Sequential entry and plant location in oligopolistic competition

Weberian location theory is confined to a single firm framework, and pays very little attention to the interdependence among firms. To fill up this gap, this article incorporates oligopolistic competition into a simple Weberian model to investigate industrial location patterns when firms are shortsighted, enter sequentially, and locate once-and-for-all. It is shown that the location of a new entrant is closer to (farther away from) the market site compared with the existing firms if the industry is characterized by diseconomies (economies) of scale.     

Strategic management under duopoly

The purpose of this paper is to present a general conjectural variation model to provide an integrative treatment of strategic management under duopoly. It is shown that the nature of the desired distortion of managers' incentives depends critically on the magnitudes of the managers' conjectural variations with respect to outputs as well as the owners' conjectural variations with respect to incentives. In particular, it has been demonstrated that when the owners' conjectural variations with respect to incentives are zero, the owners will motivate their managers to maximize profits and provide no incentives for sales under consistent conjectures. However, the owners make their managers behave more (less) aggressively and produce more (less) than profit-maximizers if the managers' conjectural variations with respect to outputs are larger (smaller) than the actual response.     

Social preferences and public economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives

Social preferences such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and a desire to uphold ethical norms are essential to good government, often facilitating socially desirable allocations that would be unattainable by incentives that appeal solely to self-interest. But experimental and other evidence indicates that conventional economic incentives and social preferences may be either complements or substitutes, explicit incentives crowding in or crowding out social preferences. We investigate the design of optimal incentives to contribute to a public good under these effects would make either more or less use of explicit incentives, by comparison to a naive planner who assumes they are absent.     

Causal relationship between energy consumption and GDP growth revisited: A dynamic panel data approach

This paper uses the panel data of energy consumption and GDP for 82 countries from 1972 to 2002. Based on the income levels defined by the World Bank, the data are divided into four categories: low income group, lower middle income group, upper middle income group, and high income group. We employ the GMM-SYS approach for the estimation of the panel VAR model in each of the four groups. Afterwards, the causal relationship between energy consumption and economic growth is tested and ascertained. We discover: (a) in the low income group, there exists no causal relationship between energy consumption and economic growth; (b) in the middle income groups (lower and upper middle income groups), economic growth leads energy consumption positively; (c) in the high income group countries, economic growth leads energy consumption negatively. After further in-depth analysis of energy related data, the results indicate that, in the high income group, there is a great environmental improvement as a result of more efficient energy use and reduction in the release of CO₂. However, in the upper middle income group countries, after the energy crisis, the energy efficiency declines and the release of CO₂ rises. Since there is no evidence indicating that energy consumption leads economic growth in any of the four income groups, a stronger energy conservation policy should be pursued in all countries.     

Stationary bootstrapping for common mean change detection in cross-sectionally dependent panels

Stationary bootstrapping is applied to a CUSUM test for common mean break detection in cross-sectionally correlated panel data. Asymptotic null distribution of the bootstrapped test is derived, which is the same as that of the original CUSUM test depending on cross-sectional correlation parameter. A bootstrap test using the CUSUM test with bootstrap critical values is proposed and its asymptotic validity is proved. Finite sample Monte-Carlo simulation shows that the proposed test has reasonable size while other existing tests have severe size distortion under cross-section correlation. The simulation also shows good power performance of the proposed test against non-cancelling mean changes. The simulation also shows that the theoretically justified stationary bootstrapping CUSUM test has comparable size and power relative to other, theoretically unjustified, moving block or tapered block bootstrapping CUSUM tests.     

On the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas under a Revenue Constraint

This paper sets out a duopolistic model to examine the price and welfare equivalence of tariffs and quotas, given the quota rent is equal to the tariff revenue. It shows that the domestic welfare ranking of the two trade policies crucially depends on the relative costs of the domestic and foreign firms; when the domestic firm's relative costs are lower than those of the foreign firm, a quota regime generally leads to a higher welfare level than that of an equivalent tariff regime. This finding contrasts sharply with the conclusions of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1977 ), where it was found that a tariff regime always generates higher domestic welfare.     

