The Asian crisis: what did we learn and when did we learn it?

This paper steps back from the detail of the Asian crisis, to ask whether the 1997 crisis advanced our broad understanding of the age‐old problem of economic crises. Some immediate lessons were learned from the failures of the crisis‐response in Indonesia, which was the worst‐affected economy. It is notable, however, how little changed to address the ongoing systemic weaknesses. Three areas of unresolved vulnerability can be identified. First, the sudden stops and reversals of international capital flows. Second, the intrinsic fragility of a financial system that borrows short and lends long. Third, unanchored exchange rates, where the market's price‐discovery can take the rate to levels far from equilibrium, for sustained periods. For more than a decade after the Asian crisis, international capital flows continued to be seen as unambiguously beneficial, with any attempts at capital flow management rejected. At a global level, it was not until the 2008 financial crisis that widespread financial fragility was addressed through tighter regulation and higher capital requirements. On exchange rates, misleading advocacy of corner solutions—either pure floating exchange rates or immutable fixed rates—continued in the face of the real‐world experience that sometimes intervention is needed to maintain an exchange rate close to equilibrium.     

Assessing social support networks in cross-national comparative surveys: Measurement issues

In recent years many cross-national comparative surveys, such as Gender and Generation Programme, International Social Survey Programme, European Quality of Life Survey, or General Social Survey, have included assessment of social support networks. Generally, two approaches were used; the name generator approach and the role relation approach. As more cross-country surveys are conducted every year, it may seem reasonable to use such data sets, since they provide high quality comparisons across countries. However, one should pay close attention to the measurement instruments, as these may cause unintentional but systematic variability in the observed data. While the data from each survey can be of high quality ??per se??, we claim that results from these surveys are not comparable, owing to their different measurement approaches and survey instruments. In this paper we present data from several experiments which show that scientific findings from these surveys depend significantly on questionnaire design.     

Learning to trust strangers: an evolutionary perspective

What if living in a relatively trustworthy society was sufficient to blindly trust strangers? In this paper we interpret generalized trust as a learning process and analyse the trust game paradox in light of the replicator dynamics. Given that trust inevitably implies doubts about others, we assume incomplete information and study the dynamics of trust in buyer-supplier purchase transactions. Considering a world made of ??good?? and ??bad?? suppliers, we show that the trust game admits a unique evolutionarily stable strategy: buyers may trust strangers if it is not too risky to do so. Examining the situation where some players may play either as trustor or as trustee we show that this result is robust.     

The take-up of means-tested income support

Many studies have identified that eligible claimants do not participate in means-tested income support programs. We examine the determinants of the decision to take-up social assistance in Canada using the 1997 Canadian Out of Employment Panel dataset. Using a conditional maximum likelihood approach to take account of the potential endogeneity of the level of benefits available to potential claimants, we find that benefit levels and recent receipt of Social Assistance (SA) are important determinants of the take-up decision. The results are important for the fiscal implications of changing benefit levels as the take-up rate is systematically related to the benefits potential recipients are entitled to receive. Further, it suggests that stigma and transaction costs associated with program use are important in explaining the take-up decision.     

Government Partisanship and Property Rights: Cross‐Country Firm‐Level Evidence

Property rights are essential to economic development but vary with the political environment. We develop and test the claim that government partisanship influences the security of business firms' property rights: the perceived security of property rights increases when right‐wing parties take power and declines with the election of left‐leaning parties. Unlike research that uses country‐level aggregates to draw inferences about the determinants of secure property rights, we analyze survey responses of over 7,400 firm owners from 73 countries using a novel difference‐in‐differences approach. We find that the political partisanship of the government in power strongly affects individual perceptions of property rights: firm owners are more likely to perceive that their property rights are secure under right‐leaning governments. Our results are robust to firm‐ and country‐level economic performance as well as controls for political institutions that might induce more stability to property rights, such as the number of checks and balances (veto players) in a system. Overall, our results indicate that business owners' beliefs about the security of property rights are highly responsive to changes in government partisanship.     

PIGS or Lambs? The European Sovereign Debt Crisis and the Role of Rating Agencies

This paper asks whether rating agencies played a passive role or were an active driving force during Europe??s sovereign debt crisis. We address this by estimating relationships between sovereign debt ratings and macroeconomic and structural variables. We then use these equations to decompose actual ratings into systematic and arbitrary components that are not explained by previously observed procedures of rating agencies. Finally, we check whether systematic, as well as arbitrary, parts of credit ratings affect credit spreads. We find that both do affect credit spreads, which opens the possibility that arbitrary rating downgrades trigger processes of self-fulfilling prophecies that may drive even relatively healthy countries towards default.