Improved estimation of portfolio value‐at‐risk under copula models with mixed marginals

Portfolio value‐at‐risk (PVAR) is widely used in practice, but recent criticisms have focused on risks arising from biased PVAR estimates due to model specification errors and other problems. The PVAR estimation method proposed in this article combines generalized Pareto distribution tails with the empirical density function to model the marginal distributions for each asset in the portfolio, and a copula model is used to form a joint distribution from the fitted marginals. The copula–mixed distribution (CMX) approach converges in probability to the true marginal return distribution but is based on weaker assumptions that may be appropriate for the returns data found in practice. CMX is used to estimate the joint distribution of log returns for the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) index and the associated futures contracts on SGX and TAIFEX. The PVAR estimates for various hedge portfolios are computed from the fitted CMX model, and backtesting diagnostics indicate that CMX outperforms the alternative PVAR estimators. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 26:997–1018, 2006     

Genealogies of calculation

This paper calls firstly for genealogies of calculation, in contrast to traditional accounting history. The term genealogy conveys a focus on the outcomes of the past, rather than a quest for the origins of the present. It is intended to avoid an a priori limiting of the field of study to accounting as it currently exists, or to a particular accounting technique such as double-entry bookkeeping. And it entails an emphasis on the historical contingency of contemporary practices, a concern with the multiple and dispersed surfaces of emergence of disparate practices of economic calculation. Secondly, the paper emphasizes the discursive nature of calculation, the language and vocabularies in which a particular practice is articulated, the ideals attached to certain calculative technologies. Thirdly, the paper stresses the importance of attending to ensembles of practices and rationales that are assembled at various collective levels, rather than with isolated instances of this or that way of accounting. The delineation of the domain of traditional accounting history is illustrated by reference to three sets of issues: the links between double-entry bookkeeping and capitalism in the writings of Weber and Sombart; the links between bookkeeping practice and decision making in the writings of Yamey; and the quest for examples of “early management accounting” in the writings of those such as Edwards and Fleischman & Parker. In contrast to such concerns of accounting history, four genealogies are presented: the promotion of discounted cash-flow techniques for investment decisions in the U.K. in the 1960s; the emergence of costs in the late eighteenth century; the accounting for value added event in Britain in the late 1970s; and the construction of standard costing in the early decades of the twentieth century.     

Collective strategies for improving environmental performance: A case study of the biotechnology industry

This paper examines the potential contributions of institutional theory and the collective strategies framework to assist managers in emerging industries in developing better means of addressing societal concerns. Lack of understanding and difficulties in communication between companies in the forefront of new technology developments and a society that is concerned about the environment have led to many of the problems facing the biotechnology industry. Measures intended to protect the environment from potential adverse effects have frequently restricted activities in the new biotechnology field, even though scientists are themselves convinced of the safety and control they exert over their new technologies. Collective strategies can be instrumental in stabilising certain aspects of the environment. Proper selection of issues and coordinated action can be helpful to all industry participants by informing public perceptions and government regulations and help insure that major environmental trends will evolve in a manner beneficial to all concerned.     

Directly measuring early exercise premiums using American and European S&P 500 Index options

The Chicago Board Options Exchange concurrently listed European‐style and American‐style options on the Standard and Poor's 500 Index from April 2, 1986 through June 20, 1986. This unique time period allows for a direct measurement of the early exercise premium in American‐style index options. In this study, using ask quotes, we find average early exercise premiums ranging from 5.04 to 5.90% for calls, and from 7.97 to 10.86% for puts. Additionally, we are able to depict a potentially useful functional form of the early exercise premium. As in previous studies, we find some instances of negative early exercise premiums. However, a trading simulation shows that traders must be able to trade within the bid–ask spread to profit from these apparent arbitrage opportunities. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 23:287–313, 2003     

