An effective step-down algorithm for the construction and the identification of nonisomorphic orthogonal arrays

In this paper we present an effective algorithm for the construction and the identification of two-level nonisomorphic orthogonal arrays. Using this algorithm, we identify and list a full catalogue of nonisomorphic orthogonal arrays with parameters OA(24,7,2,t), OA(28,6,2,t) and OA(32,6,2,t), t ≥ 2. Some statistical properties of these designs are also considered.     

First-and second-best allocations under economic and environmental uncertainty

This paper uses a micro-founded DSGE model to compare second-best optimal environmental policy, and the resulting Ramsey allocation, to first-best allocation. The focus is on the source and size of uncertainty, and how this affects optimal choices and the comparison between second- and first-best. While higher economic volatility is bad for social welfare in all cases studied, the welfare effects of higher environmental volatility depend on its size and the effectiveness of public abatement policy. The Ramsey environmental tax is pro-cyclical when there is an economic shock, while it is counter-cyclical when there is an environmental shock.     

Benchmarking Tendencies in Managerial Mindsets: Prioritizing Stockholders and Stakeholders in Peru, South Africa, and the United States

Managers in Peru, South Africa, and the United States were classified into four groups along Singhapakdi et al. (J Bus Ethics 15:1131–1140, 1996) Perceived Role of Ethics and Social Responsibility (PRESOR) scale. In Peru and the United States, individuals in the ethics and social responsibility first category reported greater satisfaction with organizational performance than did those in the profits first category. Moral capitalists—individuals who report high emphases on both social responsibility and profits—reported the highest satisfaction with performance in the United States. Managers in the United States are more likely than their counterparts in Peru and South Africa to reject the mutual exclusivity of prioritizing social responsibility and profits simultaneously. Directions for future research are outlined.     

Fiscal policy,rent seeking,and growth under electoral uncertainty: theory and evidence from the OECD

Abstract. We construct a general equilibrium model of economic growth and optimally chosen fiscal policy, in which individuals compete with each other for a share of government spending and two political parties alternate in power according to exogenous electoral uncertainty. The main prediction is that uncertainty about remaining in power results in increased fiscal spending, which in turn distorts incentives by pushing individuals away from productive work to rent‐seeking activities; then, distorted incentives hurt growth. This scenario receives empirical support in a dataset of 25 OECD countries over the period 1982–96. In particular, uncertainty about remaining in power leads to larger government shares in GDP, which in turn exert an adverse effect on the ICRG index measuring incentives and this is bad for growth.     

Tax-spending policies and economic growth: Theoretical predictions and evidence from the OECD

We present an endogenous growth model to study the growth effects of the composition of government expenditure and the associated tax burden. When we use data from a set of 23 OECD countries during 1970–2000, our econometric results support the predictions of the theory. The share of productive government expenditure is associated with higher growth, and this result is more robust when we use effective average tax rates and statutory tax rates as measures of the tax burden. With respect to the tax burden, different tax rates have different growth effects.     

The social cost of rent seeking in Europe

Direct measurement of the social cost of rent seeking is impeded by non-observable and non-reported activities. We use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to compute the social cost of rent seeking in Europe. Our estimate is based on competition among interest groups for privileges provided by governments, including income transfers, subsidies, and preferential tax treatment. The model, which is calibrated to the euro area as a whole and also to individual euro member countries for 1980–2003, performs well vis-à-vis the data. We find that significant proportions of GDP are extracted as rents available to be sought by rent seekers.