Relative Affluence and Child Labor—Explaining a Paradox

Some micro level empirical studies found child labor incidence increasing even with improvement in the economic conditions of the poor. This paper provides a possible explanation as to why increase in absolute income may not be sufficient to solve the problem of child labor. We argue that people in general are not just concerned about their own consumption; they are very much affected by the consumption of their peers. While taking decisions regarding the time allocation of their children between work and leisure, parents do keep an eye on their relative position in the society. We develop a theoretical model of household decision making to show that child labor supply from a poor family can increase even with improvements in its economic conditions, if the family's relative position in the society deteriorates and if the relative status effect is sufficiently strong.     

Competitive General Equilibrium with Finite Change and Theory of Policy Making

We visit the non‐equivalence of tariff and quota in higher dimensional finite change trade models when goods outnumber factors of production. Under competitive conditions, exogenous shocks (e.g., exposure to international trade) support the production of only a subset of commodities. If we try to protect some of the vanishing goods, tariff and quota will have different results when a tariff turns out to be a more restrictive policy than a quota, contrary to the conventional wisdom.     

International oligopoly,barriers to outsourcing and domestic employment

In this paper we analyze the impact of barriers to outsourcing on domestic employment in an oligopolistic context. We show that although an outsourcing tax makes domestic labour cheaper, its employment effect is ambiguous due to strategic considerations. Analyzing international policy interdependence, we also show that, although a unilateral tax (subsidy) by a country must raise its domestic employment, this may be counterproductive in a Nash policy equilibrium. Finally, both a credit crisis and increased product differentiation tend to worsen the employment effects of an outsourcing tax. Our central findings are robust to both Bertrand and Cournot modes of competition.     

International Trade,Migration and Unemployment – The Role of Informal Sector

This paper provides an elaborate general equilibrium framework by including informal economic activities in a model of trade, migration and unemployment. Existence of informal activities is critical in generating positive employment effects of liberal trade policies. Following a tariff cut informal wage increases and rate of unemployment goes down under reasonable conditions. Next we generalize the benchmark model to capture the phenomenon of sequential migration: from agriculture to urban informal sector, and then to urban formal sector. Positive employment effect of reformatory trade policy partly owes to the fact that the presence of informal sector directly reduces the cost of migration and, hence, further induces the process of outmigration from agricultural sector. The paper also extends the benchmark model to include both informal intermediate and final good.     

Technology adoption and LDC firms

In a duopoly framework we show that among the set of firms competing with the technology leader, both relatively advanced and relatively backward firms will not be likely adopters of the superior technology. Instead, the firms in the “middle” will invest for adopting the superior technology. This particularly characterizes the innovation characteristic of LDC markets where backward firms exist along with technology super-powers.     

Decentralized Policymaking in a Long‐run Growth Model with Seigniorage and Taxes

The paper introduces decentralized policymaking into a game‐theoretic model with output growth through capital accumulation, and in which the determination of taxes, seigniorage and the long‐run growth rate of the economy reflects the strategic interactions between the government, the central bank and the private sector. The paper investigates, among other things, the impact on the long‐run growth rate of a higher degree of inflation aversion of the central bank and a higher degree of inefficiency in the tax system.     

Unskilled immigration,technical progress,and wages—Role of the household sector

This paper revisits the relationship between unskilled immigration and skilled wage in the context of the BREXIT episode. Our simple general equilibrium model introduces a household sector, the inclusion of which shows that both return to capital and effective skilled wage may increase with a greater inflow of immigrants. This is a novel outcome in the theory of trade and factor flows. In addition, though technical progress in a skill‐intensive sector raises wage inequality, it no longer displaces traditional jobs. Here, the usual negative impact of unskilled immigration on the traditional sector is mitigated by increased returns to the unskilled workers.     

SEEKING RENT IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR

Rent seeking within the vast informal segment of the developing world is a relatively under‐explored topic in the interface of labor market policies and public economics. Moreover, how rent seeking and corruption within the informal segment gets affected by economic reforms targeted for the formal sector is rarely discussed in the literature. This paper fills the gap. We identify conditions under which economic reform in the formal segment will increase the rate of corruption or rent seeking in the informal sector and raise the pay‐off for those involved in rent‐seeking activities. When the formal sector contracts due to reforms, rent seeking in the informal sector may increase and lower the level of welfare unconditionally. Economic reforms may increase corruption instead of reducing it, unlike standard conjectures.     

Bilateral Agreements in a MultiFirm Industry: Technology Transfer and Horizontal Merger

The paper studies the profitability of technology transfer and horizontal merger between two asymmetric firms in a multifirm Cournot oligopoly. If there is only one technologically advanced firm and one or many technologically backward firm(s), a profitable technology deal between two asymmetric firms exists if and only if the collaborating firms are "close" in terms of their initial technology levels. With more than one advanced firm such a technology deal is "always" profitable. Contrary to that, a profitable bilateral horizontal merger occurs if and only if the gap of technologies between the two partners is larger than a critical level. The paper also studies the relative profitability of these two bilateral arrangements.