External Costs of Aquaculture Production in West Virginia

Temperate hill-lands of the U.S.A. such as those in West Virginia are areas from which increasing output of farm-raised fish may be possible. However, the downstream economic impacts of current and projected future effluent as a result of aquaculture production have not been extensively studied. Using an externality framework and a combination of primary and secondary data, this study determines pollution prevention costs (PPC), and downstream pollution damage costs resulting from fish farm wastewater effluent measured as willingness to pay (WTP) for restoring water quality. PPC is estimated at $0.11 per kg of trout produced (which would add 6% to private production cost), and WTP is estimated at $0.49 per kg of trout produced (representing 25% of private production cost) at current production and price levels. This study shows that installation of filtration units is a low-cost (less than 6% of total cost) and an effective technology for controlling pollution at the source. Internalizing external costs (adding this 6% to private production costs) is one strategy that could contribute to sustainable growth of the aquaculture industry.     

Dynamic panel data models: a guide to micro data methods and practice

This paper reviews econometric methods for dynamic panel data models, and presents examples that illustrate the use of these procedures. The focus is on panels where a large number of individuals or firms are observed for a small number of time periods, typical of applications with microeconomic data. The emphasis is on single equation models with autoregressive dynamics and explanatory variables that are not strictly exogenous, and hence on the Generalised Method of Moments estimators that are widely used in this context. Two examples using firm-level panels are discussed in detail: a simple autoregressive model for investment rates; and a basic production function.JEL Classification: C23This paper is prepared for a special issue of the Portuguese Economic Journal. My understanding of this subject has benefitted immeasurably from the input of colleagues, notably Manuel Arellano, Richard Blundell, Costas Meghir, Steve Nickell and Frank Windmeijer. I thank Joao Santos Silva, Frank Windmeijer and other participants at the Cemmap/ESRC Econometric Study Group workshop in London on 22 February 2002 for detailed comments on an earlier draft. Financial support from the ESRC Centre for the Microeconomic Analysis of Public Policy is gratefully acknowledged.     

Privatization of Water-Resource Development

This paper analyzes the inefficiencies from market power and return-flow externalities in private construction of a water project. The model pays special attention to increasing groundwater pumping costs, project set-up costs, limited project capacity, and return flow to the aquifer. For a given capacity, the return-flow externality causes project owners to construct the project too late when the price of groundwater is too high because the external benefit of return-flow to the aquifer is not captured. Market power exacerbates these effects since the project owner delays construction to accelerate groundwater overdraft. The return-flow externality and market power also decrease installed capacity and increase overdraft from the aquifer. Applying the model to the construction of the Central Arizona Project (CAP) for a given capacity, the estimated deadweight loss from hypothetical private construction of the project ($0.853 billion) is substantially less than the literature’s estimate of deadweight loss from actual construction by the Bureau of Reclamation ($2.603 billion). However, under the federal subsidies and insecure property rights that accompanied the CAP, private construction results in a larger estimated efficiency loss ($6.126 billion).     

The workings of a commodity money system in an incomplete information macro model

This paper compares the properties of a token money system with that of a commodity money system in an uncertain environment. In an incomplete information world, relative prices are not known with certainty. However, a commodity money system provides some information because the nominal price of the monetary commodity is known. The benefits of this information-enhancing function may be offset, though by distortions in relative prices relative to their full information Walrasian equilibrium values. Because the two systems have vastly different structural parameters, we cannot unambiguously state which system is welfare superior.     

Competitive nonlinear tariffs

This paper generalizes the study of nonlinear tariffs, i.e., those depending nonlinearly on the quantity purchased, to the case of a symmetric oligopoly. Competitive equilibria and the corresponding tariffs are analyzed in a Cournot framework. Various equilibria are obtained, which depend both upon the number of competing suppliers and the choice of market parameters used to characterize the competitors' strategies. Buyers are classified by type, each selecting an optimal consumption level in response to the prevailing tariff. The phenomena of buyer self-selection found in monopoly nonlinear pricing and the scaling of equilibrium demand elasticity found in Cournot models both appear in the results.     

An economic analysis of consumer class actions in regulated industries

Regulation and consumer class actions can complement, duplicate, or oppose each other, depending, among others, on the leanings of regulatory objective functions towards the industry or consumers. In particular, pro-consumer regulators would like to see consumers benefit from class actions while pro-industry regulators would like to prevent regulated firms from being harmed by them. However, because pro-consumer regulators are already doing their best for consumers and pro-industry regulators their best for firms, they are both usually constrained in their policies. The result is that class actions tend to be less efficient under pro-consumer regulators and more efficient under pro-industry regulators.      

Elasticity of Substitution and the Persistence of the Deviation of the Real Exchange Rates

Empirical evidence suggests (i) that the real exchange rates of developing economies show less persistence than do those of more advanced economies, and (ii) that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor tends to increase from below unity for less developed economies to above one for more advanced economies. This paper shows how the introduction of sectoral adjustment costs in a two‐sector model of a small open economy, together with CES production functions, provides a very natural explanation of this empirical regularity. Other aspects of the relationship between the technologies and the speed of convergence of the real exchange rate are also discussed.     

Depth of knowledge and the effect of higher order uncertainty

Summary A number of recent papers have highlighted the importance of uncertainty about others' information in models of asymmetric information. We introduce a notion that reflects the depth of knowledge in an information system. We show how the depth of knowledge can be used to bound the effect of higher order uncertainty in certain problems. We further provide bounds on the size of bubbles in finite horizon rational expectations models where the bounds depend on the depth of knowledge.We thank Dov Samet for pointing out an error in an earlier version.     

A market mechanism for electric power transmission

As competition is introduced into the electric power industry, access and pricing policy for transmission will play a pivotal role in shaping future market structure and performance. The externalities associated with the loop flow phenomenon in an electric power network constitute a significant barrier to the formation of efficient markets for electricity and transmission services. In this paper, we present a new approach to the design of an efficient market mechanism for transmission access that resolves these externalities. Under a trading rule that combines the Coasian and the Pigouvian principles to resolution of externalities, property rights are defined so that a competitive market could be established for transmission services and electricity to achieve a social optimum within a power pool. We characterize a dynamic trading process which is Lyapunov stable and always converges to a competitive equilibrium. Finally, we discuss some practical applicability and long-term investment issues.The authors are indebted to Charles Clark, Shmuel Oren, Pravin Varaiya, Robert Wilson, Felix Wu, and two referees for helpful comments and suggestions and particularly to William Hogan for many incisive comments and constructive suggestions. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of International Association of Energy Economists in Washington D.C., June 20, 1995, and at the Joint LBS/IFORS International Symposium on Energy Models for Policy and Planning in London on July 18–20, 1995. This paper does not represent the views of EPRI or its members. The authors remain solely responsible for the errors in this paper.