Design principles for corporate venture transition processes in established technology firms

Corporate venturing has become a well‐known approach toward new business development and strategic renewal for established technology firms. However, without an effectively designed process for aligning and integrating a corporate venture in the established business, the firm increases the risk of venture failure. This paper provides a process perspective on corporate venture transition. Based on the results of an empirical study of six corporate venture transition processes, we present suitable actions for each of the different phases of the venture transition process. In addition, we indicate the proper timing for venture transition, which is one of the long‐standing difficulties in this area. Finally, we integrate the results of the empirical study with knowledge from extant literature in a set of design principles. These design principles provide practical guidelines to improve corporate venture transition processes.     

Bringing History In: Policy accumulation and general policy alienation

Research mainly looked at problems public professionals have with specific policy programmes. However, policies are not developed in a vacuum. Public professionals are often confronted with (a series of) policy changes, intended to refine, replace or complement other policies. This policy accumulation results in professionals having a certain predisposition towards policies in general. To conceptualize this predisposition, we introduce the term general policy alienation. We investigate whether the earlier developed policy alienation scale can be adapted to measure general policy alienation. Our analyses show that the scale performs satisfactorily. Theoretical relevance, as well as directions for practical applications are discussed.     

New development: Public sector controllership—reinventing the financial specialist as a countervailing power

Different types of ‘controllers’ can be distinguished in the public sector. The authors’ research indicates that public sector controllers acknowledge the distinctive characteristics of ‘hybrid’ controllers, but question some of the possible advantages of ‘pure’ controllers. This result could signal a decreasing share of pure controllers and thus a loss of financial expertise in the public sector. This article calls for the controller to be ‘re-invented’ as a professional who combines solid financial expertise with an independent and critical attitude towards overly ambitious politicians and managers. The general public’s support for public sector organizations could be enhanced if strong controllers counterbalance the sometimes too optimistic views of managers and politicians.     

Small is beautiful? Financial efficiency of small fundraising charities

The study analyses potential scale efficiencies of 1196 Dutch fundraising charities for 2005–2009. The data set includes a unique group of small charities (reporting an income of less than €1 million). The study articulates and tests differences in financial efficiency between smaller and larger charities, specifically concerning program expenditure, administrative expenditure, and fundraising expenditure. The study finds that reported levels of program-spending efficiency and administrative efficiency are similar across small and large charities, with no economies of scale. In addition, the study finds that smaller charities report considerably better fundraising efficiency ratios, with the smallest charities reporting an average spend of €8 to raise €100 and the largest charities reporting an average spend of €15. The paper discusses why larger charities appear to experience scale inefficiencies in fundraising and provides directions for further research.     

Policy instruments for evolution of bounded rationality: Application to climate-energy problems

We demonstrate how an evolutionary agent-based model can be used to evaluate climate policies that take the heterogeneity of strategies of individual agents into account. An essential feature of the model is that the fitness of an economic strategy is determined by the relative welfare of the associated agent as compared to its immediate neighbors in a social network. This enables the study of policies that affect relative positions of individuals. We formulate two innovative climate policies, namely a prize, altering directly relative welfare, and advertisement, which influences the social network of interactions. The policies are illustrated using a simple model of global warming where a resource with a negative environmental impact—fossil energy—can be replaced by an environmentally neutral yet less cost-effective alternative, namely renewable energy. It is shown that the general approach enlarges the scope of economic policy analysis.     

Why do many resource-rich countries have negative genuine saving?: Anticipation of better times or rapacious rent seeking

We investigate the Hartwick rule for saving of a nation necessary to sustain a constant level of private consumption for a small open economy with an exhaustible stock of natural resources. The amount by which a country saves and invests less than the marginal resource rents equals the expected capital gains on reserves of natural resources plus the expected increase in interest income on net foreign assets plus the expected fall in the cost of resource extraction due to expected improvements in extraction technology. Effectively, depletion is then postponed until better times. This suggests that it is not necessarily sub-optimal for resource-rich countries to have negative genuine saving. However, in countries with different groups with imperfectly defined property rights on natural resources, political distortions induce faster resource depletion than suggested by the Hotelling rule. Fractionalised societies with imperfect property rights build up more foreign assets than their marginal resource rents, but in the long run accumulate less foreign assets than homogenous societies. Hence, such societies end up with lower sustainable consumption and are worse off, especially if seepage is strong, the number of rival groups is large and the country does not enjoy much monopoly power on the resource market. Genuine saving is zero in such societies. However, World Bank genuine saving figures based on market rather than accounting prices will be negative, albeit less so in more fractionalised societies with less secure property rights.