Earnings Performance and Discretionary Disclosure

While the influence of earnings performance on disclosure is a fundamental issue in the disclosure literature, our understanding of this influence is limited. In this paper, I examine a comprehensive set of disclosures from a sample of firms experiencing an extended period of seasonally adjusted earnings increases. I study how these firms adjust disclosure in response to earnings increases, how disclosure changes as the period of strong earnings performance nears an end and how firms disclose during a subsequent period of earnings decline. I find an increase in disclosure during the period of increased earnings. This increase is pervasive across all types of disclosure and tends to be bundled with earnings announcements. The market responds positively to this disclosure. Firms continue to disclose at a high level as they approach earnings declines. However, they shift to disclosures that focus on the positive short-term results and do not discuss the impending decreases. While this behavior is systematic, the market does not appear to anticipate the subsequent earnings declines. Once the firms announce earnings declines, the magnitude of disclosure returns to the level provided prior to the increased earnings.     

Closing small open economy models

The small open economy model with incomplete asset markets features a steady-state that depends on initial conditions and equilibrium dynamics that possess a random walk component. A number of modifications to the standard model have been proposed to induce stationarity. This paper presents a quantitative comparison of these alternative approaches. Five different specifications are considered: (1) A model with an endogenous discount factor (Uzawa-type preferences); (2) a model with a debt-elastic interest-rate premium; (3) a model with convex portfolio adjustment costs; (4) a model with complete asset markets; and (5) a model without stationarity-inducing features. The main finding of the paper is that all models deliver virtually identical dynamics at business-cycle frequencies, as measured by unconditional second moments and impulse response functions. The only noticeable difference among the alternative specifications is that the complete-asset-market model induces smoother consumption dynamics.     

UNIVERSAL BANKS ARE NOT THE ANSWER TO AMERICA'S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE "PROBLEM": A LOOK AT GERMANY, JAPAN, AND THE U.S.

This article objects to a recent tendency of legal and economic scholars to "romanticize" the corporate governance role of German universal banks and Japanese main banks. There are potential conflicts between banks' interests as lenders and as shareholders that are likely to make banks less-than-ideal monitors for outside shareholders. Citing evidence that Japanese corporate borrowers pay above-market interest rates for their bank financing, Macey and Miller interpret the high interest rates as "rents" earned by Japanese banks on their loan portfolios in exchange for (1) insulating incumbent management of borrower firms from hostile takeover and (2) accepting suboptimal returns on their equity holdings.
The main problems with the German and Japanese systems stem from their failure to produce well-developed capital markets. Concentrated and stable shareholdings reduce the order flow in the market, thereby depriving the market of liquidity. And the lack of capital market liquidity– combined with the intense loyalty of the banks towards incumbent management–removes the ability of outside shareholders to make a credible threat of takeover if managerial performance is substandard.
The problem with American corporate governance–if indeed there is one–is not that hostile takeovers are bad, but that there are not enough of them due to regulatory restrictions and misguided legal policies. While U.S. law should be amended to give banks and other debtholders more power over borrowers in the case of financial distress, encouraging U.S. banks to become large stockholders is not likely to improve corporate efficiency. Strengthening the "voice" of American equity holders by eliminating restrictions on the market for corporate control would be the most effective step in improving firm performance.     

Learning across the life cycle: Experimentation and performance among the hollywood studio heads

Guided by notions from the literature on organizational learning, this paper investigates how product line experimentation and organizational performance change across the careers of top managers. Its subjects are the studio heads who ran all the major Hollywood film studios from 1936 to 1965. The study found first, that product line experimentation declines over the course of executive tenures; second, that there is an inverse U‐shaped relationship between top executive tenure and an organization's financial performance; and third, that product line experimentation is more likely to benefit financial performance late in top executives' tenures. These findings are consistent with a three‐stage ‘executive life cycle’. During the early years of their tenures, top managers experiment intensively with their product lines to learn about their business; later on their accumulated knowledge allows them to reduce experimentation and increase performance; finally, in their last years, executives reduce experimentation still further, and performance declines. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.