ROY MODEL SORTING AND NONRANDOM SELECTION IN THE VALUATION OF A STATISTICAL LIFE*

Wage‐hedonics is used to recover the value of a statistical life (VSL) by exploiting the fact that workers choosing riskier occupations are compensated with a higher wage. Roy (Oxford Economic Papers 3 (1951), 135–46) suggests that observed wage distributions will be distorted if individuals choose jobs according to idiosyncratic returns. We describe how this type of sorting biases wage‐hedonic VSL estimates and implement two new estimation strategies that correct that bias. Using data from the Current Population Surveys, we recover VSL estimates that are three to four times larger than those based on the traditional techniques, statistically significant, and robust to a wide array of specifications.     

Impacts of meat product recalls on consumer demand in the USA

The impact of meat product recall events on consumer demand (beef, pork, poultry, and other consumption goods) in the USA is tested empirically. Beef, pork, and poultry recall indices are constructed from both the Food Safety Inspection Service's meat recall events and from newspaper reports over the period 1982–1998. Following previous product recall studies, recall indices are incorporated as shift variables in consumers’ demand functions. Estimating an absolute price version of the Rotterdam demand model, findings indicate that Food Safety Inspection Service's meat recall events significantly impact demand, and newspaper reports do not. Moreover, although elasticities related to recall events are significant they are small in magnitude relative to price and income effects. Any favourable effects on the demands of meat substitutes for a recall are offset by a more general negative effect on meat demand. The general negative effect indicates a shift out of meat to non-meat consumption goods.     

Deunionization and job polarization – a macroeconomic model analysis for a small open economy

Declining unionization rates and job polarization are two important labor market developments of recent decades. A large body of literature has analyzed these phenomena separately, but little has been done to see whether there is a link between them. We employ a macroeconomic model for a small open economy with a large input–output core to analyze how deunionization may cause job polarization. Our analysis shows that medium-skilled workers are negatively affected by deunionization, mainly as a result of the heterogeneity of the elasticities of substitution between different types of labor. While the elasticities of substitution between high- and medium-skilled labor are relatively low, the elasticities of substitution between medium- and low-skilled are relatively high. As a result, when deunionization leads to increased wage dispersion, we find that demand for low-skilled increases at the expense of medium-skilled labor, thus yielding a more polarized labor market.     

Collaborative cost-cutting: productive efficiency as an interdependency between public organizations

Collaboration between public sector organizations is typically understood as a response to complexity. Agencies collaborate in order to address complex, cross-cutting policy needs that cannot be met individually. However, when organizational size is a constraining factor in public service efficiency, collaboration can also reduce costs by capturing scale economies unavailable to organizations of sub-optimal size. Using organization theory, the article conceptualizes these two different triggers for public sector collaboration, and builds a framework for tracing their wider impact upon the formation, operation, and outcome of inter-agency partnerships. The framework is illustrated, and its implications for future research are explored.     

Buyer-Option Contracts Restored: Renegotiation, Inefficient Threats, and the Hold-Up Problem

"Buyer-option" contracts, in which the buyer selects the productvariant to be traded and chooses whether to accept delivery,are often used to solve holdup problems. We present a simplegame that focuses sharply on subgames in which the buyer proposesinefficient actions in order to improve his bargaining position.We argue for one of several alternative ways to model this situation.We then apply that modeling choice to recent models of the foundationsof incomplete contracts and show that a buyer-option contractis sufficient to induce first-best outcomes.     

Evaluating the British Model of Electricity Deregulation

Abstract ** :  A key aspect of the 1990 reforms to the British electricity supply industry was the introduction of a formal system of regulation by an autonomous regulatory body. It was expected that replacement of monopolies in some areas by markets and price‐setting in monopoly areas using a simple incentive formula would mean that regulation of the industry would be 'light'. This article examines how regulation has turned out in practice. It concludes that the promise of 'light' regulation has not been fulfilled. Regulation of competitive markets is a major regulatory activity, incentive regulation has evolved into a complex and intrusive form of rate‐of‐return, while regulation of industry structure has allowed the industry to descend into a concentrated, vertically integrated structure, at odds with the aims of the reforms .     

Vetoes Overridable by Simple Majorities

Conventional wisdom has it that the absolute (purely negative) veto is ineffective when overridable by a simple majority. That is flatly false. The examples that prove this surprising fact are themselves surprisingly ordinary yet oddly resistant to direct observation. They reveal virtues of a neglected institutional design.JEL classification: D71, D72     

Public Investment and Income Taxation: Redistribution vs. Productive Performance

This paper deals with government investment in a static two-type self-selection model of optimum income taxation. It is shown that the second-best investment rule is consistent with efficient production, provided that public investment has no influence on relative factor prices. Otherwise, however, redistributive income taxation implies that optimal investment expenditures exceed (or fall below) the efficient level as long as they raise (or decrease) the wage rate of the unskilled individuals relative to the wage rate of the skilled individuals.     

Productivity Dispersion and Measurement Error

Several reasons have been put forward to explain the high dispersion of productivity across establishments: quality of management, different input usage and market distortions, to name but a few. Although it is acknowledged that a sizable portion of productivity dispersion may also be due to measurement error, little research has been devoted to identifying how much they contribute. We outline a novel procedure for identifying the role of measurement error in explaining the empirical dispersion of productivity across establishments. The starting point of our framework is the errors-in-variable model consisting of a measurement equation and a structural equation for latent productivity. We estimate the variance of the measurement error and subsequently estimate the variance of the latent productivity variable, which is not contaminated by measurement error. Using Norwegian data on the manufacture of food products, we find that about one percent of the measured dispersion stems from measurement error.     

Learning to bid: The design of auctions under uncertainty and adaptation

We examine auction design in a context where symmetrically informed adaptive agents with common valuations learn to bid for a good. Despite the absence of private valuations, asymmetric information, or risk aversion, bidder strategies do not converge to the Bertrand–Nash equilibrium strategies even in the long run. Deviations from equilibrium strategies depend on uncertainty regarding the value of the good, auction structure, the agents? learning model, and the number of bidders. Although individual agents learn Nash bidding strategies in isolation, the learning of each agent, by flattening the best-reply correspondence of other agents, blocks common learning. These negative externalities are more severe in second-price auctions, auctions with many bidders, and auctions where the good has an uncertain value ex post.