Born-International SMEs: BI-Level Impacts of Resources and Intentions

The Katz and Gartner (1988) model describes four central properties of emerging organizations: resources, intention, exchange, and boundary. While designed as a general model for organizations, the approach has the potential to explain the early lives of "born-international" firms. In this study, boundary is used to define the central sampling frame. Two other properties, resources and intention, are evaluated in terms of their impact on the fourth property: exchange, measured as a firm's export growth and intensity. Given the inherent presence of two levels of analysis in emerging organizations, intention and resources are evaluated at both the individual and the organizational level. A sample (N = 47) of young "born-international" firms in the Indian software industry was studied, using a questionnaire. Results of the analysis are mixed for resources at both the individual and firm level variables. Intention is significant at the individual level but not the firm level. Contrary to other studies, these findings suggest that during the early stages of firm development, owner, not firm, characteristics play a pivotal role in performance, especially exports. The speculation is that this occurs because, in early stages, firms are relatively disorganized relative to the owner.     

Strategic analysis of petty corruption: Entrepreneurs and bureaucrats

This paper develops a game-theoretic model of “petty corruption” by government officials. Such corruption is widespread, especially (but not only) in developing and transition economies. The model goes beyond the previously published studies in the way it describes the structure of bureaucratic “tracks,” and the information among the participants. Entrepreneurs apply, in sequence, to a “track” of two or more bureaucrats in a prescribed order for approval of their projects. Our first result establishes that in a one-shot situation no project ever gets approved. This result leads us to consider a repeated interaction setting. In that context we characterize in more detail the trigger-strategy equilibria that minimize the social loss due to the system of bribes, and those that maximize the expected total bribe income of the bureaucrats. The results are used to shed some light on two much advocated anti-corruption policies: the single window policy and rotation of bureaucrats.     

Paragons of virtue? Competitor entry and the strategies of incumbents in the U.S. local telecommunications industry

We investigate whether the presence of new competitors has influenced the behaviour of U.S. incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) with respect to pricing, advertising and the extent of diversification that they engage in. This issue is explored empirically, using data for the major local exchange carriers for the years 1994 to 1998. The period straddles periods of both absence and presence of competition in the industry, since the Telecommunications Act of 1996 has opened hitherto closed markets to competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs). While a recent Federal Communications Commission (FCC) report on local competition documents vigorous entry during the past years, the market share of the entrants is insubstantial. Our results indicate that the threat provided by market entrants has notably influenced the strategic behaviour of ILECs. The findings show that the incumbent U.S. local operators, particularly the larger ILECs, aggressively protect their profit streams from traditional business. The evidence demonstrates that the ILECs have responded to the Telecommunications Act 1996, and to the threat of market entry it has created, through entry deterrence. This strategic behaviour has been successful in providing ILECs with protection of their monopolistic markets so far.     

Determinants of credit card delinquency and bankruptcy: Macroeconomic factors

In this paper, we examine how county unemployment rates affect consumers' delinquency and bankruptcy behavior by focusing on the credit card market. In particular, after controlling for credit supply and shocks like divorce and health coverage we investigate whether consumer propensity for delinquency and bankruptcy changes with respect to the macroeconomic fluctuations across counties. Our results show that county unemployment rates significantly influence delinquency. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of FleetBoston Financial.     

Scale efficiencies in US telecommunications: An empirical investigation

In this paper we evaluate scale efficiency patterns of local operating companies in the US telecommunications industry. Scale efficiency is defined as the ability of each company to operate as close to its most productive scale size as possible, and is calculated using data envelopment analysis. The analysis of scale efficiencies is conducted for a set of 39 local operating companies, over six time periods: 1975, 1978, 1981, 1984, 1987 and 1990. During these time periods, several technical and institutional changes took place in the industry which are likely to have had an impact on the abilities of the companies to exploit feasible scale efficiencies, and we find that scale efficiencies have steadily increased over these time periods. We also establish that the Bell operating companies are no different from the independent companies in their ability to be scale efficient; single-state firms are relatively more scale efficient; line digitization, during the periods studied, has not significantly impacted scale efficiency; and firms belonging to multi-company parents are more scale efficient. Additionally, policy regime changes, such as the introduction of intra-LATA toll market competition and incentive regulation schemes, have positively impacted firms' abilities to attain scale efficiency, while micro-segment competition in local markets have, so far, not had the expected impact.     

BILATERALISM AND FREE TRADE*

We study a setting with many countries; in each country there are firms that can sell in the domestic as well as foreign markets. Countries can sign bilateral free‐trade agreements that lower import tariffs and thereby facilitate trade. We allow a country to sign any number of bilateral free‐trade agreements. A profile of free‐trade agreements defines the trading regime. Our principal finding is that, in symmetric settings, bilateralism is consistent with global free trade. We also explore the effects of asymmetries across countries and political economy considerations on the incentives to form trade agreements.     

A case study of the industrial organization theory of direct foreign investment

Conclusion This paper examines the industrial organization theory of DFI by means of a case study of the electronic calculator industry. The investigation is done by examining the relevant product, firm and industry characteristics. We began by focusing on and identifying the technological advances in electronic calculators and the firms responsible for those advances, to determine whether DFI coincided with technological superiority. The evidence presented shows that U.S. foreign investment in electronic calculators became significant during the third phase, when the U.S. firms gained technological leadership in electronic calculator production. The firms which enjoyed this technological leadership are the ones that initiated DFI. Foreign investment activities in electronic calculators were facilitated by a gradual trend toward a concentration of the industry structure in favor of the investors. In some cases, investors were large international firms to begin with. Thus, we can conclude that the industrial organization theory of DFI is supported by the experience of the electronic calculator industry. The fact that the investors themselves generally de-emphasized the cost consideration and emphasized the market potential as motivating factors in initiating DFI ventures provides further credence to this finding. Since the investors had something unique to offer and enjoyed sufficient market power to assume the risk of initiating foreign production to exploit this unique advantage in a potentially large market, they were least concerned about the cost of production. However, the cost factor played an important role behind the DFI in developing countries.