Urban informal sector and poverty

Many studies have explored the connection between trade and poverty theoretically and empirically for the developing world. We offer another look at the possible implications of trade liberalization on urban poverty by using the urban informal sector as a catalyst. The theory shows that trade liberalization in the import competing sector raises informal wage across occupational types, and expands production and employment in the informal industrial segment. Further, using Indian provincial data on wage, capital stock and value added in the informal sector we show that real informal wage increased with trade reform and transmitted favorable impact on urban poverty reduction.     

Reform,informal sector,and extortion

Informal economy involving unrecorded, unregistered, extra‐legal activities employs majority of the work force in the developing world. Such extra‐legal existence of informal production is facilitated through extortion by agents of political forces in power. Also, extortion activities themselves constitute an informal segment. Full‐scale general equilibrium consequences of such institutions are rarely discussed in the literature. We develop a well‐specified general equilibrium model to explore the possible consequences of reform. Economic reform may have an expansionary effect on the number of extortionists. Depending on capital mobility and factor intensity assumptions informal output and informal wage may increase.     

Growth with time zone differences

We propose a two-country growth model of intermediate business-services trade that captures the role of time zone differences. It is shown that a time-saving improvement in intermediate business-services trade involving production in different time zones can have a permanent impact on productivity.     

Emigration,Finite Changes and Wage Inequality

This article shows that large outmigration of labor leads to finite changes in the structure of production at source. We argue that sectors may vanish as they cannot pay higher wages consequent to emigration. We also inquire whether emigration of one type of labor hurts the other non‐emigrating type in this setup. Various situations when real incomes of the emigrating and the non‐emigrating types do not move together are demonstrated. This generalizes some of the existing results in the literature. In particular, emigration can lead to a drastic change in the degree of inequality depending on which of the sectors survive in the postemigration regime.     

Technology Collaboration and Foreign Equity Participation: A Theoretical Analysis

Technology transfer to the developing nations has been predominantly characterized by technology collaborations between the multinationals and the local firms of these developing countries. When a multinational offers a new technology to a local firm, the firms may have different perceptions regarding the success rate of the technology in the local conditions. This paper discusses various types of contractual arrangements with equity participation by the multinational, which dominate pure technology collaboration agreements.     

PUBLIC INVESTMENT,TAXATION AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY

A low‐wage developing economy (South) is interested in accessing and attracting superior technology from a high‐wage developed economy (North) with firms having heterogeneous quality of technology. To improve upon the initial market equilibrium, which shows that relatively inefficient technologies will move to the South, the host government invests in infrastructure financed through taxing the foreign firms. We discuss the problem of existence of such a tax‐transfer mechanism within a balanced budget framework. We argue that such a policy can increase tax revenue as well as instigate the transfer of better quality technology. It turns out that this policy is more likely to be successful when the production concerns high‐value, high‐price products in low‐wage economies. Our results improve upon the conventional strategy of a tax break.     

Resolving the Credibility Problem of an Honest Government: A Case for Foreign Investment Subsidy

We develop a simple model of direct foreign investment where the host country government cannot credibly signal its honest intention such as to stick to the contracted tax rate. The foreign firm has some prior belief regarding the ex post discretionary policies of the local government. Since the investment is completely irreversible, such a belief pattern might not induce the firm to invest in a country which badly needs it. It is shown that the host government can design a subsidy scheme which might attract foreign investment by removing the credibility problem.     

Debt, Growth and Budgetary Regimes

Within the Barro (1990) model of productive public services, but with the inclusion of public debt, we derive and characterize on the balanced growth path, a set of welfare‐maximizing fiscal rules under two budgetary regimes – one with only the standard dynamic government budget constraint, and the other involving the golden rule of public finance. We demonstrate analytically that the optimal fiscal policy differs in the two budgetary regimes considered. We also analyse two cases within the second regime: one, where the ratio of current spending to tax revenues is parametrically given, and another, where this ratio is optimally chosen by the government.     

Do loan loss reserves behave like capital? Evidence from recent bank failures

Regulatory capital guidelines allow for loan loss reserves to be added back as capital. Our evidence suggests that the influence of loan loss reserves added back as regulatory capital (hereafter referred to as “add-backs”) on bank risk cannot be explained by either economic principles underlying the notion of capital or accounting principles underlying the recording of reserves. Specifically, we observe that, in sharp contrast to the economic notion of capital as a buffer against bank failure risk, add-backs are positively associated with the risk of bank failure during the recent economic crisis. Furthermore, the positive association of add-backs with bank failure risk is concentrated among cases in which the add-backs are highly likely to increase a bank’s total regulatory capital. The evidence cannot thus be fully explained by accounting principles either, since the role of loan loss reserves according to those principles does not depend on whether the reserves generate a regulatory capital increase. Additional analysis suggests that the observed influence of loan loss reserves on bank failure risk may be an unintended consequence of their regulatory treatment as capital.