Explaining Foreign Holdings of Asia's Debt Securities: The Feldstein–Horioka Paradox Revisited*

In this paper, we find that home bias is still present in all economies and regions, especially in the case of short‐term debt securities, but that there are substantial variations among economies and regions in the strength of home bias, with the eurozone economies, the USA and developing Asia showing relatively weak home bias and advanced Asia, especially Japan, showing relatively strong home bias. We then examine trends over time in foreign holdings of debt securities and find that capital has been flowing from the USA and the eurozone economies to both advanced Asia (especially Japan) and developing Asia, and that foreign holdings of debt securities have been increasing in advanced as well as developing Asia but for different reasons. The main reason in the case of advanced Asia (especially Japan) appears to be higher risk‐adjusted returns, whereas the main reason in the case of developing Asia appears to be the growth of debt securities markets combined with relatively weak home bias and (in the case of short‐term securities) lower exchange rate volatility. Finally, we find that since the global financial crisis, foreign holdings of debt securities have declined (i.e. that home bias has strengthened) in all economies and regions except developing Asia, where they have increased (except for a temporary decline in 2008) but where their share is still much lower than the optimal share warranted by the capital asset pricing market model.     

Optimal money supply in models with endogenous discount factor

This paper studies the Friedman rule for the optimal quantity of money in money in the utility (MIU) and cash–credit models while considering two specifications for the endogenous discount factor. In the first specification, the discount factor depends directly on the utility level. In the second, the discount factor depends on every component of the utility function. We show that under the former specification the Friedman rule is the optimal policy. Under the latter, however, while the Friedman rule is optimal for the MIU model, it is not optimal for the cash–credit model.     

Network motifs in an inter-firm network

Firms build business relationships during economic activities. The goal of this paper is to clarify production mechanisms and economic functions by identifying characteristic patterns of inter-firm interactions. In this paper, we empirically analyze an inter-firm network consisting of about one million firms and four million directed links, in order to specify network motifs, which are small subgraphs that occur more frequently than expected in a randomly generated network. We found that V-shaped triads are network motifs, while feedforward and feedback loop are anti-motifs. By defining roles in the subgraph according to structural equivalence, we also detected the significance profile of roles characterizing the industry sector. The taxonomy of industries obtained from the profiles is economically meaningful. These empirical findings may serve to provide an easily interpretable view of the entire inter-firm network and to improve the efficiency and safety of economic systems.     

Beyond the personal–anonymous divide: agency relations in powers of attorney in France in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries

Powers of attorney are often interpreted as evidence of trust among the parties involved. We build a novel dataset of notarized powers of attorney, capturing a wide variety of agency relationships in four large French commercial cities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to test hypotheses on the relational basis of economic relationships. We find little support for the idea of a radical shift from personal to anonymous relationships during our period. Our results point to more nuanced transformations. The preference for proxies in the same occupation as the principal somewhat declined, while professional proxies emerged and principals used relational chains, especially involving notaries, to find proxies.     

Directional imbalance in transport prices and economic geography

This paper examines how and why transport prices become imbalanced with respect to the direction of shipments and how this affects economic geography. It is shown that the equilibrium transport price of the shipment in a particular direction is a nondecreasing function of the relative size of the embarkation region. Furthermore, we show that the directional imbalance in transport prices increases the likelihood of the symmetric pattern being stable and decreases the likelihood of the core-periphery patterns being sustainable. In short, the imbalance acts as a dispersion force.     

Random walk or a run. Market microstructure analysis of foreign exchange rate movements based on conditional probability

Using tick-by-tick data for the dollar–yen and euro–dollar exchange rates recorded on the actual transaction platform, a ‘run’—continuous increases or decreases in deal prices for the past several ticks—does have some predictable information on the direction of the next price movement. Deal price movements, that are consistent with order flows, tend to continue a run once it is started. Indeed, conditional probabilities of a run continuing in the same direction after several consecutive observations exceed 0.5. However, quote prices do not show such a run tendency. Hence, a random walk hypothesis is refuted in a simple test of a run using tick-by-tick data. In addition, a longer continuous increase of the price tends to be followed by a larger reversal. The findings suggest that those market participants who have access to real-time, tick-by-tick transaction data may have an advantage in predicting exchange rate movements. The findings reported here also lend support to the momentum trading strategy.     

Licensing vs. Litigation: The Effect of the Legal System on Incentives to Innovate

With uncertain scope of patent protection and imperfect enforcement, the effective strength of patent protection is determined by the legal system. We analyze how the legal system affects the incentives of firms to innovate, taking into account possibilities of strategic licensing and litigation to deter imitation. The legal system that guarantees the patentee's monopoly power maximizes the R&D intensities. However, the legal system that induces licensing provides incentives to exert R&D effort while preserving ex post efficiency. We also compare R&D, patent licensing, and litigation behavior under American and English rules of legal cost allocation.     

Dispersion of growth paths of macroeconomic models in thermodynamic limits: two-parameter Poisson–Dirichlet models

This paper discusses dispersion of growth patterns of macroeconomic models in thermodynamic limits. More specifically, the paper shows that the coefficients of variations of the total numbers of clusters and the numbers of clusters of specific sizes of one- and two-parameter Poisson–Dirichlet models behave qualitatively differently in the thermodynamic limits. The coefficients of variations of the numbers of clusters in the former class of distributions are all self-averaging, while the those in the latter class are all non-self averaging. In other words, dispersions or variations of growth rates about the means do not vanish in the two-parameter version of the model, while they do in the one-parameter version in the thermodynamic limits. The paper ends by pointing out other models, such as triangular urn models, may converge to Mittag–Leffler distributions which exhibit non-self-averaging behavior for certain parameter combinations. The author is grateful for many helps he received from H. Yoshikawa, and M. Sibuya.     

Stock Prices and the Real Economy: Power Law versus Exponential Distributions

This paper explores the relationship between the stock prices and the real economy. The standard approach – the so called consumption-based asset pricing model – attempts to explain it based on the assumption of the representative agent. In this paper, we argue that the representative agent assumption is fundamentally flawed. Drawing on the recent advancement of “econophysics” on financial markets See Mantegna and Stanley (An Introduction to econophysics: correlations and complexity in finance, 2000) for the introduction to econophysics, we argue that in contrast to the neoclassical view, there is in fact a wedge between financial markets, the stock prices in particular, and the real economy.     

Information, Incentives, and Option Value: The Silicon Valley Model

This paper analyzes the Silicon Valley model as a novel economic institution in the domain of technological product system innovation. We analyze the informational relationship as well as governance relationships between venture capitalists and a cluster of entrepreneurial firms. The informational conditions that make the Silicon Valley model efficient are identified, leading to an understanding of the significance of standardized interfaces, modularization, and information encapsulation. We then examine the governance/incentive aspect by integrating the models of Aoki (Towards a Comparative Institutional Analysis, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001) and Baldwin and Clark (Design Rules—Vol. 1: The Power of Modularity, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000). The paper concludes by evaluating the applicability of the model to other localities and industries. J. Comp. Econ., December 2002, 30(4), pp. 759–786. Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305, and RIETI, 1-3-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0013, Japan; and Faculty of Economics, Toyo University, 5-28-20 Hakusan, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 112-8606, Japan. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D21, L23, O32, P51, P52.