Strategic Price Discrimination in Compulsory Insurance Markets

This paper considers price discrimination when competing firms do not observe a customer’s type but only some other variable correlated to it. This is a typical situation in many insurance markets—such as motor insurance—where it is also often the case that insurance is compulsory. We characterise the equilibria and their welfare properties under various price regimes. We show that discrimination based on immutable characteristics such as gender is a dominant strategy, either when firms offer policies at a fixed price or when they charge according to some consumption variable that is correlated to costs. In the latter case, gender discrimination can be an outcome of strategic interaction alone in situations where it would not be adopted by a monopolist. Strategic price discrimination may also increase cross subsidies between types, contrary to expectations.JEL Classification No.: L13, G22     

Impacts of e-Commerce and Enhanced Information Endowments on Financial Services: A Quantitative Analysis of Transparency, Differential Pricing, and Disintermediation

Some implications of e-Commerce financial services firms are becoming clear. The web drives transparency, and increases the information endowment of all market participants. It is harder to manipulate customers' behavior, or to overcharge them. Transparency drives differential pricing. Not all customers can or should be charged the same prices. Transparency reduces the viability of cross-subsidies between customers can or between products. The differential pricing enabled by the web transforms distribution channels, and enables direct distribution and alternative forms of distribution. Some intermediateraries may be bypassed altogether, while others may rapidly lose their best, most profitable, and previously most loyal customers.     

Kursprognose mit Hilfe der Technischen Analyse — Eine empirische Untersuchung

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

The Capital Tax and Welfare Effects from Asymmetric Information on Equity Markets

This paper explores the implications of informational asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors for optimal capital tax rates and welfare. It adopts a model in which asymmetric information implies a home bias in equity. The paper finds that asymmetric information may raise capital tax rates by reducing the marginal cost of taxation. Furthermore, it shows that investors may gain from informational asymmetries. Although asymmetric information increases the uncertainty as perceived by investors, it may also increase tax rates and allow for a higher consumption of public goods. This reflects that asymmetric information may reduce the distortionary effects of competition among governments.     

Hedging Housing Risk*

An unusually rich source of data on housing prices in Stockholm is used to analyze the investment implications of housing choices. This empirical analysis derives market-wide price and return series for housing investment during a 13-year period, and it also provides estimates of the individual-specific, idiosyncratic, variation in housing returns. Because the idiosyncratic component follows an autocorrelated process, the analysis of portfolio choice is dependent upon the holding period. We analyze the composition of household investment portfolios containing housing, common stocks, stocks in real estate holding companies, bonds, and t-bills. For short holding periods, the efficient portfolio contains essentially no housing. For longer periods, low-risk portfolios contain 15 to 50 percent housing. These results suggest that there are large potential gains from policies or institutions that would permit households to hedge their lumpy investments in housing. We estimate the potential value of hedges in reducing risk to households, yet yielding the same investment returns. The value is surprisingly large, especially to poorer homeowners.     

Erklärungsansätze für vertragswidriges Verhalten Versicherungsnehmern aus Sicht der ökonomischen Theorie

The two main purposes of this paper are an introduction to the economic analysis of insurance fraud and furthermore a derivation of factors that determine fraudulent behavior of policyholders on insurance markets. Consequently, we analyze the strategic decision problems of insurance companies and the policyholders and identify some factors that can help to reduce fraudulent behavior. In this context we evaluate two derived starting points for the combat against insurance fraud: fraud detection systems and a consequent charge policy of detected defrauders. We illustrate that both points can help to reduce the cost of fraud. Furthermore, we enhance our earlier analysis with respect to the empirical fact that some individuals care about fairness or — in the insurance fraud context — the legitimacy of their actions. Surprisingly, in some market situations these concerns of some policyholders do not lead to a lower fraud probability. Finally, we discuss how and to what extent insurance companies can influence such ethical concerns of policyholders. On that score, we distinguish insurance specific and insurance unspecific factors and their impact on the consumers attitudes towards insurance fraud.     

Aspekte einer Neugestaltung des Rechtes der Versicherungsvermittlung

The current fundamental reform of the German insurance law cannot and will not stop short of the law of insurance mediation. Up to now Sec. 43 to 48 Versicherungsvertragsgesetz (VVG = German Insurance Act) govern only one type of insurance intermediary known as insurance agent. The act only sets up rules to which extent the insurance agent has authority to bind the insurer. In the way the law is construed by the courts it differs in many aspects from the written law. Thus it is suggested to define the generic term ?insurance intermediary“ in the act as well as the subcategories ?insurance broker“ and ?insurance agent“, whereby the term ?insurance agent“ also includes the field staff employed by an insurer. In connection with the diffi-cult distinction between insurance brokers and insurance agents it remains questionable on which type of intermediary the rules regulating the relationship between agents and insurants and thereby protecting the potential customers should be applied accordingly. This controversial and in practice significant question should be explicitly decided by the legislator for reasons of legal certainty. In so far Sec. 43a of the Austrian Insurance Act could act as a model function. Regarding the insurance agents’ authority to receive (Empfangsvertretungsmacht des Versicherungsvertreters) for the insurer propositions exist to explicitly declare Sec. 43 No.l VVG, which grants the agent the authority to receive when accepting a contractual offer for the insurer, as mandatory. This suggestion would be in accordance with the current case law. Furthermore the wording of Sec. 43 No.l VVG should be altered so that the insurants’ pre-contractual risk-notifications, which the prevailing opinion already regards as being included, is explicitly mentioned. In principle Sec. 43 No.2 WG, which grants the agent the authority to receive notifications and representations for the duration of the insurance contract, should be declared as mandatory, too. Exempted should be the authority to receive for dispositions regarding the entitlements to benefits from (life) insurance contracts and the right to receive the insured sum. Sec. 44 WG, which strongly restricts the attribution of the agent’s knowledge to the insurer, is unconvincing, especially from a legal policy point of view. Therefore it is to be cancelled without substitution. Finally the legislator should refrain from codifying the customary liability based on the principles of reliance.     

Zwischen Vertragstreue und Vorteilsstreben

In the context of this article the author states that the present law situation is quite sufficient, in order to fight frauds within the insurance range effectively. In his personal view it is missing however at general consciousness that such frauds represent criminal injustice. In all other respects the author demands the attitude of the insurance industry to bring already detected criminal offences also to criminal pursuit.     

Zur Nachhaltigkeit der Generationenverträge: Eine Diagnose der Kranken- und Pflegeversicherung

Employing the generational accounting approach, this paper analyses the stance of fiscal policy in Germany. We find that fiscal policy is presently not sustainable, which is mainly due to pay-as-you-go financed social insurance systems. In order to illustrate the relative impact, we isolate the Public Health Insurance and the Public Long Term Care Insurance. Our findings suggest that without radical reforms the implicit debt burden for future generations might reach a magnitude of more than two times the annual GDP and contribution rates to both schemes will explode during the next three decades.