A theory of persistent income inequality

This paper explores the dynamics of income inequality by studying the evolution of human capital investment and neighborhood choice for a population of families. Parents affect the conditional probability distribution of their children's income through the choice of a neighborhood in which to live. Neighborhood location affects children both through local public finance of education as well as through sociological effects. These forces combine to create incentives for wealthier families to segregate themselves into economically homogeneous neighborhoods. Economic stratification combines with strong neighborhoodwide feedback effects to transmit economic status across generations, leading to persistent income inequality.     

A quantitative approach to stakeholder interests

In an age when the role, behaviour and performance of the firm are under greater scrutiny than ever before, it is important to pursue quantitative empirical research in the area of social auditing. Using data relating to one particular company, the various inputs and outputs attributable to the firm's different stakeholders, (shareholders, employees, consumers and the community) are examined and corresponding rates of return calculated. Considerable methodological and data problems arise and consequently the results need careful interpretation.     

Revenue Sharing with Heterogeneous Investments in Sports Leagues: Share Media,Not Stadiums

This study examines revenue sharing in sports leagues where franchises engage in multiple types of investments. Previous literature typically treats revenues and investments as homogeneous, but we add to the literature by differentiating between investment types and revenue sources. This is important because investment in talent leads to winning, which is a zero-sum game for the league and therefore owners have an incentive to limit talent investment. However, other investments, such as stadiums, are not a zero-sum game, and therefore the implications of revenue sharing are different for the league. We provide sufficient conditions under which it is more efficient to share media revenue compared to stadium revenue. We conclude by providing applications of this model.     

The effect of political visibility on audit effort and audit pricing

This study examines whether auditors adjust their effort and pricing decisions for political visibility. We argue, from the behavioural literature, that political visibility will create the need for more justification by auditors. Using data on actual audit fees, hours and billing rates for a sample of New Zealand public sector companies, we find that total audit fees are positively related to the number of press mentions (our proxy for political visibility). Consistent with our expectations we find that audit fees are monotonically related to audit fees. We also find that auditors increase the hours spent on the audit but not billing rates, which further suggests defensive bolstering by auditors.     

Why Do the Swiss Rent?

At less than 34%, Switzerland has the lowest home ownership rate in Western Europe. This may seem odd given the economic strength of the country. We use household survey data for five Swiss cantons to explore some possible reasons for this. We estimate a tenure choice equation that allows us to analyze the impacts of a number of key variables on the ownership rate. We pay particular attention to the relative cost of owning and renting, which is a function of house prices, rents, and the user cost of owning. The latter is a function of income tax policy and expected house price inflation, among other things. We also measure mortgage underwriting criteria and consider rent control and other policies affecting rental housing. By simulating a number of hypothetical changes to taxation and other policies, underwriting criteria, and price levels, we assess the importance of these variables in explaining the ownership rate. We conclude that high house prices—relative to household incomes and wealth—and the tax on imputed rent are the most important causes of Switzerland’s low ownership rate.     

Ownership structure and hospital service costs and fees: A decomposition approach

This paper analyzes hospital characteristics that are associated with higher average costs and charges for venipuncture, computed tomography procedures (computerized axial tomography [CAT] scans), and electrocardiograms (EKG). Using data from a Medicare database, our results indicate that higher wages, larger hospital sizes, and greater service quality are associated with higher procedure costs, whereas system membership is generally associated with lower procedure costs. Blinder‐type decompositions, which are the main focus of this study, suggest (a) that venipuncture costs are about 17% to 19% lower at proprietary hospitals than at nonprofit or government hospitals, (b) CAT scan costs are about 6% to 12% lower at nonprofit hospitals than at proprietary and government hospitals, and (c) that EKG costs are about 3% lower at proprietary hospitals than at nonprofit or government hospitals. Lastly, large portions of each of these differences are found to be due to both differences in mean values of the hospitals' characteristics by ownership type and differences in the mechanism by which the hospitals' characteristics are transmitted to procedure costs.     

Experienced and Novice Investors: Does Environmental Information Influence Investment Allocation Decisions?

Economic Value Added (EVA) is a performance measure that is being used by an increasing number of companies, but academic research on EVA is limited. In addition, all prior empirical academic studies on EVA have used the firm as the unit of analysis. In this study, we examine the effect of EVA on the performance of individual managers. Specifically, we examine whether managers on EVA-based bonus plans outperform managers on traditional accounting-based bonus plans. We are able to test this because we have access to an EVA-focused company that has managers on both EVA and traditional bonus plans. Our results suggest that managers on EVA bonus plans who understand the EVA concept perform better than managers on traditional bonus plans. However, we find some evidence that the increase in performance results from increased consistency or congruence in the manager's evaluation–reward process rather than from superiority of EVA as a performance measure. Also, we find that the effect of EVA bonuses and EVA understanding differs depending on the area of the firm in which the manager is employed. This suggests that EVA may not be a universally appropriate base for reward systems. *Mohan Lal passed away 24 July 2002. This paper is dedicated to him.