Strategies that fit emerging markets

It's no easy task to identify strategies for entering new international markets or to decide which countries to do business with. Many firms simply go with what they know-and fall far short of their goals. Part of the problem is that emerging markets have "institutional voids": They lack specialized intermediaries, regulatory systems, and contract-enforcing methods. These gaps have made it difficult for multinationals to succeed in developing nations; thus, many companies have resisted investing there. That may be a mistake. If Western companies don't come up with good strategies for engaging with emerging markets, they are unlikely to remain competitive. Many firms choose their markets and strategies for the wrong reasons, relying on everything from senior managers' gut feelings to the behaviors of rivals. Corporations also depend on composite indexes for help making decisions. But these analyses can be misleading; they don't account for vital information about the soft infrastructures in developing nations. A better approach is to understand institutional variations between countries. The best way to do this, the authors have found, is by using the five contexts framework. The five contexts are a country's political and social systems, its degree of openness, its product markets, its labor markets, and its capital markets. By asking a series of questions that pertain to each ofthe five areas, executives can map the institutional contexts of any nation. When companies match their strategies to each country's contexts, they can take advantage of a location's unique strengths. But first firms should weigh the benefits against the costs. If they find that the risks of adaptation are too great, they should try to change the contexts in which they operate or simply stay away.     

The non-neutrality of debt in investment timing: a new NPV rule

Summary Limited liability debt financing of irreversible investments can affect investment timing through an entrepreneur’s option value, even after compensating a lender for expected default losses. This non-neutrality of debt arises from an entrepreneur’s unique investment opportunity, and it is shown in a standard model of irreversible investment that includes the equilibrium effect of a competitive lending sector. The analysis is partial, in that it takes as exogenously given an entrepreneur’s use of debt. Intuitively, limited liability lowers downside risk for the entrepreneur by truncating the lower tail of risks, and lowers the investment threshold. Compensating the lender for expected default losses reduces project profitability to the entrepreneur, and increases the investment threshold. The net effect is negative, because lower downside risk has an additional impact on the option value of delaying investment. The standard NPV rule in real options theory implicitly assumes debt to be neutral. With non-neutrality of debt, an investment threshold is higher than investment cost, but lower than the standard NPV rule. Comparisons with other standard investment thresholds show similar relationships.     

Omnichannel marketing: Are cross-channel effects symmetric?

The rapid growth in omnichannel (e.g., Web, call center, sales agent, store) shopping and the need to effectively allocate resources across channels are prompting managers and researchers to better understand cross-channel effects, that is, the effects of marketing efforts in one distribution channel on shopping outcomes in other channels. We develop a broad set of hypotheses about cross-channel effects based on channel richness and influence roles (informative, persuasive). To test the hypotheses, we model the effects (own and cross) of channel marketing efforts on shopping outcomes in different channels through a simultaneous equation system. We estimate these models using data from the auto insurance industry that comprises the exclusive agent, the independent agent, the Web, and the call center channels. Our results offer novel insights. They show that cross-channel effects and elasticities are significant and asymmetric. While the effect of marketing efforts in a channel on shopping outcomes in a dissimilar (with a different primary influence role) channel is positive (e.g., exclusive agent, the Web, and the call center channels are complementary), the magnitudes of the cross-channel effects are asymmetric. Similarly, while the effect of marketing efforts in a channel on shopping outcomes in a similar (with the same primary influence role) channel is negative (e.g., independent agent and exclusive agent channels are substitutional), they are also asymmetric. Exclusive agent efforts have a greater negative effect on the outcomes of independent agent efforts than vice versa. Based on the results, we develop a channel influence vs. influenceability analysis tool for managers to better plan their channel efforts. We also illustrate a resource allocation model that shows substantial incremental profits from the reallocation of marketing efforts based on our model with cross-channel effects relative to a model without cross-channel effects.     

