Determinants of smallholder farmers' participation in banana markets in Central Africa: the role of transaction costs

A bivariate probit model was employed to jointly and separately estimate banana market participation decisions of buying and selling households in Rwanda and Burundi using household survey data. Selectivity bias was corrected for estimating the transacted volumes using Heckman's procedure. The results showed that transaction cost‐related factors such as geographical location of households, market information sources, and travel time to the nearest urban center influence market participation. Non‐price‐related factors such as security of land tenure, labor availability, off‐farm income, gender of the household head, and years of farming experience had a significant influence on the transacted volumes. Output prices had a significant correlation with sales volume, indicating price incentives increased supply by sellers. Generally, the findings suggest that policies aimed at investments in rural road infrastructure, market information systems, collective marketing, and value addition of banana products may provide a potential avenue for mitigating transaction costs and enhancing market participation and production of marketed surplus by rural households.     

Das leere Versprechen der aktiven Konjunktursteuerung

Since the financial crisis and the ensuing sluggish recovery, a growing number of voices have called for a more active role for fiscal policy to stimulate the economy. We reject this call and argue that in normal times, monetary policy and automatic stabilisers are sufficient to smooth the business cycle. The effectiveness of active fiscal policy is too uncertain and the requirements for a sensible adjustment are too high. Moreover, determining the state of the business cycle is almost impossible in real time. The benefits of active fiscal policy therefore do not outweigh its costs. Only in exceptional situations should policy makers consider active fiscal policy measures as an option.     

Argumente gegen die Reform des Stabilitätsgesetzes wenig überzeugend — eine Replik

In their reply, Dullien and van Treeck criticise the argument of Michaelis, Elstner and Schmidt that the German Stability and Growth law (StabG) from the 1960s must not be reformed. They claim that Michaelis et al. neglect that the concept of sustainability has changed over the past 50 years and that nowadays issues such as social and ecological sustainability should be included. Moreover, the claim by Michaelis et al. that the StabG provides important tools for business cycle management is hardly convincing, given that these tools have not been used since the 1970s and stimulus packages have been passed on other legal grounds. / In their response Michaelis et al. stress that economic policy has to consider equally aspects of economic, social and ecological sustainability. The StabG, however, is a completely inappropriate basis for attempts to address aspects of social and ecological sustainability. The main use of the StabG consists in the possibility to quickly implement fiscal measures that could mitigate the consequences of severe economic downturns. Proposals of Dullien and van Treeck that various dimensions of sustainability are controllable by a predetermined set of instruments neglect the complexity of the social market economy.     

CEOs' Passion for Inventing and Radical Innovations in SMEs: The Moderating Effect of Shared Vision

Based on a sample of 388 small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs), we investigate how a CEO's passion for inventing is associated with radical innovations in SMEs. Furthermore, we examine whether this relationship is moderated by a shared vision. Our results demonstrate that CEOs who are passionate about inventing play a significant role with regard to radical innovation and that the degree to which a firm's members share its vision is positively correlated with this relationship. Our findings enrich upper echelons theory by incorporating insights into how deep‐level psychological traits are related to firm outcomes. In addition, we enhance our understanding of how passion can actually predict firm‐level outcomes.     

Corruption and the public display of wealth

We study an agent–client model of corruption, in which potential corruptors are uncertain about the probability with which officials are subjected to an audit, either high or low. We characterize a signaling equilibrium, in which officials who are less likely to be audited engage in public conspicuous consumption, whereas those who are more likely to be audited do not. In this equilibrium, officials are better off than in the equilibria without conspicuous consumption. The signaling equilibrium exists if the officials' bargaining power vis‐à‐vis potential corruptors is sufficiently high, which implies that corruption can be curbed by creating competition among officials.     

Information management with specific investments and cost-based transfer prices

Abstract

We analyse information flows in a profit-centre organisation with internal trade between two risk-neutral divisions. Prior to production, the divisions make unverifiable investments in intrafirm synergies. After investments are made, the selling division announces a cost-based transfer price which includes a mark-up on variable costs. The buying division then decides what quantity to purchase at that unit cost. From the head office's perspective, the key issues are to influence both, divisional investments and the seller's manipulation of the mark-up. To do so, the head office can fund a pre-decision information system before divisional investments are made. The system produces forward-looking information that can be used to improve the divisions' investment decisions, but which cannot be used in evaluating their performance. Our analytical framework allows us to identify cost and revenue structures for which pre-decision information either supports or destroys intrafirm synergies by motivating or discouraging divisional investments, thereby resulting in an increase in, decrease in or in no impact whatsoever on, firm profit. Among our most interesting findings is the counterintuitive result that pre-decision information can undermine the incentives of risk-neutral agents to invest specifically. Our results add to earlier agency models that found different, albeit equally dysfunctional effects of pre-decision information. Contrary to these studies, our findings are not driven by either risk aversion or rent extraction.     

The best of both worlds: how rural entrepreneurs use placial embeddedness and strategic networks to create opportunities

Entrepreneurial activities are strongly influenced by the context in which they occur. It is therefore imperative to understand how different contexts enable entrepreneurs to create opportunities. In this paper, we focus on the spatial context of rural entrepreneurs and explore how the rural context impacts on their opportunity creation. Based on a multiple case study, we find that rural entrepreneurs mix what we refer to as placial embeddedness – an intimate knowledge of and concern for the place – with strategically built non-local networks, i.e. the best of two worlds. Notably, the entrepreneurs seek to exhaust the localized resource base before seeking out non-local resources. Our findings thus contribute to our understanding of entrepreneurship in context and challenge future research to explore how different forms of contexts are bridged in different settings to create varieties of entrepreneurial activities.     

On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU

Illegal immigration affects not only EU member states adjacent, but also those distant from the Mediterranean Sea due to open internal borders and intra-EU onward migration. Member states without a direct influx of illegal immigrants may therefore free-ride on border countries’ enforcement efforts, leading to a sub-optimal level of border control when immigration policy remains uncoordinated. By applying a numerical example, we show that an expected externality mechanism leads to voluntary preference revelation with respect to immigration policy under several (but not all) scenarios, thereby avoiding strategic behavior in the regular negotiation process. This policy measure requires, however, the EU Commission to take on a very active role as moderator between member states (rather than as legislator).     

What matters in the finance–growth nexus of advanced economies? Evidence from OECD countries

Over the last decades, a large strand of finance and growth literature has provided ample evidence on the importance of financial deepening for economic development. Yet, recently, the focus of public debate has shifted towards the role of the financial system structure, an area in which empirical research remains relatively sparse and exploratory in nature. With this article, we aim to contribute to that debate by analysing the role the financial system structure plays in economic growth and risk. Focusing on stock markets and studying OECD economies over 1994–2013, we find that, ceteris paribus, financial systems with relatively larger stock markets facilitate economic growth and dampen economic risk. Our findings remain robust under application of instrumental variable and system generalized method of moments estimators, as well as when we use an alternative definition of stock market development, estimate median regressions, examine relatively high-frequency annual data, control for systemic banking crises or apply quadratic specifications. We find no such effect for private bond markets or private credit volume. Overall, our results suggest that financial system structure matters for the economic development of advanced economies and highlight the importance of a debate about the optimal structure of an economy’s financial system.