Competitive nonlinear tariffs

This paper generalizes the study of nonlinear tariffs, i.e., those depending nonlinearly on the quantity purchased, to the case of a symmetric oligopoly. Competitive equilibria and the corresponding tariffs are analyzed in a Cournot framework. Various equilibria are obtained, which depend both upon the number of competing suppliers and the choice of market parameters used to characterize the competitors' strategies. Buyers are classified by type, each selecting an optimal consumption level in response to the prevailing tariff. The phenomena of buyer self-selection found in monopoly nonlinear pricing and the scaling of equilibrium demand elasticity found in Cournot models both appear in the results.     

An economic analysis of consumer class actions in regulated industries

Regulation and consumer class actions can complement, duplicate, or oppose each other, depending, among others, on the leanings of regulatory objective functions towards the industry or consumers. In particular, pro-consumer regulators would like to see consumers benefit from class actions while pro-industry regulators would like to prevent regulated firms from being harmed by them. However, because pro-consumer regulators are already doing their best for consumers and pro-industry regulators their best for firms, they are both usually constrained in their policies. The result is that class actions tend to be less efficient under pro-consumer regulators and more efficient under pro-industry regulators.      

Elasticity of Substitution and the Persistence of the Deviation of the Real Exchange Rates

Empirical evidence suggests (i) that the real exchange rates of developing economies show less persistence than do those of more advanced economies, and (ii) that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor tends to increase from below unity for less developed economies to above one for more advanced economies. This paper shows how the introduction of sectoral adjustment costs in a two‐sector model of a small open economy, together with CES production functions, provides a very natural explanation of this empirical regularity. Other aspects of the relationship between the technologies and the speed of convergence of the real exchange rate are also discussed.     

Depth of knowledge and the effect of higher order uncertainty

Summary A number of recent papers have highlighted the importance of uncertainty about others' information in models of asymmetric information. We introduce a notion that reflects the depth of knowledge in an information system. We show how the depth of knowledge can be used to bound the effect of higher order uncertainty in certain problems. We further provide bounds on the size of bubbles in finite horizon rational expectations models where the bounds depend on the depth of knowledge.We thank Dov Samet for pointing out an error in an earlier version.     

A market mechanism for electric power transmission

As competition is introduced into the electric power industry, access and pricing policy for transmission will play a pivotal role in shaping future market structure and performance. The externalities associated with the loop flow phenomenon in an electric power network constitute a significant barrier to the formation of efficient markets for electricity and transmission services. In this paper, we present a new approach to the design of an efficient market mechanism for transmission access that resolves these externalities. Under a trading rule that combines the Coasian and the Pigouvian principles to resolution of externalities, property rights are defined so that a competitive market could be established for transmission services and electricity to achieve a social optimum within a power pool. We characterize a dynamic trading process which is Lyapunov stable and always converges to a competitive equilibrium. Finally, we discuss some practical applicability and long-term investment issues.The authors are indebted to Charles Clark, Shmuel Oren, Pravin Varaiya, Robert Wilson, Felix Wu, and two referees for helpful comments and suggestions and particularly to William Hogan for many incisive comments and constructive suggestions. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of International Association of Energy Economists in Washington D.C., June 20, 1995, and at the Joint LBS/IFORS International Symposium on Energy Models for Policy and Planning in London on July 18–20, 1995. This paper does not represent the views of EPRI or its members. The authors remain solely responsible for the errors in this paper.     

Habit Formation, Catching Up with the Joneses, and Economic Growth

Our objective is to investigate how alternative assumptions about preferences affect the process of economic growth. To do this, we analyze a neoclassical growth model under three alternative preference specifications: (i) time separable, (ii) catching up with the Joneses, and (iii) habit formation. Departing from the time separable specification leads to important differences in the dynamic structure, the adjustment path followed by key economic variables, the correlation patterns implied by the time series generated by the model, and the speed of convergence to the new steady state. In the catching up with the Joneses economy the differences arise from a consumption externality, while in the habit formation economy the difference arises from the fact that agents not only smooth consumption but also its rate of change.     

Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities

We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the game has a unique strategy profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes a result of Carlsson and van Damme (Econometrica 61 (1993) 989-1018) for two-player, two-action games. The surviving profile, however, may depend on fine details of the structure of the noise. We provide sufficient conditions on payoffs for there to be noise-independent selection.     

CUTTING CARBON EMISSIONS AT A PROFIT (PART I): OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNITED STATES

This article identifies and corrects shortcomings in recent modeling studies on the economics of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the United States. The major assessments of the Kyoto Protocol—by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the Clinton White House Council of Economic Advisers, the U.S. Department of Energy Interlaboratory Working Group, and the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum—are found to be seriously incomplete. Each study omits one or several of four major cost-reducing policy options, resulting in cost estimates that are far too pessimistic.
In the present study, these shortcomings are overcome through the integrated evaluation of all major cost-cutting policy options within a coherent least-cost framework. Three domestic policies—a national carbon cap and permit trading program, productivity-enhancing market reforms and technology programs, and recycling of permit auction revenues into economically advantageous tax cuts—are combined with international emissions allowance trading.
This analysis shows that an integrated least-cost strategy for mitigating U.S. greenhouse gas emissions would produce an annual net output gain of roughly 0.4% of GDP in 2010 and about 0.9% of GDP in 2020. On a cumulative net present value basis, the United States would gain $250 billion by 2010 and $600 billion by 2020. International flexibility mechanisms (including emissions trading) are of only secondary significance in realizing these productivity, output, and welfare gains.     

Anti-insurance: Analysing the Health Insurance System in Australia

This paper develops a model to analyse the Australian health insurance system when individuals differ in their health risk and this risk is private information. In Australia private insurance both duplicates and supplements public insurance. We show that, absent any other interventions, this results in implicit transfers of wealth from those most at risk of adverse health to those least at risk. At the social level, these transfers represent a mean preserving spread of income, creating social risk and lowering welfare – what we call anti-insurance. The recently introduced rebate on private health insurance can improve welfare by alleviating anti-insurance.     

Consumption externalities, production externalities, and efficient capital accumulation under time non-separable preferences

The effects of consumption and production externalities on economic performance under time non-separable preferences are examined both theoretically and numerically. We show that a consumption externality alone has long-run distortionary effects if and only if labor is supplied elastically. With fixed labor supply, it has only transitional distortionary effects. Production externalities always generate long-run distortions, irrespective of labor supply. The optimal tax structure to correct for the distortions is characterized. We compare the implications of this model with those obtained when the consumption externality is contemporaneous. While some of the long-run effects are robust, there are also important qualitative and quantitative differences, particularly along transitional paths.