Endogenous price leadership and technological differences

This study constructs a two-stage game of price leadership in a duopolistic market for a homogeneous product. In the first period, the two firms determine a price leader; they set a price for the product in the second period. It is demonstrated in the present study that the technologically superior firm tends to become a price leader. This result reveals that price leadership is determined by the interaction of "competitive force", which prevents the price leader from choosing too high a price (like the joint profit maximizing price or the cartel price), and "collusive force", which prevents a price from falling to a Bertrand price.     

Pricing Structure in Tokyo Metropolitan Land Markets and its Structural Changes: Pre-bubble,Bubble, and Post-bubble Periods

In this paper, we estimate hedonic price equations of Japanese commercial and residential land prices for a 25-year period and to investigate possible structural changes in these price equations. Our price equations are based on transaction prices, not appraised land values, of commercial land in Central Business Districts of Tokyo (Chiyoda Ward, Chuo Ward, and Minato Ward), and residential land of its suburb (Setagaya Ward). We find that price structure differs substantially among locations, reflecting differences in supplier pricing and end-user preferences. We also find significant structural changes in price structure, identifying pre-bubble, bubble and post-bubble periods.

Consumer Attitude towards Organic Labeling Schemes in Japan

ABSTRACT

Japan is the most lucrative organic market in the Asian region and is projected to account for about 80% of the Asian market revenues by 2009 (Kuhlmann and Jones, 2006). This study identifies Japanese consumer preference and interest in two major labeling information- source of organic certification/traceability and country of origin for organic food products. Stated preference method (SPM) based survey data was collected from two major cities in Japan in order to develop Japanese consumers' organic food choice model. Findings show that Japanese consumers are willing to pay 10% price premium for the organic food products compared to conventional products that have no specific labeling, suggesting a significant profit margin to be possibly captured by the organic producers and marketers. The Japanese consumers have perceived value of the JAS label in their stated preference and showed willingness to pay a price premium for this quality certification system, which validates the importance of government-regulated mandatory labeling. Regarding the country origin labeling issue, the Japanese consumers showed clear preference for the domestic organic products to the imported products, while showing no preference for any particular country origin for imported organic products. For private-voluntary organic labeling, the consumer organization-led organic label is considered to be more reliable source than the retailer-guaranteed organic label.     

Sounds that make you smile and share: a phonetic key to prosociality and engagement

The importance of names has been demonstrated for decision making related to individuals as well as companies. While previous researchers have focused on traits such as the fluency of names, we present three studies that focus on the role of the “hard e” or [ē] sound in relation to helping behavior. Because pronunciation of the [ē] sound requires a facial movement that mimics a smile particularly when the sound occurs at the end of a name, our research complements previous findings generated by the theory of embodied cognition in which biting on a pencil or chopstick evoked behavioral and mood changes. Study 1 finds that participants are more likely to help someone whose name ends with the [ē] sound while study 2 utilizes a broader set of contrasting sounds and finds a basic preference for the [ē] sound that is specific to women. Study 3 shows that women are significantly more likely to recall addressing their parents as Mommy or Daddy when soliciting help rather than Mom or Dad. Our findings complement previous research concerning motherese and highlight a phonetic cue for prosocial behavior that appears to offer insights for marketing and management. Just as the current studies are important in understanding interpersonal interactions, the findings have direct relevance for marketing campaigns that focus on consumer engagement.     

Alternative Approaches to Commercial Property Price Indexes for Tokyo

The paper studies the problems associated with the construction of price indexes for commercial properties that could be used in the System of National Accounts. Property price indexes are required for the stocks of commercial properties in the balance sheets and related price indexes for the land and structure components of a commercial property are required in the balance sheet accounts for the calculation of the Multifactor Productivity of the Commercial Property Industry. The paper uses a variant of the builder's model that has been used to construct Residential Property Price Indexes. Geometric depreciation rates are estimated for commercial offices in Tokyo using assessment data for REIT. The problems associated with the decomposition of property value into land and structure components are addressed. The problems associated with depreciating capital expenditures on buildings and with measuring the loss of asset value due to early retirement of the structure are also addressed.     

