首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
文章检索
  按 检索   检索词:      
出版年份:   被引次数:   他引次数: 提示:输入*表示无穷大
  收费全文   162篇
  免费   5篇
财政金融   17篇
工业经济   8篇
计划管理   24篇
经济学   56篇
运输经济   11篇
旅游经济   3篇
贸易经济   33篇
农业经济   1篇
经济概况   14篇
  2021年   1篇
  2020年   2篇
  2019年   8篇
  2018年   3篇
  2017年   4篇
  2016年   3篇
  2015年   4篇
  2014年   5篇
  2013年   12篇
  2012年   5篇
  2011年   12篇
  2010年   7篇
  2009年   10篇
  2008年   6篇
  2007年   6篇
  2006年   5篇
  2005年   2篇
  2004年   4篇
  2003年   4篇
  2002年   6篇
  2001年   2篇
  2000年   7篇
  1999年   9篇
  1998年   2篇
  1997年   4篇
  1996年   2篇
  1995年   2篇
  1993年   4篇
  1992年   5篇
  1991年   2篇
  1990年   1篇
  1989年   1篇
  1986年   1篇
  1983年   2篇
  1982年   3篇
  1981年   3篇
  1980年   2篇
  1977年   2篇
  1966年   1篇
  1965年   1篇
  1962年   1篇
  1957年   1篇
排序方式: 共有167条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
161.
In the framework of (set-valued or single-valued) solutions for coalitional games with transferable utility, the three notions of consistency, bilateral consistency, and converse consistency are frequently used to provide axiomatic characterizations of a particular solution (like the core, prekernel, prenucleolus, Shapley value). Our main equivalence theorem claims that a solution satisfies consistency (with respect to an arbitrary reduced game) if and only if the solution satisfies both bilateral consistency and converse consistency (with respect to the same reduced game). The equivalence theorem presumes transitivity of the reduced game technique as well as difference independence on payoff vectors for two-person reduced games.  相似文献   
162.
163.
164.
The paper analyses the value creation benefits of the holding form of organisation in France by empirically examining the effects of non-controlling stake purchases on target shareholder wealth, operational performance and bidder shareholder returns for a sample of 122 stake purchases in French listed companies. The evidence puts into question the ability of holding companies to create value for the firms they purchase stakes in or their own shareholders, adding to the current debate on the relative role played by large shareholders and the external market for corporate control as ultimate disciplining devices.  相似文献   
165.
166.
167.
When the telecommunications industry was liberalised in Europe and North America in the 1980s and 1990s, it inherited a legacy of monopoly providers whose footprint was national or multi-regional in its character. The regulatory framework, particularly that adopted in EU member states, reflected this pattern of relatively homogeneous deployment achieved, in part, by decades of cross-subsidised pricing and universal service goals. Perhaps because of this legacy, telecommunications regulators have often adopted the presumption that relevant markets are national in character, unless proven otherwise Although geographically-variegated regulatory remedies have been permitted (even in the face of allegedly national relevant markets) and adopted in many member states, many regulators have never done so, and overly cautious thresholds for permitting geographically based forbearance suggest a continued bias towards presuming national markets and remedies. We find that this presumption of uniformity and the tendency to aggregate geographic markets together is not supported by first principles of antitrust analysis, although there may have been strong practical reasons to apply this presumption in the past circumstances of the telecommunications and broadband industries.On the ground, however, there has arguably never been as much heterogeneity across geographies and across technological solutions that provide effective ultra-fast broadband speeds. Both technological (i.e., product market) and geographic heterogeneity are likely to increase with the advent of mobile 5G networks. With their deployment, a cautious regulatory stance towards geographic variation and a cautious regulatory stance towards inter-technology or inter-modal competition may result in regulation that could exceed what is required to ensure effective competition and could instead distort the incentives to enter of facilities-based actors. This may also result in higher-cost and inefficient investment. A more geographically varied and technologically agnostic regulatory framework may satisfy the principle of proportionate and focused regulation—with the possibility that the locus of regulation shifts from the access network to bottleneck facilities such as fibre, ducts and poles.This discussion is especially germane when one considers the highly speculative nature of forecasts and projections about future demand, and the competing claims of proponents of 5G and fibre. While there is some scepticism about the performance of mobile networks, we note that pure mobile and fixed 5G services may have synergies in deployment, and that the idea of competing with residential broadband services is a core strategy of very influential large-scale industry actors. In terms of a future research agenda, regulatory decisions could benefit from much more research into the relationship between domestic and global bandwidth constraints and their influence on development of software and application, as well as much more quantitative research by academics on the drivers of bandwidth demand. The risks associated with promoting investment that results in large-scale wasted resources should also be central to the regulatory agenda.  相似文献   
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号