Your employment brand: is it working for or against you?

The ability to attract and retain hard-to-find professionals is vitally connected to the perceptions of your organization both internally and externally. Many organizations confuse their employment brand with branding and all too often put considerable effort and often scarce resources against ineffective initiatives. Most health care organizations do not consistently allocate the necessary resources needed to build and sustain a strong employer brand. The relationship between employers and employees to and among each other and the values you strive for collectively are the cornerstones of your employment brand. It is imperative for nurse leaders to create and sustain an environment where employees are inherently positive and connected to their organization.     

The Impact of Land-Use Change on Ecosystem Services,Biodiversity and Returns to Landowners: A Case Study in the State of Minnesota

Land-use change has a significant impact on the world’s ecosystems. Changes in the extent and composition of forests, grasslands, wetlands and other ecosystems have large impacts on the provision of ecosystem services, biodiversity conservation and returns to landowners. While the change in private returns to landowners due to land-use change can often be measured, changes in the supply and value of ecosystem services and the provision of biodiversity conservation have been harder to quantify. In this paper we use a spatially explicit integrated modeling tool (InVEST) to quantify the changes in ecosystem services, habitat for biodiversity, and returns to landowners from land-use change in Minnesota from 1992 to 2001. We evaluate the impact of actual land-use change and a suite of alternative land-use change scenarios. We find a lack of concordance in the ranking of baseline and alternative land-use scenarios in terms of generation of private returns to landowners and net social benefits (private returns plus ecosystem service value). Returns to landowners are highest in a scenario with large-scale agricultural expansion. This scenario, however, generated the lowest net social benefits across all scenarios considered because of large losses in stored carbon and negative impacts on water quality. Further, this scenario resulted in the largest decline in habitat quality for general terrestrial biodiversity and forest songbirds. Our results illustrate the importance of taking ecosystem services into account in land-use and land-management decision-making and linking such decisions to incentives that accurately reflect social returns.     

The patterns of induced diffusion: Evidence from the international diffusion of wind energy

Recent years have seen growing academic interest in the concept of induced diffusion as efforts to address concerns about energy security and climate change have intensified. Research on induced diffusion explores whether policy tools or interventions can incentivise the diffusion of innovations. This body of literature has explored the effectiveness and efficiency of various policy interventions and as such has been mainly concerned with the determinants of diffusion. This paper is, by way of contrast, concerned with the patterns of diffusion when diffusion is induced. Drawing on the Bass and Davies models of innovation diffusion we develop a number of propositions that suggest that the patterns of diffusion are different when policy plays a role in the diffusion process. These propositions are then econometrically tested in the context of the international diffusion of wind energy in 25 OECD countries. We find that, as predicted, without effective and strong policy interventions, countries will have conventional logistic diffusion with very similar speeds of diffusion. However, as expected the patterns of diffusion take on a different functional form (Bass curve) when there is a strong policy inducement. We conclude by discussing the implications and limitations of these results and suggesting avenues for further research.     

When do incentives work in channels of distribution?

The incentive dilemma refers to a situation in which incentives are offered but do not work as intended. The authors suggest that, in an interorganizational context, whether a principal-provided incentive works is a function of how it is evaluated by an agent: for its contribution to the agent’s bottom line (instrumental evaluation) and for the extent it is strategically aligned with the agent’s direction (congruence evaluation). To further understand when incentives work, the influence of two key contextual variables—industry volatility and dependence—are examined. A field study featuring 57 semi-structured depth interviews and 386 responses from twin surveys in the information technology and brewing industries provide data for hypothesis testing. When and whether incentives work is demonstrated by certain conditions under which the agent’s evaluation of an incentive has positive or negative effects on its compliance and active representation. Further, some outcomes are reversed in the high volatility condition.     

Market power in input purchase and trade

Market power in the input purchase is becoming increasingly common because of growing consolidation and mergers and also due to multinational firms establishing a stronghold in buying inputs in the developing countries. In this study, we formulate a general equilibrium model consisting of a competitive sector and an oligopsony sector which exercises market power over inputs. Our results indicate that if the oligopsony sector incurs a higher marginal factor cost for the intensive factor, basic results of the standard two-sector model continue to hold. But if the marginal factor cost is higher for the non-intensive factor, then factor intensities in the physical and value sense differ and traditional trade propositions such as the Stolper–Samuelson theorem do not hold.     

