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61.
Marco Matsumura Ajax Moreira José Vicente 《International Review of Financial Analysis》2011,20(5):237-243
In this work we compare the interest rate forecasting performance of a broad class of linear models. The models are estimated through a MCMC procedure with data from the US and Brazilian markets. We show that a simple parametric specification has the best predictive power, but it does not outperform the random walk. We also find that macroeconomic variables and no-arbitrage conditions have little effect to improve the out-of-sample fit, while a financial variable (Stock Index) increases the forecasting accuracy. 相似文献
62.
Toshihiro Matsumura 《Southern economic journal》2003,70(2):403-413
In this paper, I investigate endogenous roles in a mixed duopoly, where private and state-owned public turns compete, by allowing two production periods. I find that many equilibria exist, including the Coumot-type equilibrium and one Stackelberg-type equilibrium where the public firm becomes the follower. However, another Stackelberg-type equilibrium where the public firm becomes the leader does not exist. If small inventory costs are introduced, the unique equilibrium outcome becomes the Stackelberg type where the public firm is the follower. 相似文献
63.
64.
We revisit an endogenous timing game by introducing corporate social responsibility into firms' payoffs. Previous research investigates an endogenous timing game in a mixed oligopoly, wherein one welfare‐maximizing public firm competes against profit‐maximizing private firms. It shows that the outcome is completely different from that of private oligopoly. In contrast to its result, we find that this change in payoff does not matter as long as the payoffs are symmetric. Our result indicates that asymmetry, and not welfare‐concerning objectives, yields specific results in the literature on mixed oligopoly. 相似文献
65.
The spatial selection of heterogeneous firms 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
We show that heterogeneous firms choose different locations in response to market integration. Specifically, decreasing trade costs lead to the gradual agglomeration of efficient firms in the larger country where they have access to a bigger pool of consumers. In contrast, high-cost firms seek protection against competition from efficient firms by locating in the smaller country. However, when the spatial separation of markets ceases to be a sufficient protection against foreign competition, high-cost firms choose to set up in the larger market. Hence, the relationship between economic integration and international productivity gap first increases and then decreases with market integration. 相似文献
66.
We investigate endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly with a negative externality. We find that quantity (price) competition yields a simultaneous‐move (sequential‐move) outcome under a significant negative externality. These results indicate that mixed duopolies yield the same results as private duopolies under a significant negative externality, which is in sharp contrast to the results in mixed duopolies without a negative externality. Unless the negative externality is insignificant, public leadership yields greater welfare than private leadership, and public leadership is more robust than the private leadership as equilibrium. If optimal environmental tax policy is introduced, however, private leadership yields the greatest welfare and this an equilibrium outcome in the endogenous timing game under quantity competition. 相似文献
67.
Toshihiro Ihori 《Journal of Macroeconomics》1982,4(2):179-194
The purpose of this paper is to examine the implications of expansionary monetary policy financed by open-market purchases and to reconsider the assignment problem. We present a strict definition of open-market operations: a swap of money against bonds is achieved by just buying or selling bonds in the open market all through the adjustment process. Under this definition the open-market paradox given by Blinder and Solow is avoided. Even in the case of zero capital mobility, the assignment problem has an important economic meaning. 相似文献
68.
69.
Toshihiro Okubo 《Economic Theory》2009,38(3):533-559
This paper incorporates Melitz’s Econometrica (71:1695–1725, 2003) heterogeneous-firm trade model in the Ricardian model of
comparative advantage with a continuum of sectors introduced by Dornbusch et al. (Am Econ Rev 67(5), 823–839, 1977). In particular,
we characterise the equilibrium outcomes when neither sectors nor countries are symmetric. We find that trade patterns can
follow Ricardian comparative advantage, while wage rates are proportional to market size due to a home market effect. Interestingly,
trade liberalisation hurts the large country but benefits the small one by reducing the number of sectors with two-way trade
and expanding those with specialised (one-way) trade.
I would like to thank Mike Artis, Richard Baldwin, Frederic Robert-Nicoud, Matthias Helble, Giovanni Facchini, Thierry Verdier
and a referee for their helpful comments and suggestions. Also I would like to thank Mike Artis for his excellent proof reading. 相似文献
70.
Toshihiro Matsumura 《Journal of public economics》1998,70(3):385
We investigate a quantity-setting duopoly involving a private firm and a privatized firm jointly owned by the public and private sectors. The private firm maximizes profits, while the privatized firm takes both profits and social welfare into consideration. We consider how many shares the government should hold in the privatized firm. We find that neither full privatization (the government does not hold any shares) nor full nationalization (the government holds all of the shares) is optimal under moderate conditions. 相似文献