Experiential regret in service failure: The role of service justices

ABSTRACT

Regret is so common as to be the second most frequently named emotion in a study of the use of emotions in everyday language (Shimanoff, 1984 Shimanoff, S. B. (1984). Commonly named emotions in everyday conversations. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 58, 514. doi:10.2466/pms.1984.58.2.514[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Regret is a negative, cognitively based emotion that we experience when realizing or imagining that our present situation would have been better had we acted differently (Zeelenberg, 1999 Zeelenberg, M. (1999). The use of crying over spilled milk: A note on the rationality and functionality of regret. Philosophical Psychology, 12, 325–340. doi:10.1080/095150899105800[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Meanwhile, complaint handling takes an important role in raising the retention rate of the customers who experience service problems (Hart, Heskett, & Sasser, 1990 Hart, C. W. L., Heskett, J. L., & Sasser, W. E., Jr. (1990). The profitable art of service recovery. Harvard Business Review, 68(4), 148–156.[PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Customers anticipate that enterprises will remedy their service failure. The complaining process enhances the relationship between dissatisfied customers and enterprises (Chebat & Slusarczyk, 2005 Chebat, J. C., & Slusarczyk, W. (2005). How emotions mediate the effects of perceived justice on loyalty in service recovery situations: An empirical study. Journal of Business Research, 58, 664–673. doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2003.09.005[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). One of the strategies to retain customers is to recover justice from failures (Blodgett, Hill, & Tax, 1997 Blodgett, J. G., Hill, D. J., & Tax, S. S. (1997). The effects of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice on postcomplaint behavior. Journal of Retailing, 73(2), 185–210. doi:10.1016/s0022-4359(97)90003-8[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). This study intended to explore the impact of customers’ experiential regret in service failure on customers’ behavioral intention and investigate whether the service justice perceived by customers moderates the relationship between these two.     

Does illiquidity matter in residential properties?

No, it does not, despite the general perception that illiquidity matters in real estate. As expected, our evidence shows that the illiquidity costs for the U.S. residential properties are large. The costs are equivalent to 12% of the total property returns on average, ranging from 9.5% to 29.5% of property prices depending on the illiquidity level and market conditions. However, when amortized by holding periods, monthly illiquidity costs are on average 0.08%, and illiquidity risk does not appear to be priced in residential properties; illiquid properties do not show higher returns than liquid properties. On the contrary, we find evidence of flight-to-quality in bull markets, that is, high-quality illiquid properties are preferred to low-quality liquid properties in buoyant markets. These results are in sharp contrast with those in equities and bonds where flight-to-liquidity has been reported when markets are in stress.     

Effect of disclosure regulation on earnings management through related-party transactions: Evidence from Taiwanese firms operating in China

This study examines the effect of disclosure regulation on earnings management using Taiwanese companies conducting transactions with China as the institutional setting. Measuring earnings management by the amount of discretionary accruals (DACCs), the study shows that disclosure regulation mitigates DACCs of Taiwanese firms engaging in related-party transactions with Chinese entities. Following enactment of the disclosure regulation in November 2000, DACCs among Taiwanese enterprises conducting transactions via offshore affiliates dropped. While the disclosure regulation helps to reduce earnings management, this study reports that such effect is asymmetric between high-tech firms and non–high-tech firms. Specifically, the disclosure regulation is effective in reducing earnings management among firms in non–high-tech sectors. However, such effect is not significant among firms in high-tech sectors. This study discusses the implications of empirical findings for corporate management, regulatory agencies, and firm stakeholders.     

Technology choice under duopoly

This paper presents a conjectural variation approach to demonstrate that competing firms will often distort their cost structures away from strict cost minimization for strategic reasons. In particular, it is shown that the nature of the desired distortions of production technology depends critically on the magnitudes of the firms' conjectural variations with respect to outputs as well as the firms' conjectural variations with respect to technology. These results are in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom based on monopolized or perfectly competitive markets.