Trading in derivatives when the underlying is scarce

Regulatory restrictions and market frictions can constrain the aggregate quantity of long and short positions in a security. When these constraints bind, we refer to the security as scarce, and its price becomes distorted relative to its value in a frictionless market. We show that an otherwise redundant derivative can reduce the price distortion of the underlying security by relaxing its scarcity. We also show that it is especially important to analyze the underlying and derivative markets jointly when evaluating the impact of regulation, such as short-sales bans and position limits in derivatives, that restricts trade.     

Managerial incentives and corporate control auctions

An analysis of the sequence of bidding in corporate control contests involving white knights reveals a category of white knights termed as ‘delayed bid’ white knights who make their bid after two consecutive hostile bids. The ‘immediate bid’ white knights make their bid in relative haste after the first hostile bid. Overpayments by white knights are much larger for the ‘immediate bid’ white knights. An analysis of the respective compensation packages shows that the managers of the ‘immediate bid’ white knights have a lower proportion of their income linked to stock value (relative to their annual cash income) compared to ‘delayed bid’ white knights and hostile bidders.     

Testing for PPP: Should we use panel methods?

A common finding in the empirical literature on the validity of purchasing power parity (PPP) is that it holds when tested for in panel data, but not in univariate (i.e. country-specific) analysis. The usual explanation for this mismatch is that panel tests for unit roots are more powerful than their univariate counterparts. In this paper we suggest an alternative explanation. Existing panel methods assume that cross-unit cointegrating relationships, that would tie the units of the panel together, are not present. Using simulations, we show that if this important underlying assumption of panel unit root tests is violated, the empirical size of the tests is substantially higher than the nominal level, and the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected too often even when it is true. More generally, this finding warns against the automatic use of panel methods for testing for unit roots in macroeconomic time series.First version received: November 2001/Final version received : October 2003     

On tariff and quality innovation in a market with discrete preferences

In a market for a quality-differentiated good with heterogeneous set of consumers and a local firm facing competitive imports from abroad, we examine private and social incentives for quality innovation. For differential tariff regime, we show that both the private and social gains increase with the tariff protection for the low-quality segment of the domestic market for any given tariff on high-quality imports. But for some very high costs of innovation, the local firm may not undertake a socially desirable innovation. The pro-competitive effect, on the other hand, ensures that quality-distortion-at-the-bottom occurs only for very high levels of tariffs.     

Economic Properties of Statistical Indices: The Case of a Multidimensional Gini Index

This paper seeks to construct a Gini index of the distribution of standard of living. Since standard of living has various dimensions, we need a multidimensional Gini index (MGI). The literature on index numbers contains two distinct approaches: the statistical and the economic. In the context of MGIs the statistical approach (which obtains the indices from conditions based on statistical or data-related considerations) seems to be open to the criticism that it sometimes yields indices that violate economic norms. However, the economic approach (where the indices are derived from norms based on economic theory) also does not seem to have succeeded so far in obtaining an MGI satisfying the various normative requirements that have been proposed in the literature. This paper shows that it is possible to obtain an MGI from the statistical approach ensuring, at the same time, that the economic norms are satisfied. In this sense it is an attempt to bring the two disparate traditions in index construction referred to above closer to each other. The index that is developed here does not appear in the existing literature. Moreover, the literature does not seem to contain any other MGI satisfying all of the proposed economic norms.

     

Does trade size restriction affect trading behavior? Evidence from Indian single stock futures market

Algorithmic traders use their advantage of speed to execute a large number of small-sized trades in a very short time. In the presence of a minimum trading unit (MTU) restriction, they are forced to trade at the smallest possible sizes, often restricted by the MTU. Using a novel data set of single stock futures market obtained from the National Stock Exchange of India, we show that the MTU restriction acts as a binding constraint for traders while optimizing trade sizes. Contrary to expectation, we find weak evidence that liquidity is positively impacted by the contract size revision.     

Regulation,reputation, and environmental risk

This paper examines how preferences for social reputation affect the design of monetary incentives in an efficient mechanism for environmental risk. Our results are a high reputation firm receives less than optimal transfer; the low reputation firm sacrifices information rent.