Can food-for-work encourage agricultural production?

Food-for-work (FFW) is the most widely used type of public works program in Ethiopia through which a high share of the food aid is distributed. This paper assesses the impacts of FFW in Tigray, a chronically food insecure region in Ethiopia, in terms of relieving liquidity constraints and thereby improving input use in agriculture. A Heckman selection model on the adoption and intensity of fertilizer use demonstrated that FFW positively influenced the decision to adopt fertilizer and there was no evidence of disincentive effect.     

Pasture Improvement, Stocking Rates and Rural Investment

Research Fellow in the Institute of Applied Economic Research and is a review of some result from part of the institute's Primary Production Research Project. The study was the subject of a paper presented to the annual conference of the Australian Agricultural Economic Society in February 1969 and will be published by the Institute as Technical Report No. 2.     

Post-Failure Success: Sensemaking in Problem Representation Reformulation

Failure is an inevitable feature of innovation, and management research promulgates the importance of learning from it. Key to excelling at an innovation-based strategy is understanding the processes that can turn failures into successes. However, post-failure success remains elusive. Although failure signals that the innovation journey is off course, shifting trajectory is difficult, because it may require revising assumptions and reformulating the project’s problem representation. Using comparative case studies, this study set out to understand how problem representations are reformulated. Employing case method and comparing data versus theory iteratively, the important role of sensemaking and of leadership behaviors in driving post-failure success became salient. Findings show that problem representations post-failure require a process of problem formulation characterized by sensemaking and that innovative solutions are enabled by the reformulation of problem representations that spring from prospective sensemaking. Furthermore, this article identifies leadership change behavior as the linchpin driving a problem formulation process characterized by prospective sensemaking that catalyzes innovative solutions and explains why some projects thrive post-failure and others do not. This article provides empirical support to the theoretical work of the literature on problem formulation, while extending the learning-from-failure literature by emphasizing and demonstrating the process driving post-failure success. The major implication of our study is that different leadership behaviors may foster different types of sensemaking (retrospective or prospective), and that, in turn, the type of sensemaking matters for how a problem is reformulated. Ultimately, this article concludes that in the context of project failure, problem reformulation that springs from prospective sensemaking enables innovative solutions post-failure.     

Market Imperfections and Land Productivity in the Ethiopian Highlands

This study analyses how market imperfections affect land productivity in a degraded low‐potential cereal‐livestock economy in the Ethiopian highlands. A wide array of variables is used to control for land quality in the analysis. Results of three different selection models were compared with least squares models using the HC3 heteroskedasticity‐consistent covariance matrix estimator. Market imperfections in labour and land markets were found to affect land productivity. Land productivity was positively correlated with household male and female labour force per unit of land. Female‐headed households achieved much lower land productivity than male‐headed households. Old age of household heads was also correlated with lower land productivity. Imperfections in the rental market for oxen appeared to cause overstocking of oxen by some households. Conservation technologies had no significant positive short‐run effect on land productivity. The main results were consistent across the different econometric models.     

The nature of tournaments

This paper characterizes the optimal way for a principal to structure a rank-order tournament in a moral hazard setting (as in Lazear and Rosen in J Polit Econ 89:841?C864, 1981). We find that it is often optimal to give rewards to top performers that are smaller in magnitude than corresponding punishments to poor performers. The paper identifies four reasons why the principal might prefer to give larger rewards than punishments: (1) R is small relative to P (where R is risk aversion and P is absolute prudence); (2) the distribution of shocks to output is asymmetric and the asymmetry takes a particular form; (3) the principal faces a limited liability constraint; and (4) there is agent heterogeneity of a particular form.