Estimating the performance effects of business groups in emerging markets

Business groups—confederations of legally independent firms—are ubiquitous in emerging economies, yet very little is known about their effects on the performance of affiliated firms. We conceive of business groups as responses to market failures and high transaction costs. In doing so, we develop hypotheses about the effects of group affiliation on firm profitability: affiliation could either boost or depress firm profitability, and members of a group are likely to earn rates of return similar to other members of the same group. Using a unique data set compiled largely from local sources, we test for these effects in 14 emerging markets: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. We find evidence that business groups indeed affect the broad patterns of economic performance in 12 of the markets we examine. Group affiliation appears to have as profound an effect on profitability as does industry membership, yet strategy scholars have a much clearer grasp of industries than of groups. Moreover, membership in a group raises the profitability of the average group member in several of the markets we examine. This runs contrary to the wisdom, conventional in advanced economies, that unrelated diversification depresses profitability. Overall, our findings suggest that the roots of sustained differences in profitability may vary across institutional contexts; conclusions drawn in one context may well not apply to another. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Agency problems in tracking stock and minority carve-out decisions: Explaining the discrepancy in short- and long-term performances

Several studies have evaluated short- and long-term performances of parent firms who resort to restructuring via tracking stock or minority carve-out. Results show that short-term positive performance of restructuring parents turns negative in the long haul. Although researchers have attempted to resolve this inconsistency, a satisfactory explanation is yet to emerge. In this paper, we offer the self-serving behavior of restructuring parents’ managers as a potential explanation for the observed discrepancy in the short- and long-term performances. We argue that managers of parent firms create new units to receive additional compensation packages. We present evidence that the long-term negative performance can be attributed, at least partially, to self-awarded raise. Since managers of tracking stock parents enjoy a greater degree of managerial discretion and controls, we hypothesize that they would pay themselves a bigger compensation package than their carve-out counterparts and their long-term performance would be inferior to that of the latter group. Our results largely support these hypotheses.

Limits to arbitrage and hedging: Evidence from commodity markets

We build an equilibrium model of commodity markets in which speculators are capital constrained, and commodity producers have hedging demands for commodity futures. Increases in producers' hedging demand or speculators' capital constraints increase hedging costs via price-pressure on futures. These in turn affect producers' equilibrium hedging and supply decision inducing a link between a financial friction in the futures market and the commodity spot prices. Consistent with the model, measures of producers' propensity to hedge forecasts futures returns and spot prices in oil and gas market data from 1979 to 2010. The component of the commodity futures risk premium associated with producer hedging demand rises when speculative activity reduces. We conclude that limits to financial arbitrage generate limits to hedging by producers, and affect equilibrium commodity supply and prices.     

Capital Structure Deviation and Speed of Adjustment

As a firm deviates from its target leverage from above (below), the bankruptcy costs (foregone tax savings) rise at an increasing rate while the tax savings (reduced bankruptcy costs) rise at a decreasing rate, generating a stronger incentive for rebalancing capital structure. This phenomenon renders the speed of adjustment (SOA) an increasing function of the deviation. Employing a bootstrapping‐based estimation strategy that averts well‐known estimation biases, we find U.S. firms exhibit a positive SOA sensitivity to leverage deviation. Also, the SOA sensitivity is greater for overlevered than underlevered firms.     

On the (non-)lattice structure of the equilibrium set in games with strategic substitutes

This paper studies models where the optimal response functions under consideration are not increasing in endogenous variables, and weakly increasing in exogenous parameters. Such models include games with strategic substitutes, and include cases where additionally, some variables may be strategic complements. The main result here is that the equilibrium set in such models is a non-empty, complete lattice, if, and only if, there is a unique equilibrium. Indeed, for a given parameter value, a pair of distinct equilibria are never comparable. Therefore, with multiple equilibria, some of the established techniques for exhibiting increasing equilibria or computing equilibria that use the largest or smallest equilibrium, or that use the lattice structure of the equilibrium set do not apply to such models. Moreover, there are no ranked equilibria in such models. Additionally, the analysis here implies a new proof and a slight generalization of some existing results. It is shown that when a parameter increases, no new equilibrium is smaller than any old equilibrium. (In particular, in n-player games of strategic substitutes with real-valued action spaces, symmetric equilibria increase with the parameter.)      

Adoption of new technology and joint venture instability

We consider a joint venture between a local firm from a less developed country, and a foreign multinational. In a dynamic two period model, we demonstrate that the availability of new technology can trigger a joint venture breakdown, a result that is consistent with the empirical evidence. We find that such breakdown is more likely if the MNC is relatively patient, or, in contrast to the existing literature, there is an increase in the level of demand. Moreover, our results are robust to alternative assumptions regarding bargaining power and control.