COMPETITIVENESS AND STABILITY OF COLLUSIVE BEHAVIOR

We investigate the relationship between the degree of competition and the stability of collusive behaviour, by introducing the element of relative performance in the objective functions of the firms. We show that an increase in the degree of competition destabilizes the collusion. This relation differs starkly in the standard symmetric Cournot and Bertrand duopoly models, with the former being more unstable than the latter.     

ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN MULTI-STAGE DUOPOLY GAMES*

This paper presents an investigation of the endogenous timing in multi-stage duopoly games in which duopolists choose two variables over two periods. The paper elaborates the two-stage strategic commitment game discussed by Brander and Spencer (1983). Duopolists decide their outputs and cost-reducing investments and they are allowed to choose which action to take first. The paper discusses two types of games; one is a three-stage game in which each duopolist can commit to the order of choices before it chooses its output or cost-reducing investments, and the other is a two-stage game in which it cannot. The paper finds that at least one firm chooses its output first. Furthermore, the three-stage game has the unique equilibrium outcome in which both firms choose their outputs first.     

Profit-Enhancing Parallel Imports

We investigate competition between a domestic intellectual property right holder and a foreign imitator and consider how parallel imports affect their profits. We consider a two-country model. Country A is a developed country where intellectual property rights are highly protected, and country B is a developing country where protection is weak. The intellectual property right holder can sell the products for both markets while the imitator cannot export the products to country A. We find that permitting parallel imports can be beneficial for both players because it serves as a commitment device to soften price competition.     

Entry regulation and social welfare with an integer problem

This paper elaborates on Salop (1979) who showed that the number of firms at free-entry equilibrium is excessive from the viewpoint of social welfare (excess-entry theorem). This paper considers an integer problem of the number of firms entering the market. We find that the excess-entry theorem does not hold true if the marginal production cost is increasing, while it holds true if the marginal production cost is constant. This result warns against the use of the excess-entry theorem for rationalizing entry regulation such as the notorious Japanese Large-Scaled Retail Act restricting the new entry of retailers.     

Strategic Complementarity in Direct Investments

The paper investigates a three‐country duopoly model. Two developed countries have large markets and one developing country has a cost advantage. The author finds that strategic complementarity in location choice yields multiple equilibria. One is a cost‐oriented agglomeration of firms in the developing country and the other is a market‐oriented equilibrium where each firm locates in its developed home country. Also, private incentives for the cost‐oriented location are excessive (resp. insufficient) from the viewpoint of world welfare if firms choose their locations non‐cooperatively (resp. cooperatively).     

Mixed Duopoly with Product Differentiation: Sequential Choice of Location

We investigate the sequential choice of location in a mixed duopoly, where a welfare–maximising public firm competes against a profit–maximising private firm. We examine the desirable role of the public firm in a mixed market. We also consider the effect of price regulation. We find that the public firm should become the follower (leader) if a price regulation is (is not) imposed. We also find that neither price regulation nor privatisation of the public firm improves welfare.     

International spillover effects of consumption taxation

This paper investigates the international spillover effects of a revenue-neutral increase in consumption taxes coupled with a reduction in wage taxes in a two-country open economy. Many economists feel that the consumption tax would be an improvement over the income tax. This paper provides counterexamples to the conventional wisdom. We show that conversion to a consumption tax may reduce capital accumulation and may transmit a negative externality to the rest of the countries in the world economy under certain conditions: endogenous labor supply and bequests.     

Overlapping tax revenue,soft budget,and rent seeking

This paper investigates how the soft-budget constraint with grants from the central government to local governments tends to internalize the vertical externality of local public investment by stimulating local expenditure when both the central and local governments impose taxes on the same economic activities financed by public investment. The model incorporates the local governments’ rent-seeking activities in a multi-government setting. The soft-budget constraint is welfare deteriorating because it stimulates rent-seeking activities, although a soft-budget game may attain the first-best level of public investment.     

A comparison of the Japanese and U.S. business cycles

This paper constructs a consistent set of quarterly Japanese data for the 1960–2002 sample period and compares properties of the Japanese and U.S. business cycles. We document some important differences in the adjustment of labor input between the two countries. In Japan most of the adjustment is in hours per worker of males and females and also in employment of females. In the U.S. most of the adjustment is in employment of both males and females. We formulate, estimate, and analyze a model that makes the distinction between the intensive and extensive margin and allows for gender differerences in labor supply. A weak empirical correlation between hours per worker and employment in Japanese data is a puzzle for our theory.