Stabilization of effective exchange rates under common currency basket systems

We investigate the extent to which a common currency basket peg would stabilize effective exchange rates of East Asian currencies. We use an AMU (Asian Monetary Unit), which is a weighted average of ASEAN10 plus 3 (Japan, China, and Korea) currencies, as a common currency basket to investigate the stabilization effects. We compare our results with another result on stabilization effects of the common G3 currency (the US dollar, the Japanese yen, and the euro) basket in the East Asian countries [Williamson, J., 2005, A currency basket for East Asia, not just China. In: Policy Briefs in International Economics, No. PB05-1. Institute for International Economics]. We obtained the following results: first, the AMU peg system would be more effective in reducing fluctuations of the effective exchange rates of East Asian currencies as a number of countries applied the AMU peg system increases in East Asia. Second, the AMU peg system would more effectively stabilize the effective exchange rates than a common G3 currency basket peg system for four (Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand) of the seven countries. The results suggest that the AMU peg system would be useful for the East Asian countries whose trade weights on Japan are relatively higher than others. J. Japanese Int. Economies 20 (4) (2006) 590–611.     

COMMERCIAL PROPERTY PRICE INDEXES AND THE SYSTEM OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS

This paper studies the problems associated with the construction of price indexes for commercial properties that could be used in the System of National Accounts (SNA). Property price indexes are required for the stocks of commercial properties in the Balance Sheets of the country. Related service price indexes for the land and structure input components of a commercial property are required in the Production Accounts of the country if the Multifactor Productivity of the Commercial Property Industry is calculated as part of the SNA. The paper reviews existing methods for constructing an overall Commercial Property Price Index (CPPI) and concludes that most methods are biased (due to their neglect of depreciation) and more importantly, not able to provide separate land and structure subindexes. A class of hedonic regression models that is not subject to these problems is discussed.     

Mechanisms that efficiently verify the optimality of a proposed action

The best known achievement of the literature on resource-allocating mechanisms and their message spaces is the first rigorous proof of the competitive mechanism's informational efficiency. In an exchange economy withN persons andK+1 commodities (including a numeraire), that mechanism announcesK prices as well as aK-compenent trade vector for each ofN−1 persons, making a total ofNK message variables. Trial messages are successively announced and after each announcement each personprivately determines, usingprivate information, whether she finds the proposed trades acceptable at the announced prices. When a message is reached with which all are content, then the trades specified in that message take place, and they satisfy Pareto optimality and individual rationality. The literature shows that no (suitably regular) mechanism can achieve the same thing with fewer thanNK message variables. In the classic proof, all the candidate mechanisms have the privacy property, and the proof uses that property in a crucial way. ‘Non-private’ mechanisms are, however, well-defined. We present a proof that forN>K,NK remains a lower bound even when we permit ‘non-private’ mechanisms. Our new proof does not use privacy at all. But in a non-private mechanism, minimality of the number of message variables can hardly be defended as the hallmark of informational efficiency, since a non-private mechanism requires some persons to know something about the private information of othersin addition to the information contained in the messages. The new proof of the lower boundNK invites a new interpretation of the competitive mechanism's informational efficiency. We provide a new concept of efficiency which the competitive mechanism exhibits and which does rest on privacy even whenN>K. To do so, we first define a class ofprojection mechanisms, wherein some of the message variables are proposed values of the action to be taken, and the rest are auxiliary variables. The competitive mechanism has the projection property, with a trade vector as its action and prices as the auxiliary variables. A projection mechanism proposes an action; for each proposal, the agents then use the auxiliary variables, together with their private information, to verify that the proposed action meets the mechanism's goal (Pareto optimality and individual rationality for the competitive mechanism) if, indeed, it does meet that goal. For a given goal, we seek projection mechanisms for which theverification effort (suitably measured) is not greater than that of any other projection mechanism that achieves the goal. We show the competitive mechanism to be verification-minimal within the class of private projection mechanisms that achieve Pareto optimality and individual rationality; that proofdoes use the privacy of the candidate mechanisms. We also show, under certain conditions, that a verification-minimal projection mechanism achieving a given goal has smallest ‘total communication effort’ (which is locally equivalent to the classic ‘message-space size’) among all private mechanisms that achieve the goal, whether or not they have the projection property.     

New office technology and the labour process in contemporary Japanese banking

Japanese banks account for the top nine of the world's ten biggest banks. Rationalization has led to increased control of employees in the sphere of labour management. This article examines labour management and working conditions in relation to the introduction of new office technology.