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This paper examines whether greater exposure to global capital markets, stable share ownership, and group affiliation of Japanese firms have any impact on the quality of their investor relations practices (IR) and market-value added (MVA). The results indicate that foreign ownership and foreign listings are positively associated with IR. Foreign listings are also positively associated with MVA. However, stable ownership and group affiliation do not seem to have any impact on IR. These findings suggest that Japanese firms that are more exposed to global capital markets are more likely to adopt shareholder-oriented policies rather than stakeholder-oriented policies. 相似文献
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Tetsuo Yamamori Kazuhiko Kato Toshiji Kawagoe Akihiko Matsui 《Experimental Economics》2008,11(4):336-343
We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the effects of communication in a dictator game, while maintaining subjects’
anonymity. In the experiment, the recipient has an opportunity to state a payoff-irrelevant request for his/her share before
the dictator dictates his/her offer. We found that the independence hypothesis that voice does not matter is rejected. In
particular, if the request is for less than half of the pie, the dictator’s offer increases as the recipient’s request increases.
Additionally, there is no dictator who is other-regarding and, at the same time, does not react to the recipient’s request.
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. 相似文献
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. 相似文献
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Extant theories agree that debt should inhibit diversification but predict opposing performance consequences. While agency theory predicts that debt should lead to higher performance for diversifying firms, transaction cost economics (TCE) predicts that more debt will lead to lower performance for firms expanding into new markets. Our empirical tests on a large sample of Japanese firms support TCE by showing that firms accrue higher returns from leveraging their resources and capabilities into new markets when managers are shielded from the rigors of the market governance of debt, particularly bond debt. Furthermore, we find that the detrimental effects of debt are exacerbated for R&D intensive firms and that debt is not necessarily harmful to firms that are either contracting or managing a stable portfolio of markets. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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