Financial crisis in the Russian Federation: Are the Russians learning to tango?

The paper presents some evidence about the rise and fall of financial markets in Russia in the course of 1998, and discusses the causes and likely consequences of the crisis for the Russian economy. It also discusses some important policy issues regarding the effects of global financial integration. The central message is that the Russian financial disaster is a typical example of crisis contagion, although the underlying vulnerability of the economy was a problem which no investor could ignore. In particular, financial stabilization remained extremely fragile owing to the deterioration of the fiscal situation and the vulnerability of the banking system.     

The Clean Development Mechanism in a world carbon market

This paper discusses the role of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in the market for carbon quotas and countries' commitments to reduce their carbon emission levels. We show that the CDM contributes to an efficient funding of clean technology investments in least developed countries. However, the CDM is not neutral on the global level of carbon emissions as it entices countries to raise their emission caps. The CDM may also make inappropriate the inclusion of any country that takes no emission abatement commitment. It can even make inefficient a country's decision to commit to an emission target. The implications of the presence of non‐additional projects are also analyzed.     

Impact of social media on economic growth – evidence from social media

This article attempts to investigate the impact of social media (SM) on economic growth. Using information obtained from memberships to social networks, we find that SM has a negative and significant impact on economic growth. This provides evidence in favour of our hypothesis that SM increases the search costs for information and also increases the substitution effect from labour to leisure thereby producing a negative impact on growth.     

Does Aid Unpredictability Weaken Governance? Evidence from Developing Countries

This paper examines the effects of aid on governance from a different perspective by asserting that aid unpredictability can potentially increase corruption in recipient countries by providing incentives to risk‐averse and corrupt political leaders to engage in rent‐seeking activities. Analyses of data from 80 developing countries over the period 1984–2004 offer evidence that higher aid unpredictability is associated with more corruption as measured by a synthetic index. We also find further evidence that this latter impact is more severe in countries with weak initial institutional conditions. These findings are a supplementary advocacy for the need for better management and better predictability of aid flow in developing countries.     

Bayesian inference for the mover–stayer model in continuous time with an application to labour market transition data

This paper presents Bayesian inference procedures for the continuous time mover–stayer model applied to labour market transition data collected in discrete time. These methods allow us to derive the probability of embeddability of the discrete‐time modelling with the continuous‐time one. A special emphasis is put on two alternative procedures, namely the importance sampling algorithm and a new Gibbs sampling algorithm. Transition intensities, proportions of stayers and functions of these parameters are then estimated with the Gibbs sampling algorithm for individual transition data coming from the French Labour Force Surveys collected over the period 1986–2000. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Forbonnais,the two balances and the Économistes

Abstract

The link established by François Véron de Forbonnais (1722–1800) between two balances, the balance of trade and the balance of power, takes its full meaning in the context of the science of trade or “commerce politique” the author developed in his works. In polemical stance against the Économistes – the Physiocrats – and starting from the irremediable fact of the division of nations rather than their union, he intended to promote two goals: peace in Europe and the prosperity of nations through foreign trade. His approach was disputed by the Économistes who proposed instead a confraternal vision of nations in a free trade environment. This paper analyses Forbonnais' arguments, the answers of the Économistes and Forbonnais' final reply, and stresses the different views of politics this polemic denotes.     

RACIAL BELIEFS,LOCATION, AND THE CAUSES OF CRIME*

This article provides a unified explanation for why blacks commit more crime, are located in poorer neighborhoods, and receive lower wages than whites. If everybody believes that blacks are more criminal than whites—even if there is no basis for this—then blacks are offered lower wages and, as a result, locate further away from jobs. Distant residence increases even more the black–white wage gap because of more tiredness and higher commuting costs. Blacks have thus a lower opportunity cost of committing crime and become indeed more criminal than whites. Therefore, beliefs are self‐fulfilling.     

Law enforcement and transition

We present a simple model to analyze law enforcement problems in transition economies. Law enforcement implies coordination problems and multiplicity of equilibria due to a law abidance and a fiscal externality. We analyze two institutional mechanisms for solving the coordination problem. A first mechanism, which we call “dualism”, follows the scenario of Chinese transition where the government keeps direct control over economic resources and where a liberalized non-state sector follows market rules. The second mechanism we put forward is accession to the European Union. We show that accession to the European Union, even without external borrowing, provides a mechanism to eliminate the “bad” equilibrium, provided the “accessing” country is small enough relative to the European Union. Interestingly, we show that accession without conditionality is better than with conditionality because conditionality creates a coordination problem of its own that partly annihilates the positive effects of expected accession.     

A Simple Model of Corporate Bailouts in a Globalized Economy*

In this paper, we explore how globalization influences the decision of governments to rescue inefficient domestic firms when bailouts affect firms’ markup. We develop a model of international trade in which immobile domestic-owned enterprises (DOEs) compete with foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs) in an oligopolistic market. The decision to bail out DOEs leads to lower corporate tax revenues if FOEs are immobile, whereas tax revenues might increase if FOEs are mobile. Interestingly, the mobility of FOEs makes governments more prone to rescuing inefficient domestic firms because tax competition reduces the opportunity cost of a bailout policy in terms of public good provision.