并购交易中的金降落伞计划

对于即将奔赴海外进行并购的中国企业而言,必须仔细审视这些“金降落伞”计划是否会加大收购成本或增加目标公司现金支出从而阻碍购并。     

International Financial Cooperation and the Number of Adherents: The Basel Committee and Capital Regulation

Theoretical analyses of international cooperation point to cooperation being optimized with a small number of participants. History is consistent with this view. However an anomaly is the international capital standards created by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). Basel I has over 100 adherents, and approximately that number of countries have been identified in a survey as candidates for Basel II. The author demonstrates that this is not an anomaly. First, Basel I was a product of a duopoly and then an oligopoly prior to approval by the BCBS. Secondly, self-interest and other factors explain why more than 100 countries have agreed to accept these standards. JEL Classification Numbers: E58, F33, G15, G28     

International Rent Sharing and Domestic Labour Markets: A Macroeconomic Analysis

Compared to international trade relations relatively little is known about the role foreign direct investment linkages play in the transmission of disturbances from one country to the next. Inspired by the microevidence on profit sharing within multinational corporations and within industries, we investigate for six countries whether a cross-border rent-sharing phenomenon can be identified at the macroeconomic level. The rent-sharing hypothesis implies that an increase in foreign profitability should boost wages and/or employment in the domestic economy. We find corroborative evidence for Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. US labour market conditions, by contrast, are not affected by changes in profitability in other countries. JEL no. E32, F23, F40, J23, J31     

Subsidizing Charitable Giving with Rebates or Matching: Further Laboratory Evidence

We examine two different ways to subsidize charitable giving: by a rebate (returning a portion of the donation to the giver) or by a match (adding additional donations to the giver's donation). In previous experimental research, we have shown that participants give more to charity under the match than under an equivalent rebate. The previous within-subject experimental design required participants to make a series of decisions under both types of subsidy. Each decision consisted of an allocation of an endowment between the subject and a charity chosen by the subject from a specified list. This article examines whether that result is an artifact of the previous within-subjects design: subjects may have failed to fully distinguish the two types of subsidy. In the current article, we report results from a between-subjects design, where participants are required to make only one type of decision—involving rebates or involving matching subsidies. Our results confirm previous findings.