Interests Versus Ideology in the Ratification of the 16th and 17th Amendments

The ideology of Progressivism that peaked in the early years of the 20th century brought with it the 16th amendment, which allowed the federal government to tax incomes, and the 17th amendment, which mandated direct elections of Senators. Both were ratified in 1913. The 16th amendment provided the financing for government to expand its scope, and the 17th amendment created more democratic accountability, which both were goals of the Progressive movement. An examination of House and Senate voting on these amendments suggests that those opposed to the amendments voted against them based on interests rather than ideology.     

Peer group influences on children’s product preferences

In contrast to earlier studies using adult subjects, this experiment with first graders did not f’md a high degree of brand loyalty development in response to a minimally differentiated product. In fact, while some brand preferences did develop, most subjects appeared to seek some degree of variety in their choices. It is interesting to speculate that children have a “greater need for novelty” than adults and are thus less likely to develop brand loyalty. However, extensive research will be required to remove this proposition from the realm of speculation.     

Development and Use of Biopesticides: Implications of Government Policy and Consumers’ Preferences

Biopesticides developed and used in the future will emerge against the backdrop of the environmental effects associated with the use of conventional pesticides and government policies designed to control these effects. In the final analysis, farmers’ choices on pesticides will be influenced by the prevailing costs and benefits of conventional pesticides and their alternatives including biopesticides. The outlook for pesticide use is complicated, though some directions can be perceived. There are a number of factors that will serve potentially to impact pesticide use which in turn will affect the development of biopesticides. These include pesticide regulation, the FAIR Act, the crops planted, the management of ecologically based systems, and consumer demand for “green” products.     

The impact of mergers on acquiring firm shareholder wealth: The 1905–1930 experience

From the standpoint of investors successful acquisitions increase profitability and stock Contemporary studies find acquiring firm shareholders earning small gains before and large losses after consolidation. Using modern financial market procedures, we examine a portfolio of 191 acquiring firms from 1905 to 1930 to determine the impact on firm owners of early industrial acquisitions in the United States and the effect of institutional changes on takeover gains. Acquisitions from 1905 to 1930 raised shareholder wealth by more than 3 percent, an increase exceeding gains from more recent mergers. Stock price continued to rise after completion for acquisitions before World War I, but fell dramatically for acquisitions during the oligopoly merger wave of the late 1920s.We would like to thank Patrick Byrne and Tara Nussman for help in collecting the financial data, Ralph Nelson for permitting us to use his and Carl Eis's worksheets on merger activity from 1905 to 1930, and George Bittlingmayer, Malcolm Burns, David Gulley, Stephen Grubaugh, Lori Leeth, John Matsusaka, Dennis Mueller, Rexford Santerre, Scott Sumner, Tugrul Temel, and Nikhil Varaiya for their helpful comments.     

The Challenge of Humanistic Economics

The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) created the Hospital Compare Program in 2003 to increase transparency between healthcare providers and consumers. Implemented in 2005, this transparency consists of hospitals' collecting and making publicly available a set of hospital quality score measures. The CMS induced participation by financially penalizing hospitals that did not publicly report a specific subset of these measures (called “starter” measures). Three years into the program, the penalty for non-reporting both the starter measures and other (“non-starter”) measures was increased. I use a difference-in-differences methodology to analyze the effect of the increased CMS penalty on the likelihood that a hospital publicly reported its starter and non-starter measure scores. I find that the penalty had an economically and statistically insignificant effect on the probability that a hospital publicly reported its starter scores, but a statistically significant 8.0 percent effect (p-value<0.01) on whether it reported its non-starter scores. These findings are robust to a series of alternative empirical specifications.