Secure implementation in Shapley–Scarf housing markets

This paper considers the object allocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (J Math Econ 1:23–37, 1974). We study secure implementation (Saijo et al. in Theor Econ 2:203–229, 2007), that is, double implementation in dominant strategy and Nash equilibria. We prove that (1) an individually rational solution is securely implementable if and only if it is the no-trade solution, (2) a neutral solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a serial dictatorship, and (3) an efficient solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a sequential dictatorship. Furthermore, we provide a complete characterization of securely implementable solutions in the two-agent case: a solution is securely implementable if and only if it is either a constant solution or a serial dictatorship.     

A dynamic two country Heckscher–Ohlin model with non-homothetic preferences

We examine the properties of a two-country dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin model that allows for preferences to be non-homothetic. We show that the model has a continuum of steady state equilibria under free trade, with the initial conditions determining which equilibrium will be attained. We establish conditions under which a static Heckscher–Ohlin theorem will hold in the steady state, and also conditions for a dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin theorem to hold. If both goods are normal, each country will have a unique autarkic steady state, and all steady state equilibria are saddle points. We also consider the case in which one good is inferior, and show that this can lead to multiple autarkic steady states, violations of the static Heckscher–Ohlin theorem in the steady state. Furthermore, there may exist steady state equilibria that Pareto dominate other steady states. These steady states will be unstable if discount factors are the same in each country, although they may exhibit dynamic indeterminacy if discount factors differ.     

Strategic approximations of discontinuous games

An infinite game is approximated by restricting the players to finite subsets of their pure strategy spaces. A strategic approximationof an infinite game is a countable subset of pure strategies with the property that limits of all equilibria of all sequences of approximating games whose finite strategy sets eventually include each member of the countable set must be equilibria of the infinite game. We provide conditions under which infinite games admit strategic approximations.     

Equilibrium price formation in markets with differentially informed agents

We consider a pure exchange economy with a finite set of types of agents which have incomplete and asymmetric information on the states of nature. Our aim was to describe the equilibrium price formation and analyze how the lack of information may affect the allocation of resources. To do so, we adapt to an asymmetric information scenario a variant of the Shapley–Shubik game introduced by Dubey and Geanakoplos (J Math Econ 39:391–400, 2003 ).     

Compensating for unforeseeable damages in torts

The doctrine regarding unforeseeable damages in a contract was established in the well known case of Hadley vs. Baxendale. According to the judgement, a plaintiff cannot be compensated for unforeseeable damages in an incomplete contract unless he informs the defendant of the possible unforeseen contingency beforehand. In this paper, I extend the argument to the tort case in which it is hardly possible to communicate between a plaintiff and a defendant before an accident occurs. In the case of the sequential bilateral accident in which the victim’s care level is observable to the injurer, the victim’s care level can be a signal of the unforeseen contingency. I mainly discuss the implementability of the social optimum by the contributory negligence with dual standard of care enabling the communication between the parties.     

Effect of Diversity of Large Wildlife Species on Financial Benefits to Local Communities in Northwest Namibia

There exist few quantitative assessments of the relationship between biodiversity per se and economic benefits at scales that are relevant for conservation. Similarly, the merits of Community-Based Natural Resource Management programs for both wildlife and people are contested. Here, we harness two databases, on wildlife surveys and financial benefits, to address these issues for communal conservancies in northwest Namibia. We use ordination methods to characterize the diversity and stability of large wildlife assemblages on conservancies, and demonstrate that diversity (but not stability) is an important explanator of conservancy financial benefits. Our results indicate that for this area of Namibia, biodiversity, as represented by large wildlife assemblages, has an important, positive effect on the tangible financial benefits that people derive from conservation programs.     

Accounting for Spatial Effects in Economic Models of Land Use: Recent Developments and Challenges Ahead

The marked increase in the availability of spatial data has forced researchers engaged in land use modeling to directly confront the question of space and the theoretical and methodological challenges involved in developing spatial models. Advances have come from multiple disciplines, most notably through the development and application of spatial theory and methods from regional science, geography, urban economics and more recently, theoretical and applied econometrics. The main goal of this paper is to summarize the econometric challenges of spatial data and to highlight spatial models and methods with a particular focus on models of land markets and land use change. We also discuss the data and modeling challenges associated with modeling the underlying spatial economic mechanisms that give rise to land use patterns and the complexities involved in modeling land use as a coupled economic-ecological system.     

Dynamic pricing of electricity in the mid-Atlantic region: econometric results from the Baltimore gas and electric company experiment

The Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BGE) undertook a dynamic pricing experiment to test customer price responsiveness to different dynamic pricing options. The pilot ran during the summers of 2008 and 2009 and was called the Smart Energy Pricing (SEP) Pilot. In 2008, it tested two types of dynamic pricing tariffs: critical peak pricing (CPP) and peak time rebate (PTR) tariffs. About a thousand customers were randomly placed on these tariffs and some of them were paired with one of two enabling technologies, a device known as the Energy Orb and a switch for cycling central air conditioners. The usage of a randomly chosen control group of customers was also monitored during the same time period. In 2009, BGE repeated the pilot program with the same customers who participated in the 2008 pilot, but this time it only tested the PTR tariff. In this paper, we estimate a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) model on the SEP pilot’s hourly consumption, pricing and weather data. We derive substitution and daily price elasticities and predictive equations for estimating the magnitude of demand response under a variety of dynamic prices. We also test for the persistence of impacts across the two summers. In addition, we report average peak demand reduction for each of the treatment cells in the SEP pilot and compare the findings with those reported from earlier pilots. These results show conclusively that it is possible to incentivize customers to reduce their peak period loads using price signals. More importantly, these reductions do not wear off when the pricing plans are implemented over two consecutive summers. Our analyses reveal that SEP participants reduced their peak usages in the range of 18 to 33% in the first summer of the SEP pilot and continued these reductions in the second summer.     

Estimating the Costs of Protecting Native Species from Invasive Animal Pests in New South Wales,Australia

Invasive animal pests reduce crop and livestock output, require management and control measures, and threaten native plants, animals and their habitat. The agricultural and management costs are often directly measurable. But the costs to protect threatened native plants and animals are harder to assess. The Rural Lands Protection Boards were the government agency in New South Wales that managed invasive animals. An analysis of their decisions provided the opportunity to estimate the costs of protecting native species. The number of native plants and animals threatened by invasive pests was modelled against the expenditure, area, pest abundance, climate and location of 38 Board districts. There was a strong negative relationship between the number of threatened native species and Board expenditure. This relationship was interpreted to estimate the marginal cost of protecting a threatened native species, the downward shift in the supply curve necessary to protect all threatened native species, and the gains from the shift in the form of cost savings in the continued protection of non-threatened native species. These results value some of the costs that invasive animal pests impose on the environment.