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51.
Toshihiro Ihori 《Economics Letters》1980,6(3):267-272
This paper derives some sufficient conditions under which an increase in the tax revenue requirement leads to a less progressive tax structure in the context of the educational investment model. 相似文献
52.
Price Premiums for Eco-friendly Commodities: Are ‘Green’ Markets the Best Way to Protect Endangered Ecosystems? 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Paul?J.?FerraroEmail author Toshihiro?Uchida Jon?M.?Conrad 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2005,32(3):419-438
‘Green’ markets represent a means through which public goods can be privately provided. A green product is an impure public
good consisting of a private good (e.g., rain forest honey) bundled with a jointly produced public good (e.g., biodiversity
protection). In the context of ecosystem protection, popular green commodities include eco-tourism excursions, coffee grown
under forest canopies (‘shade-grown’), tagua nuts for buttons and ornaments, rainforest nuts and oils for cosmetic products,
and rain forest honey. We examine the dynamic efficiency of eco-friendly price premiums in achieving ecosystem protection
and rural welfare goals by contrasting the use of price premiums to the use of payments that are tied directly to ecosystem
protection. We demonstrate analytically and empirically that direct payments are likely to be more efficient as a conservation
policy instrument. Depending on the available funds, the direct payments may be better or worse than green price premiums
in achieving rural welfare objectives. If direct payments are not feasible for social or political reasons, we demonstrate
analytically and empirically that the price premium approach is likely to be more effective at achieving conservation and
development objectives than the currently more popular policy of subsidizing capital acquisition in eco-friendly commercial
activities. 相似文献
53.
We investigate the optimal behavior of a public firm in a mixed market involving private firms and one public firm. Existing works show that welfare-maximizing behavior by the public firm is suboptimal when the number of firms is given exogenously. We allow free entry of private firms and find that, in contrast to the case with the fixed number of firms, welfare-maximizing behavior by the public firm is always optimal in mixed markets. Furthermore, we find that mixed markets are better than pure markets involving no public firm if and only if the public firm earns nonnegative profits. 相似文献
54.
Mixed oligopoly and spatial agglomeration 总被引:8,自引:0,他引:8
Abstract We investigate a mixed market where a state‐owned welfare‐maximizing public firm competes against profit‐maximizing private firms. We use a circular city model with quantity‐setting competition. In contrast to a pure market case discussed by Pal (1998a) , spatial agglomeration of private firms always appears in equilibrium. All private firms locate at the same point, and the public firm locates at the opposite side. We also find that this equilibrium pattern of the location is second best provided that output of each private firm cannot be controlled by the social planner. JEL Classification: H42, L13
Oligopole mixte et agglomération spatiale Les auteurs examinent un marché mixte où une entreprise publique possédée par l'État et cherchant à maximiser le niveau de bien‐être est en concurrence avec des entreprises privées qui cherchent à maximiser leurs profits. On utilise un modèle de cité circulaire où la concurrence se fait en choisissant la quantité produite. En contraste avec le cas du marché parfait discuté par Pal (1998a), l'agglomération spatiale des entreprises privées paraît être en équilibre. Toutes les entreprises privées se localisent au même point, et l'entreprise publique se localise du côté opposé. Il appert que ce pattern d'équilibre de localisation est un équilibre de second ordre compte tenu du fait que la production de chaque entreprise privée ne peut être contrôlée par le planificateur social. 相似文献
Oligopole mixte et agglomération spatiale Les auteurs examinent un marché mixte où une entreprise publique possédée par l'État et cherchant à maximiser le niveau de bien‐être est en concurrence avec des entreprises privées qui cherchent à maximiser leurs profits. On utilise un modèle de cité circulaire où la concurrence se fait en choisissant la quantité produite. En contraste avec le cas du marché parfait discuté par Pal (1998a), l'agglomération spatiale des entreprises privées paraît être en équilibre. Toutes les entreprises privées se localisent au même point, et l'entreprise publique se localise du côté opposé. Il appert que ce pattern d'équilibre de localisation est un équilibre de second ordre compte tenu du fait que la production de chaque entreprise privée ne peut être contrôlée par le planificateur social. 相似文献
55.
56.
Toshihiro Matsumura 《Australian economic papers》1998,37(2):103-118
This paper investigates a two-stage price-setting duopoly with differentiated goods. First, each firm announces its price; second, it chooses its actual price; and finally the market opens. Once a firm announces a price, it is able to discount it but not raise it. The model includes Stackelberg-type and Bertrand-type equilibria as possible outcomes. Whether Bertrand or Stackelberg appears in equilibrium depends on the properties of demand functions crucially. We find three patterns of equilibrium outcomes; one case has Bertrand equilibrium only, another has Stackelberg only, and the other has both equilibria 相似文献
57.
Marco Matsumura Ajax Moreira José Vicente 《International Review of Financial Analysis》2011,20(5):237-243
In this work we compare the interest rate forecasting performance of a broad class of linear models. The models are estimated through a MCMC procedure with data from the US and Brazilian markets. We show that a simple parametric specification has the best predictive power, but it does not outperform the random walk. We also find that macroeconomic variables and no-arbitrage conditions have little effect to improve the out-of-sample fit, while a financial variable (Stock Index) increases the forecasting accuracy. 相似文献
58.
The standard international tax model is extended to allow for heterogeneous firms when agglomeration forces are important, enabling us to study the relocation effects of taxes that vary according to firm size. We show that allowing for heterogeneity permits a given tax scheme to have an endogenously different effect on the location decision of small and big firms, with the biggest firms being endogenously more likely to relocate in reaction to high taxes. We show that a reform that flattens the tax–firm–size profile can raise tax revenue without inducing any relocation. 相似文献
59.
The present paper reexamines the price-setting Stackelberg duopoly with asymmetric and strictly convex cost functions in a
homogeneous product market. It demonstrates that in a generic environment, the higher-cost firm is likely to be the price
leader. That is, leadership by such a firm is either (a) a unique equilibrium or (b) a payoff- and risk-dominant equilibrium
in the observable delay game. Thus, while this paper complements and generalizes the findings of recent studies that indicate
the possibility of the higher-cost firm’s leadership in homogeneous product markets, it also contrasts with the traditional
literature that predicts the dominant-firm price leadership in various environments. 相似文献
60.
This paper extends existing analyses of self-insurance and self-protection—distinctions first made by Ehrlich and Becker (J
Polit Econ 80:623–648, 1972)—that countries may implement at a national level in pursuit of their security. We show that,
when no market insurance is available, self-insurance alone raises important new issues as to the definition of “fair pricing”
and as to the relations between pricing, optimization, risk aversion, and inferiority that are significantly different from
standard, conventional market analysis. We also discover a hitherto unrecognized tendency for misallocation between self-protection
and self-insurance when both are available and considered together. Because of external effects running from self-protection
to self-insurance, governments ruled by myopic bureaucracies and trying to find the right balance face incentives that encourage
extreme, self-inflicted moral hazard, to the detriment of self-protection. 相似文献