Do the world’s largest cities follow Zipf’s and Gibrat’s laws?

We examine whether the size distribution and the growth process of the world’s largest cities follow Zipf’s law and Gibrat’s law. The parametric results of the size distribution analysis reject Zipf’s law for all sample sizes and also show the Zipf exponent systematically declines as the sample size increases. The growth process analysis confirms Gibrat’s law and yields a local Zipf exponent of one for cities with a normalized population less than 0.53%, which includes about 95% of the total observations. The deviations from Zipf’s law occur at the extreme upper tail and are likely a result of restricted mobility of population across countries. However, given that Gibrat’s law holds, we can expect the size distribution to converge to Zipf’s law with a decline in the barriers to immigration.     

Do Piketty and Saez Misstate Income Inequality? Critiquing the Critiques

A large body of literature points to sharply growing income inequality over the past half century. The Piketty and Saez dataset that measures income distribution provides empirical support for this claim. Our article evaluates three prominent criticisms of this dataset as well as the responses of Piketty and Saez to these criticisms. One key argument against using their dataset is that Piketty and Saez do not control for income shifting by top income earners in response to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) and thus overstate income inequality. In evaluating this criticism we find that a segment of their dataset likely understates income inequality; this is just the opposite of what critics assert. This implies that the Piketty–Saez dataset is a valuable resource for income inequality research and that scholars can use it to build more refined, accurate and insightful measures of income inequality.     

Costs and effectiveness of fingolimod versus alemtuzumab in the treatment of highly active relapsing-remitting multiple sclerosis in the UK: re-treatment,discount, and disutility

Objective: Patients with relapsing-remitting multiple sclerosis (RRMS) treated with disease modifying therapies (DMTs) who continue to experience disease activity may be considered for escalation therapies such as fingolimod, or may be considered for alemtuzumab. Previous economic modeling used Markov models; applying one alternative technique, discrete event simulation (DES) modeling, allows re-treatment and long-term adverse events (AEs) to be included in the analysis.

Methods: A DES was adapted to model relapse-triggered re-treatment with alemtuzumab and the effect of including ongoing quality-adjusted life year (QALY) decrements for AEs that extend beyond previous 1-year Markov cycles. As the price to the NHS of fingolimod in the UK is unknown, due to a confidential patient access scheme (PAS), a variety of possible discounts were tested. The interaction of re-treatment assumptions for alemtuzumab with the possible discounts for fingolimod was tested to determine which DMT resulted in lower lifetime costs. The lifetime QALY results were derived from modeled treatment effect and short- and long-term AEs.

Results: Most permutations of fingolimod PAS discount and alemtuzumab re-treatment rate resulted in fingolimod being less costly than alemtuzumab. As the percentage of patients who are re-treated with alemtuzumab due to experiencing a relapse approaches 100% of those who relapse whilst on treatment, the discount required for fingolimod to be less costly drops below 5%. Consideration of treatment effect alone found alemtuzumab generated 0.2 more QALYs/patient; the inclusion of AEs up to a duration of 1 year reduced this advantage to only 0.14 QALYs/patient. Modeling AEs with a lifetime QALY decrement found that both DMTs generated very similar QALYs with the difference only 0.04 QALYs/patient.

Conclusions: When the model captured alemtuzumab re-treatment and long-term AE decrements, it was found that fingolimod is cost-effective compared to alemtuzumab, assuming application of only a modest level of confidential PAS discount.     

Poor institutions as a comparative advantage

Classic theories of comparative advantage point to factor productivity and factor abundance as determinants of specialization and trade. Likewise, geography and topography can determine trade patterns. Institutions, however, are increasingly seen as important sources of comparative advantage. A global drug prohibition regime implies that institutional quality matters more than traditional sources in the drug trade. This paper theoretically models trade patterns of illicit goods and confirms the role of institutions empirically with respect to the drug trade. In particular, illicit enterprises gain force in countries where resources are scarce, drug enforcement is uncertain, and institutions are weak in absolute terms and relative to neighboring countries. I propose several policy alternatives that emphasize economic opportunity for the poor and institutional quality that complement drug prohibition.