Corruption and wage inequality?

Does corruption aggravate wage-inequality? We try to answer this question in terms of a general equilibrium model where both skilled and unskilled workers participate in corruption. Corruption in our model diverts resources from the productive sectors. Factor intensities within the productive sectors and between production and corruption activities determine the wage impact of corruption. Lower degree of corruption may increase wage-inequality although the size of the corruption sector definitely contracts.     

Trade Reform and Informal Wages

When trade reform contracts protected formal sectors in developing countries and the formal workers move to the informal sector for employment, does that reduce informal wages? Using a 2 × 2 Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson (HOS) structure with formal–informal production organization for the same commodity, we show that a tariff cut in the import‐competing sector increases both informal wage and employment under very reasonable assumptions. An increase in the price of the export commodity will also increase informal wages, although aggregate informal employment unambiguously falls even if the informal export sector is labor intensive. Furthermore, the formal–informal segmentation of each sector opens up an interesting, hitherto unexplored, possibility that the informal export sector may contract despite a price increase in this sector. Change in the overall size of the export sector is also ambiguous and conditional on the relative strengths of changes in these two segments.     

Trade and technology transfer in a vertically differentiated industry

This paper provides a model of trade and technology transfer in a vertically differentiated industry. We provide three key results. First, freer trade allows an increase in the size of the import competing sector, a counterintuitive proposition. Second, under reasonable conditions a foreign monopolist producing a relatively higher quality product will transfer technology to the local producer for producing a relatively lower quality product. Third, government can design subsidies to induce technology transfer and improve welfare.      

Uniform tariffs in general equilibrium —A simple model

In a production structure exhibiting both Heckscher-Ohlin and specific-factor features, uniform tariffs may fail to protect many import-competing sectors. Hence, for some minimum degree of protection, the feasible tariff structure tends to be asymmetric.I am indebted to two referees of this Journal for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.     

R&D organization and technology transfer

In this paper we consider a Cournot duopoly model to examine the effects of licensing on R&D organization. When firms do cooperative R&D to share the cost of R&D, possibility of licensing can influence the decision on R&D organization. But, if the firms do cooperative R&D to avoid duplication in R&D process, possibility of licensing may influence the decision on R&D organization, provided one firm behaves like a Stackelberg leader in the product market.     

Inward-looking policies,finite change,and employment: The capital reallocation effect

It is well recognized that there emerged a trend of inward-looking trade policies even before the COVID pandemic crippled the world. These were reflected in both BREXIT and US-China trade conflicts. As countries become inward-oriented, usually local prices start rising. With this backdrop, this paper explores how rising local prices are likely to affect employment in the short and long runs when we accommodate for the finite change in a general equilibrium structure whereby sectors not only contract but might also close down altogether due to the capital reallocation effect following a price incentive.