Crime,punishment, and prejudice

We examine the link between the penalties used to punish convicted criminals and judicial prejudice against defendants. In our model, agents choose to commit crimes if their privately observed utility from doing so is high enough. A crime generates noisy evidence, and defendants are convicted when the realized amount of evidence is sufficiently strong to establish the probability of guilt beyond a fixed threshold. We show that if convicted offenders are incarcerated, poorer individuals face a strong prior prejudice in trials and are therefore convicted with less evidence than richer individuals. At the same time, they commit crimes more frequently. Penalties such as monetary fines can eliminate this bias, but may also reverse it. We fully characterize the penalty schedule that guarantees an unbiased equilbrium. We extend the model such that agents also differ in characteristics such as race or gender. We show biased outcomes (targeted at subgroups of the population) may still exist, even if all members of the population are ex-ante alike in their economic characteristics.     

The Bard of Savagery: Thorstein Veblen and Modern Social Theory

The hypothesis of this paper is that a detailed history of a specific location and period is more effective for isolating the important characteristics of institutions than studies which span multiple millennia across the globe. To illustrate this hypothesis, I examine three Italian city-states in the period between eleventh and sixteenth centuries. This was a time when the "commercial revolution" was underway in these city-states. As a result, there were institutional innovations in settlement patterns, work organization, and self-governing institutions to help provide for mutual defense and for the internalization of gains from long-distance trade. I contrast this case study with the methodology and findings employed by Douglass C. North, John J. Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast (2009) in Violence and Social Orders. Rather than analyze the importance of beliefs and the protection of property rights as in prior work of theirs, the authors here focus on the "Schumpeterian competition" between impersonal organizations as an effective institutional form to control violence. Moreover, the timeframe of their book extends to "all recorded human history." In contrast to North, Wallis, and Weingast's approach, I concentrate on Genoa, Florence, and Venice in an effort to explain more effectively the emergence of the public/private divide and the relationship between politics and economics in modern industrial society. Experimentation in medieval Italy in mediating conflict between newly emerging classes, innovating in public finance to support the military, and focusing on broad civic participation in the political process had a lasting impact on the development of the state as an institution.     

The Formation of Economic Policy: A Cognitive-Evolutionary Approach to Policy-Making

This essay proposes a cognitive-evolutionaryapproach to economic policy making where the entire process ofpolicy-formation and implementation is analyzed as a collectiveprocess of mobilization and problem-solving that extends fromthe individual level over the level of collective decision makingto the constitutional level. In the procedural view proposed,many issues or problems of economic policy are not fully solvedbecause of four main filters or barriers that filter out certainissues while letting others through. The main task for politicalentrepreneurs is to surmount these barriers. Important aspectsof the politico-economic process are cognitive processes of perceptionand interpretation by the individual; processes of interpretation,mobilization, and negotiation at the collective level; and evolutionarydynamics at the constitutional level.—This interdisciplinaryoriented approach provides a framework that suggests new categoriesfor analyzing policy-making in a systematic way by linking thebehavior and thinking of the individual with the ongoing politicalprocess at the collective and constitutional level, and leadsto conclusions for advising politicians.     

Interest groups,power relations,and the configuration of value chains: The case of biodiesel in India

Production of biodiesel is technologically simple, and the process of value addition – from the cultivation of oilseeds to oil extraction and transesterification – is straightforward. There is, however, great variation in the socioeconomic configuration of this value chain. In some regions of India, the cultivation of tree-borne oilseeds is organised in a social forestry mode, in which poor landless people are paid to perform reforestation tasks and receive usufruct rights to collect oilseeds; in other regions, peasant cooperatives, subcontracting arrangements between farmers and transnational corporations, or large-scale plantations are promoted. There are also many different end uses and ways of processing biodiesel, from village-level projects for rural off-grid electrification to large scale processing. This article explains how five Indian states have developed biodiesel policies that reflect different political goals and favour different constituencies, reflecting the states’ specific socioeconomic structures, power relations norms.     

Thorstein Veblen's Analysis of German Intellectualism: Institutionalism as a Forecasting Method

A bstract Veblen's critique of German intellectuals during World War I ran parallel to his overall critique of Imperial Germany . Elements from the modern West (liberal ideas or technology ) were seen as grafted onto the German authoritarian structure in such a way as to temporarily strengthen that structure. Analysis of wartime writings by German academics verifies Veblen's assertions. Those writings presented the authoritarian state as a better protector of the interests of all the German people than was the type of constitutional state found in Britain. The shrill wartime writings of Werner Sombart wete of a different tone than those of the moderates, verifying Veblen's concerns over the explosiveness of the mixture of the modern and authoritarian, as well as its fascistic potential. Veblen's institutional forecastting can, with reservations, be rewarding in analyzing similar atavistic continuities today.     

A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: the case of independent types

We provide a simple proof of the equivalence between ex ante and ex post budget balance constraints in Bayesian mechanism design with independent types when participation decisions are made at the interim stage. The result is given an interpretation in terms of efficient allocation of risk.     

Find Out How Much It Means to Me! The Importance of Interpersonal Respect in Work Values Compared to Perceived Organizational Practices

Two large online surveys were conducted among employees in Germany to explore the importance employees and organizations place on aspects of interpersonal respect in relation to other work values. The first study (n = 589) extracted a general ranking of work values, showing that employees rate issues of respect involving supervisors particularly high. The second study (n = 318) replicated the previous value ranking. Additionally, it is shown that the value priorities indicated by employees do not always match their perceptions of actual organizational practices. Particularly, interpersonal respect issues that involve employees’ supervisors diverge strongly negative. Consequences and potentials for change in organizations are discussed.     

Price–quality competition in a mixed duopoly

We examine competition between a private and a public provider in markets for merit goods, such as education, healthcare, housing, recreation, or culture. The private firm provides a high‐price/high‐quality variety of the good and serves richer individuals, whereas the public firm provides a low‐price/low‐quality variety and serves poorer individuals. We first characterize the private competitor’s best response to changes in the public firm’s price and quality. This enables us to examine the distributional effects of policies that affect the price or quality of the public firm’s product. We then numerically characterize the public firm’s optimal provision policy, taking the private response into consideration. Our results have implications for the financing of publicly provided goods, and for whether additional resources, if available, should be spent on reducing the price or enhancing the quality of these goods.