Schumpeter's ghost: Is hypercompetition making the best of times shorter?

At the center of Schumpeter's theory of competitive behavior is the assertion that competitive advantage will become increasingly more difficult to sustain in a wide range of industries. More recently, this assertion has resurfaced in the notion of hypercompetition. This research examines two large longitudinal samples of firms to discover which industries, if any, exhibit performance that is consonant with Schumpeterian theory and the assertions of hypercompetition. We find support for the argument that over time competitive advantage has become significantly harder to sustain and, further, that the phenomenon is limited neither to high‐technology industries nor to manufacturing industries but is seen across a broad range of industries. We also find evidence that sustained competitive advantage is increasingly a matter not of a single advantage maintained over time but more a matter of concatenating over time a sequence of advantages. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Demand under product differentiation: an empirical analysis of the US wine market*

Oversupply has led to a number of perplexities for the Australian wine industry in recent times. When disaggregated from the industry level, however, the problem can be better described as a range of attribute‐specific disequilibria. To date, the solutions to this problem have predominantly revolved around supply‐side policies of reducing output through crop thinning or vine pulling. By contrast, this paper focuses on the demand side and argues that the disequilibria may be reduced by gaining a better understanding of the demand for Australian wine. A discrete choice model of product differentiation is used to estimate the demand for wine in Australia's second largest export market, the United States. Implications of the analysis are explored.     

More on money as a medium of exchange

Summary We extend the analysis of Kiyotaki and Wright, who study economies where the commodities that serve as media of exchange (or, commodity money) are determined endogenously. Kiyotaki and Wright consider only steady-state, pure-strategy equilibria; here we allow dynamic and mixed-strategy equilibria. We demonstrate that symmetric, steady-state equilibria in mixed-strategies always exist, while sometimes no such equilibria exist in pure-strategies. We prove that the number of symmetric steady-state equilibria is generically finite. We also show, however, that for some parameter values there exists a continuum of dynamic equilibria. Further, some equilibria display cycles.We thank the National Science Foundation and the University of Pennsylvania Research Foundation for financial support, as well as seminar participants at Stanford University, the London School of Economics, the Econometric Society World Congress in Barcelona, and the Conference on Monetary Theory and Financial Institutions at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis for their comments or suggestions. Alberto Trejos provided research assistance. The views expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.     

Determinants of Co-operative Patronage in Alberta

Co-operative managers face an increasingly heterogeneous pool of potential members. Because these members bring a variety of economic and noneconomic demands to their co-operative, managers must know how different member characteristics and performance perceptions influence their decision to patronize a co-operative. This study applies three models of co-operative patronage to survey data from rural Alberta. A Poisson regression is used to determine the factors that explain the number of co-operatives used, while an index of co-operative patronage measures the relative intensity of co-operative versus proprietary firm usage. A third model contucts a Tobit analysis of the amount of business conducted with each of several different types of co-operatives. The results show that older farmers tend to partonize more co-operatives, and larger farms do a greater share of their business with co-operatives than do smaller fiarms. Farmers who believe co-operatives offer innovative products and services are more likely to patronize them, while a belief that co-operatives should play an active role in noneconomic matters is not important.     

Proxy-quality thresholds: Theory and applications

We consider alternative models of a regression containing a proxy for an unobserved regressor. For each model at most two pieces of prior information are necessary to determine the sign of any regressor coefficient: the sign of the partial correlation between the proxy and the unobserved regressor, and a lower bound on the partial or simple correlation between the proxy and the unobserved regressor. We apply our technique to investment and leverage regressions that contain a proxy for the incentive to invest. In both cases proxy quality must be high for the coefficient of interest to be non-zero.     

Inference with dependent data using cluster covariance estimators

This paper presents an inference approach for dependent data in time series, spatial, and panel data applications. The method involves constructing t and Wald statistics using a cluster covariance matrix estimator (CCE). We use an approximation that takes the number of clusters/groups as fixed and the number of observations per group to be large. The resulting limiting distributions of the t and Wald statistics are standard t and F distributions where the number of groups plays the role of sample size. Using a small number of groups is analogous to ‘fixed-b’ asymptotics of [Kiefer and Vogelsang, 2002] and [Kiefer and Vogelsang, 2005] (KV) for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent inference. We provide simulation evidence that demonstrates that the procedure substantially outperforms conventional inference procedures.