The effects of customer equity drivers on loyalty across services industries and firms

Customer equity drivers (CEDs)—value equity, brand equity, and relationship equity—positively affect loyalty intentions, but this effect varies across industries and firms. We empirically examine potential industry and firm characteristics that explain why the CEDs–loyalty link varies across services industries and firms in the Netherlands. The results show that (1) some previously assumed industry and firm characteristics have moderating effects while others do not and (2) firm-level advertising expenditures constitute the most crucial moderator because they influence all three loyalty strategies (significant for value equity and brand equity; marginally significant for relationship equity), while three industry contexts (i.e., innovative markets, visibility to others, and complexity of purchase decisions) each influence two of the three loyalty strategies. Our results clearly show that specific industry and firm characteristics affect the effectiveness of specific loyalty strategies.     

Partner Empowerment and Relationship Failure in Franchising

Franchisors must empower franchisees to take decisions on a package of peripheral elements in response to pressure for local adaptations and for entrepreneurial autonomy. However, little is known about which specific elements should be decentralized and to what extent adaptation of such elements affects disputes between franchisor and franchisees. This study explores these issues by analyzing which decision rights should be franchisees’ responsibility to reduce early terminations instigated by the franchisor. The results show that delegating decision rights on local advertising and personnel reduces early terminations while delegation of pricing tends to increase them, regardless of the size of the system. Interestingly, successful delegation in other decision‐areas is contingent on the brand‐name value. More specifically, only larger chains seem to benefit from delegating assortment and decoration decisions.     

A Note on the Poll Tax

A poll tax is usually seen as the standard example of a lump sum tax and therefore as allocationally efficient. In this paper, it is shown that in a dynamic setting with endogenous fertility, a poll tax may yield a Pareto‐inferior outcome as compared to a percentage consumption tax.     

Exchange rates and perfect competition

The purpose of this note is to demonstrate that the commonly held belief that incomplete and perverse pass-through are incompatible with perfect competition is wrong! To this end, we consider two types of firms both operating in two countries. The demand sides of the markets of the two countries are separated and each type of firm produces its good in one of these countries. We study the effect of an exchange-rate change on the competitive equilibrium prices in each country. When producing for the foreign market causes the same costs as producing for the home market then the law of one price holds and an exchange-rate change is completely offset by price changes. Furthermore, when cost functions neither exhibit economies nor diseconomies of scope between producing for the home and producing for the foreign market then prices move in the right directions in response to an exchange-rate change. However, with general cost structures, even in this simple perfectly competitive model, perverse directions of price changes can result from an exchange-rate change.     

Are overtime plants more efficient than standard-time plants? A stochastic production frontier analysis using the IAB Establishment Panel

Using data from the IAB Establishment Panel, 1995–2000, we investigate between-plant variations in productivity. The study compares technical efficiencies between plants which work overtime (overtime plants) and plants which do not work overtime (standard-time plants), where technical efficiency measures the gap between feasible output and actual output for a given input combination. A fixed effects approach is applied, which does neither rely on any distributional assumptions of the inefficiencies, nor on the independence between the regressors and inefficiencies. For both, models with time-invariant and time-varying inefficiencies, we do not find evidence that the two plant-types differ in their technical efficiency.First version received: May 2002 / Final version received: August 2004The comments by Martyn Andrews and Bob Hart are gratefully acknowledged. The article has also benefited from the comments of two anonymous referees.     

Finance,inequality and the poor

Financial development disproportionately boosts incomes of the poorest quintile and reduces income inequality. About 40% of the long-run impact of financial development on the income growth of the poorest quintile is the result of reductions in income inequality, while 60% is due to the impact of financial development on aggregate economic growth. Furthermore, financial development is associated with a drop in the fraction of the population living on less than $ 1 a day, a result which holds when conditioning on average growth. These findings emphasize the importance of the financial system for the poor.      

Market Reaction to Goodwill Impairments

This paper examines the information content of goodwill write-downs under International Accounting Standard (IAS) 36 (Impairment of Assets) and Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 142. We investigate whether the informational value depends on the reliability of the news. Using a sample of 564 goodwill write-down announcements issued from 2005 to 2009, we find a negative capital market reaction to announcements of unexpected goodwill write-offs. Our results indicate that investors react more negatively when a country's level of legal protection is low and allows more management discretion. We further report that market reaction is associated with managers explaining the write-down decision and depends on the verifiability of these explanations. Investors react more negatively when an unverifiable internal explanation is given and less negatively when a verifiable external explanation is provided. We do not find significant differences between write-down announcements under SFAS 142 and IAS 36.     

Shareholder value mining: Wealth effects of takeovers in German coal mining, 1896–1913

We investigate the wealth effects of takeovers in the mining industry of the German Ruhr district between 1896 and 1913. We employ event study methodology and use a new data set that covers stock prices of joint-stock mining companies and information on share prices of Gewerkschaften, an organisational form that was exclusively designed for German mining companies. Our empirical results show that takeovers enhanced shareholder value. The clear beneficiaries were the owners of the acquired companies, those of the acquirers hardly gained significantly. Collusion in the mining industry benefited the shareholders of small, poorly performing takeover targets.