Financialisation and Rising Shareholder Power in Kaleckian/Post-Kaleckian Models of Distribution and Growth

We establish the link between rising shareholder power on the firm level, increasing pressure on labour, and redistribution at the expense of wages, with the macroeconomic effects on capacity utilisation, profits and capital accumulation. Three channels of transmission of ‘financialisation’ and increasing shareholder power, the ‘preference channel’, the ‘finance channel’ and the ‘distribution channel’, are introduced into two different variants of the Kaleckian distribution and growth model, the Kaleckian model and the Post-Kaleckian model. Within these models, three potential regimes of accumulation are derived, the ‘contractive’ regime, the ‘profits without investment’ regime, and the ‘finance-led growth’ regime. Only the ‘profits without investment’ regime generates a strict micro-macro identity, whereas the other two regimes are characterised by fallacies of composition, a ‘paradox of accumulation’ in the ‘finance-led growth’ regime and a ‘paradox of profits’ in the ‘contractive’ regime.     

Fiscal deficits,monetary reform and inflation stabilization in romania

Developing countries have witnessed an increase in foreign bank participation during the last decade. Using bank level data for the period 1991–2001, we examine the influence of foreign banks on the financing of small firms in Tanzania. Despite dominating the banking sector, results suggest that the financing of small firms by foreign banks is insignificant compared to domestic banks. Clearly, there is a need for a new approach to policy that will encourage significant foreign bank lending to small firms.     

Willingness and ability of Bulgarian consumers to pay for improved public health care services

An application of the contingent valuation method to the willingness and ability of Bulgarian consumers to pay for public health care services is presented. The study uses data from a household survey conducted in May–June 2000. The willingness and ability to pay for outpatient, inpatient and dental services is investigated. A combination of interval checklist and open-ended questions are used to elicit the willingness-to-pay amounts. The impact of the sociodemographic characteristics on the responses is examined by a generalized Tobit regression. Based on the regression equation, the welfare effects of various fee levels are simulated.     

Optimal surveillance against foot‐and‐mouth disease: the case of bulk milk testing in Australia

Previous foot‐and‐mouth disease (FMD) outbreaks and simulation‐based analyses suggest substantial payoffs from detecting an incursion early. However, no economic measures for early detection have been analysed in an optimising framework. We investigate the use of bulk milk testing (BMT) for active surveillance against an FMD incursion in Australia. We find that BMT can be justified, but only when the FMD entry probability is sufficiently high or the cost of BMT is low. However, BMT is well suited for post‐outbreak surveillance, to shorten the length of time and size of an epidemic and to facilitate an earlier return to market.     

Estimating the costs and benefits of soil conservation in Europe

Economics is about problems of choice. In erosion control, both public authorities and private land users are faced with such problems. What is the impact of erosion, both on-site and off-site, and to what extent can this impact be quantified? If we conceptualize this impact in terms of sustainability, how can we compare one type of effect against another? The former question can be answered only by natural scientists, the latter by economists and other social scientists. Weighing different aspects of sustainability requires value judgments, and economists are sometimes accused of having a jaundiced view of reality, wrongly supposing that decisions are based on rationality and denying the importance of emotion.However, let us assume that there is some mileage to be gained out of attempting to estimate the cost of erosion in an economic sense—which consists of converting the various effects into a common denominator: euros. If we can predict the impact of erosion control measures on erosion rates, we can know the benefit of these measures. The cost also needs to be calculated, not in terms of money but in terms of resources expended (which could have been used for other purposes) and in terms of possible negative impacts of erosion control (for instance, increased use of herbicides in reduced-tillage systems).There are important other considerations which economists may study. Firstly, there is the comparison of present versus future costs and benefits: how much can we sacrifice today for higher sustainability tomorrow?Secondly, there is the issue of private versus public costs and benefits: how do the goals of private land users differ from (those of?) the public good, how can this help us to predict land users’ behaviour, and what incentives would be appropriate to make them behave in such a way as to maximize the public good? Thirdly, how do we deal with uncertainty and risk?These problems loomed large in a study to support an extended impact assessment for the EU Soil Thematic Strategy, in 2005. Whereas much research has been done on erosion and its impact, much of this is on a small scale. The extent of the problem on a national, let alone a continental or a global scale, is still poorly known. The paper discusses how these problems were faced, which is not the same as saying they were resolved.     

How much does household collateral constrain regional risk sharing?

We construct a new data set of consumption and income data for the largest US metropolitan areas, and we show that the extent of risk-sharing between regions varies substantially over time. In times when US housing collateral is scarce nationally, regional consumption is about twice as sensitive to income shocks. We also document higher sensitivity in regions with lower housing collateral. Household-level borrowing frictions can explain this new stylized fact. When the value of housing relative to human wealth falls, loan collateral shrinks, borrowing (risk-sharing) declines, and the sensitivity of consumption to income increases. Our model aggregates heterogeneous, borrowing-constrained households into regions characterized by a common housing market. The resulting regional consumption patterns quantitatively match those in the data.     

General versus Product-Specific Life Style Segmentations

Given a segmentation problem, marketers may be forced to consider the benefits of both general and product-specific life style segmentations. This study therefore explores the procedures and refinements associated with each approach and offers overall conclusions as to each one's efficacy.     

Can fat taxes and package size restrictions stimulate healthy food choices?

Consumers prefer bonus packs, as opposed to price discounts, for healthy foods, but they want a price discount rather than a bonus pack for indulgent foods (Mishra & Mishra, 2011). This study conceptually replicates and extends this finding to show that consumers are more responsive to changes in price than to changes in package size for indulgent food options, whereas they are more responsive to changes in package size than to changes in price for healthy food options.     

Partisanship and the effectiveness of oversight

We examine the welfare effects of partisanship in a model of checks and balances. An executive makes a policy proposal and an overseer then decides whether or not to veto the executive's proposal. Both the executive and the overseer have private information as to the correct policy to pursue, and both are motivated by the desire to appear competent. A partisan overseer is one who, in addition to seeking to promote her own reputation, cares how her decision will impact the executive's reputation. Our main result is that partisanship can improve the efficacy of an oversight regime, as the distortions caused by a partisan overseer's desire to affect the executive's reputation can offset the distortions caused by her desire to enhance her own. Our results provide a new rationale for divided government, as partisan considerations are often necessary to prevent the overseer from rubber stamping all executive proposals.