AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF RELATIONSHIP MAGNITUDE

Based upon a review of the extant literature, it is proposed that the structure of an interorganizational relationship is composed of relationship type and the under‐researched construct of relationship magnitude. Specifically, it is hypothesized that relationship magnitude, a second order construct composed of trust, commitment, and dependence, affects relationship type, which affects the perception of value of the relationship. The results of a survey analyzed through structural equation modeling support these hypotheses.     

A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters

We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of ‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role. I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Background Risk and the Performance of Insurance Markets under Adverse Selection

Background risk can influence the performance of insurance markets that must deal with adverse selection when applicants are risk vulnerable, since they are more averse to bearing the insurable risk as a result of their exposures to background risk. We show that background risk always results in a lower deductible for the incentive constrained contract, and that a broader range of markets attains the stable sequential equilibrium cross-subsidized pair of separating contracts. We conclude that background risk always improves the performance of markets for coverage against (insurable) foreground risks that must deal with adverse selection. We also find, however, that these improvements are never sufficient to offset the cost to insureds of bearing the background risk.     

Dynamic scoring: Alternative financing schemes

Neoclassical growth models predict that reductions in capital or labor income tax rates are expansionary when lump-sum transfers are used to balance the government budget. This paper explores the consequences of bond-financed tax reductions that bring forth a range of possible offsetting policies, including future government consumption, capital tax rates, or labor tax rates. Through the resulting intertemporal distortions, current tax cuts can be expansionary or contractionary. The paper also finds that more aggressive responses of offsetting policies to debt engender less debt accumulation and less costly tax cuts.     

RELATIONSHIP MAGNITUDE AND ITS ROLE IN INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIP STRUCTURE

Close relationships between and among supply chain members are becoming more prevalent. However, there is lack of agreement in the literature and in practice concerning the characteristics of different interorganizational relationships. The resultant confusion is an obstacle to the progression of research and could cause problems among firms in a supply chain. Based on previous research and an exploratory study conducted with company executives responsible for supply chain management activities, this article seeks to introduce the concept of relationship magnitude (i.e., the extent or degree of closeness or strength of the relationship) and differentiate it from relationship type (i.e., classes of relationships that share common traits). Implications for managers and opportunities for future research are provided.     

The treatment of racial and sexual discrimination in economics journals and economics textbooks: 1972 to 1987

This article examines two decades of scholarly literature on discrimination and two decades of discussion of discrimination in economics textbooks. At first discrimination was taken seriously and policy responses adequate to the problem were advocated. Today this is a minority position. The article first traces the way thatJEL policies concerning indexing and abstracting have contributed to this change. Next textbooks are analyzed to show how this change is manifested in commonly used curricular materials. Finally, political preferences are shown to undergird crucial arguments like those concerning minimum wages. Conclusions linking ideology to research agendas are put forward.