Meaning transfer in celebrity endorsements: an explanation using metaphors

The concept of meaning transfer is relevant in the context of celebrity endorsements but rarely tested because of its complexity. This study integrates the basic tenets of meaning transfer model in celebrity endorsements and metaphor theory in marketing. The study builds on the literature on the various streams in celebrity endorsements and notes the contradictions in each. Thereby, it presents a conceptual model of meaning transfer using metaphors as the explaining thread. The model is validated using empirical data collected through a metaphor elicitation method. Based on the results, four propositions are developed related to celebrity metaphors and metaphor transfer in celebrity endorsements. The findings suggest that celebrity meaning(s) could be explained through metaphors and the metaphors may be transferred to a brand from a celebrity endorser via an endorsement. The propositions developed in the study have important implications for researchers and practitioners in celebrity endorsement.     

Organizational adaptation in an economic shock: The role of growth reconfiguration

Studies suggest that firms navigating an economic shock can adapt and improve performance by targeting perceived growth opportunities. A puzzle, however, is that an economic shock increases environmental uncertainty and therefore the risk associated with growth reconfiguration. This study finds that growth reduced performance and increased the risk of firm failure during the Asian economic shock of 1997. Growing firms differed in the extent to which they were able to mitigate the constraints imposed by the shock. However, the presence of developed external institutions played a more systematic role in their adaptation than did organizational resources represented by financial slack or product diversification. The deliberate attempt to reconfigure augmented the adverse effect of the economic shock on firm performance and survival. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An exploratory study on the impact of pro-market reforms on the Indian corporate sector

Pro-market reforms were expected to increase competition, improve efficiency and reduce agency costs by improving the institutional environment in emerging markets. In an attempt to establish the macro–micro linkages of these goals, this paper aims to analyse the impact of reforms on the performance of firms belonging to different ownership categories. We find that while state owned enterprises have shown signs of convergence, the performance of other domestic firms has stagnated. Meanwhile multinational subsidiaries have shown consistently better performance, raising questions on the motive and direction of reforms. We end by discussing the policy implications and avenues for future research.     

Cross-border mergers and market concentration in a vertically related industry: theory and evidence

We present a tractable model of oligopoly to identify the linkages between local competition and cross-border mergers in a vertically related industry. We show that the incentives for cross-border mergers rise with vertical integration in an industry when the premerger concentration in that industry is sufficiently high relative to the concentration in the same industry in a foreign country. We also show that the incentives for a merger between a foreign firm and a vertically integrated home firm will be higher than that for a merger between a foreign firm and a disintegrated home firm, when the premerger concentration at home is low relative to the premerger concentration in the foreign country. We then analyze a firm-level panel of 90,614 M&A observations, between 1990 and 2012, from 86 countries. Logistic regressions confirm that market concentration is an important determinant of cross-border M&A. Our results support the conjectures of our theoretical model and are consistent with recent empirical findings and theoretical predictions.     

Privatization and Strategic Mergers across Borders

We present a theoretical model to capture the role of privatization in the incentives for and implications of cross‐border horizontal mergers. Absent any merger incentives in an autarkic equilibrium, we show that a decrease in the degree of privatization will lower the incentives for diversification of international production. The incentives for diversification for any given degree of privatization will fall when the private and public firms are allowed to move sequentially rather than simultaneously. The presence of the public firm also introduces a new source of asymmetry in the incentives for cross‐border mergers: a reduction in the degree of privatization at home will dampen the potential gains from a take‐over of a home firm by a foreign firm but magnify the potential gains from a take‐over of a foreign firm by a home firm.     

A public firm in a model of spatial duopoly with price discrimination

We visit the role of privatization in the location decision of firms in an industry where no firm can produce all varieties demanded. We demonstrate that the Nash equilibrium locations are socially optimal, in the presence of a publicly owned firm, notwithstanding the degree of privatization.     

Import competition,employment and wage in US manufacturing: new evidence from multivariate panel cointegration analysis

This paper examines whether employment and wages in the US manufacturing sector exhibit any long-run relationship with import competition. The results based on a multivariate panel cointegration analysis of observations on 12 two-digit SIC manufacturing industries over the period from the third quarter of 1982 to the fourth quarter of 1992 indicate that US manufacturing employment does not bear a long-run relationship with import competition but manufacturing wage does. While the long-run correlation between import price and manufacturing wage is found to be sector sensitive panel estimation reveals a highly significant negative correlation between import price and manufacturing wage.     

COLLUSIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN COURNOT OLIGOPOLIES WITH UNKNOWN COSTS*

The article studies collusive equilibria in an infinitely repeated Cournot oligopoly with unknown costs. I look at collusive pooled Perfect Bayesian equilibria and separating equilibria either with signaling or with communication. In the separating equilibria with signaling the firms play the strictly separating Bayesian Nash equilibrium in period 1 and produce the optimal incentive compatible collusive quantity vector from period 2 onwards. In the separating equilibrium with communication the optimal incentive compatible quantity vector is produced from period 1 onwards. Among these, the optimal separating equilibrium with communication gives the highest expected discounted joint profits.     

Real exchange rates and real interest rates once again: a multivariate panel cointegration analysis

This paper employs multivariate panel cointegration techniques to re-examine the empirical relationship between bilateral real exchange rates and real interest rates. The results from a panel of 1470 quarterly observations on Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, and USA over the period 1977 to 1994 indicate the absence of any long-run relationship between the two variables.     

Equilibrium in behavior strategies in infinite extensive form games with imperfect information

Summary We prove the existence of equilibrium in behavior strategies for extensive form games when the game has infinite actions. The result is derived under the assumption that the behavior strategies satisfy the bounded measurability condition. The condition implies that the behavior strategies are restricted to those which can be viewed as continuous functions from the set of initial histories to the space of probability distributions over action spaces which satisfy the Lipschitz bound.I am grateful for the helpful comments of an anonymous referee.