional concepts within the process of European integration

In order to come to an understanding concerning the questions surrounding the drafting of a European constitution, one must differentiate the three different meanings of the word ‘constitution’ by virtue of the very nature of its beginnings. The concept of a constitution in the organisational sense is the first possible way to understand the term. As such, ‘Constitution'is synonymous with the organizational founding statute of any association or collective. Separate from this is a second possible context of the term, which refers to the legal meaning of the word. Here, the expression is understood as the highest legal norm of an autonomous legal order, its first and highest law. Within both of these meanings, one can speak of a ‘European Constitution’. A third, political way of understanding the term refers to the concept of the constitution as an ordering idea, which a specific place to the internal and external independent political unity combines and which orders from the outside inward. In other words, with this is concerned the question, why exactly this specific space within these specific limits to the independent political unity should be combined/bound. The introduction of such an order upon which can be founded, why exactly this concrete space in the specific limits as independent unity should be constituted, is still not today found for Europe.     

Competitive balance and gate revenue sharing in team sports

This paper shows that under reasonable conditions, increasing gate revenue sharing among teams in a sports league will produce a more uneven contest, i.e. reduce competitive balance. This result has significant implications for antitrust authorities and legislators, who have tended to assume that revenue sharing arrangements will necessarily promote competitive balance.     

The raw material basis of global value chains: allocating environmental responsibility based on value generation

A new approach to allocate environmental responsibility, the ‘value added-based responsibility’ allocation, is presented in this article. This metric allocates total environmental pressures occurring along an international supply chain to the participating sectors and countries according to the share of value added they generate within that specific supply chain. We show that – due to their position in global value chains – certain sectors (e.g. services) and countries (e.g. Germany) receive significantly greater responsibility compared to other allocation approaches. This adds a new perspective to the discussions concerning a fair distribution of mitigation costs among nations, companies and consumers.     

Federalism and decentralization—a critical survey of frequently used indicators

The economic effects of federalism are unclear: some papers find that federalism has strong positive effects on a number of economically relevant variables, others find negative effects. The results often crucially hinge on the proxies for federalism used. In this paper, we critically survey the existing indicators for both federalism and fiscal decentralization. We argue that federalism is a constitutional institution, whereas decentralization is the outcome of a policy choice, and that the two ought to be systematically distinguished because decentralization can also occur in nonfederally structured states. We further argue that institutional details are very important with regard to federalism and that dummy variables usually capture only very specific aspects of these institutional details. We use factor analysis to test whether the latent variables behind the observed indicators support these assumptions. More than two important factors are derived, implying that a more fine-grained differentiation beyond simply “‘federalism” and “decentralization” might be in order. The correlations of the most important proxies for various aspects of federalism and decentralization with a number of quasi-exogenous variables, as well as with institutional variables, are usually rather modest.     

Leseliste Top 5: Beteiligungscontrolling

PRAXIS | Magazin

Leseliste Top 5: Beteiligungscontrolling