The aggregate-monotonic core

We introduce the aggregate-monotonic core as the set of allocations of a transferable utility cooperative game attainable by single-valued solutions that satisfy core-selection and aggregate-monotonicity. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the coincidence of the core and the aggregate-monotonic core. Finally, we introduce upper and lower aggregate-monotonicity for set-valued solutions, and characterize the aggregate-monotonic core using core-selection and upper and lower aggregate-monotonicity.     

Economies with Land—A Game Theoretical Approach

With an economy with land (an economy of Debreu-type in which land is the unique commodity) we associate a cooperative game with transferable utility v . The set of all TU-games of type v is investigated and the set of equilibrium payoffs (in the TU-sense) of the economy is described as a subset of the core of v . We prove that equilibrium payoffs can be extended to population monotonic allocation schemes in the sense of Sprumont.     

The Split Core for Sequencing Games

The split core is a refinement of the core for sequencing games. The split core arises from a generalization of the equal gain splitting (EGS) rule that is introduced byCuriel et al. (1989). It is pointed out that the split core is the convex hull of permutation-based gain splitting allocations and the EGS allocation is in the barycenter of the split core. Finally, an axiomatic characterization of the split core is provided.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: 026.