Higher wages in exporting firms: self-selection, export effect, or both? First evidence from linked employer-employee data

While it is a stylized fact that exporting firms pay higher wages than non-exporting firms, the direction of the link between exporting and wages is less clear. Using a rich set of German linked employer-employee panel data we follow over time plants that start to export. We show that the exporter wage premium does already exist in the years before firms start to export, and that it does not increase in the following years. Higher wages in exporting firms are thus due to self-selection of more productive, better paying firms into export markets; they are not caused by export activities.     

Financial market equilibria with cumulative prospect theory

The paper first shows that financial market equilibria need not to exist if agents possess cumulative prospect theory preferences with piecewise-power value functions. This is due to the boundary behavior of the cumulative prospect theory value function, which might cause an infinite short-selling problem. But even when a non-negativity constraint on final wealth is added, non-existence can occur due to the non-convexity of CPT preferences, which might cause discontinuities in the agents’ demand functions. This latter observation also implies that concavification arguments which has been used in portfolio allocation problems with CPT preferences do not apply to our general equilibrium setting with finite many agents. Existence of equilibria is established when non-negativity constraints on final wealth are imposed and there is a continuum of agents in the market. However, if the original prospect theory is used instead of cumulative prospect theory, then other discontinuity problems can cause non-existence of market equilibria even in this case.     

Natural resource extraction and civil conflict

Based on evidence linking natural resources to civil conflict, this paper studies two armed groups fighting to control a resource and possibly a second prize. Labor is used in the agricultural, resource extraction and conflict sectors, and the groups also buy a capital input to conflict subject to the constraint that capital spending cannot exceed resource earnings. I find that exogenous shocks can have different effects on conflict intensity depending on whether the credit constraint binds. In particular, international policies to ban natural resource exports from conflict zones (e.g. ‘blood diamonds’), raise agricultural productivity or limit the import of weapons will limit conflict intensity if the credit constraint binds. However, if the credit constraint does not bind, then the first two policies promote conflict, and so could even the third policy. The results therefore suggest some caution in international policymaking.     

Uncertainty avoidance,risk tolerance and corporate takeover decisions

In this paper, we examine the role of national culture in corporate takeover decisions, by arguing that managerial risk tolerance (a combination of risk aversion and risk perception), at the national level, is a cultural trait and affects the expected net synergies CEOs require. We propose a theoretical framework that links CEO risk tolerance to the expected net synergies. We empirically show that CEOs of firms located in countries with lower levels of risk tolerance, measured by Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) uncertainty avoidance score, require higher premiums on takeovers, and show that uncertainty avoidance plays a greater role in relatively large takeovers. Additional testing reveals that CEOs from high uncertainty avoiding nations engage less in cross-border/cross-industry takeovers, suggesting that uncertainty avoidance captures more the CEO’s risk perception than his/her risk aversion.     

Investing in natural capital as management strategy in fisheries: The case of the Baltic Sea cod fishery

Many of today's fish stocks are officially managed following the precautionary approach. Yet, different political objectives and uncertainties among fishermen about their economic future make its implementation difficult. Over 75% of all commercially valuable stocks are exploited, overused, or collapsed and in a state of recovery [FAO, 2004. The state of the world fisheries and aquaculture. FAO, Rome. Managing fish stocks with an ecosystem-based approach is likely to stop the divestment of natural capital by combining sustainable use strategies with the preservation of marine ecosystems. Using the example of the Baltic Sea cod fishery, we show that a recovery program is economically and ecologically viable and reduces negative externalities. While policy makers must assist fishermen during the early years of the program, fishermen will experience greater landings and profits in subsequent years.     

Sustainability in shipper-logistics service provider relationships: A tentative taxonomy based on agency theory and stimulus-response analysis

The paper contributes to research on sustainability in dyadic buyer–supplier relationships of logistics services. It presents deeper knowledge on why and how suppliers choose to behave sustainably. The research analyzes how shippers stimulate their LSPs and how LSPs respond by conducting sustainability activities. Agency theory and the stimulus–organism–response model are applied as the theoretical foundations for an explorative case study analysis of three large and five small and medium-sized European logistics service providers (LSPs) active in road transport services. Significant differences are found between the sustainability efforts of SMEs and large LSPs and a tentative taxonomy of the sustainability response types of LSPs is derived. The taxonomy contributes to theory-guided research in sustainable supply chain management and procurement. Thereby, mismatches of stimuli and responses are identified and related agency problems in dyadic relationships in terms of sustainability are discussed. From a managerial point of view, the findings may serve as a starting point for purchasers of logistics services to develop adequate sustainability selection criteria and incentives.     

The Basic Analytics of Access to Financial Services

Access to financial services, or rather the lack thereof, is often indiscriminately decried as problem in many developing countries. This paper argues that the “problem of access” should rather be analyzed by identifying different demand and supply constraints. We use the concept of an access possibilities frontier, drawn for a given set of state variables, to distinguish between cases where a financial system settles below the constrained optimum, cases where this constrained optimum is too low, and—in credit services—cases where the observed outcome is excessively high. We distinguish between payment and savings services and fixed intermediation costs, on the one hand, and lending services and different sources of credit risk, on the other hand. We include both supply and demand side frictions that can lead to lower access. The analysis helps identify bankable and banked population, the binding constraint to close the gap between the two, and policies to prudently expand the bankable population. This new conceptual framework can inform the debate on adequate policies to expand access to financial services and can serve as basis for an informed measurement of access.     

Reaching out: Access to and use of banking services across countries

This paper is a first attempt at measuring financial sector outreach and investigating its determinants. First, we present new indicators of banking sector outreach across 99 countries, constructed from aggregate data provided by bank regulators. Second, we show that our indicators closely predict harder-to-collect micro-level statistics of household and firm use of banking services, and are associated with measures of firm financing obstacles in the expected way. Finally, we explore the association between our outreach indicators and standard determinants of financial sector depth. We find many similarities but also some differences in the determinants of outreach and depth.