National self-insurance and self-protection against adversity: bureaucratic management of security and moral hazard

This paper extends existing analyses of self-insurance and self-protection—distinctions first made by Ehrlich and Becker (J Polit Econ 80:623–648, 1972)—that countries may implement at a national level in pursuit of their security. We show that, when no market insurance is available, self-insurance alone raises important new issues as to the definition of “fair pricing” and as to the relations between pricing, optimization, risk aversion, and inferiority that are significantly different from standard, conventional market analysis. We also discover a hitherto unrecognized tendency for misallocation between self-protection and self-insurance when both are available and considered together. Because of external effects running from self-protection to self-insurance, governments ruled by myopic bureaucracies and trying to find the right balance face incentives that encourage extreme, self-inflicted moral hazard, to the detriment of self-protection.     

Consumer‐benefiting exclusive territories

Abstract.  I investigate the effect of exclusive territories, which are typical vertical controls imposed by upstream firms. Using shipping spatial models, I consider an industry that consists of many independent local markets. An upstream monopolist restricts competition between downstream firms using exclusive territories. I find that exclusive territories reduce the prices of final products in all local markets in quantity‐setting competition. In price‐setting competition, they raise prices in half the local markets, reduce them in other markets, and also reduce the total consumer surplus. JEL classification: L42, R32     

Interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition: The optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy

This paper explores the implications of the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition for the optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy à la (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996) and (Besley and Coate, 1997). As an extension of Hoyt’s (1991) finding that intensified tax competition is always harmful and aggravates the extent to which public goods are undersupplied in a region, we show that intensified tax competition can be beneficial if political as well as tax competition is considered. In particular, we identify plausible conditions under which (i) there is an optimal intensity of tax competition such that the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition will result in the optimal provision of public goods and (ii) intensified tax competition will be beneficial if and only if the degree of tax competition is less than this optimal intensity.     

Japan's fiscal policy and fiscal reconstruction

This paper investigates the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy and the fiscal reconstruction movement in Japan. We first summarize Japan's fiscal policy in recent years and discuss advantages and disadvantages of government deficits. Next, we investigate the macroeconomic effects of Japanese fiscal policy and evaluate the plausibility of non-Keynesian effects. We also analyze the possibility of the crowding-in effect of fiscal policy and investigate the spillover effects of deregulation. Finally, we discuss political constraints in the fiscal reconstruction attempts and propose some measures for successful fiscal reforms in the near future.     

Trade liberalisation and agglomeration with firm heterogeneity: Forward and backward linkages

This paper studies the impact of trade cost reductions on the geographical concentration of manufacturing in the presence of intermediate input linkages, firm heterogeneity and fixed export costs. The presence of non-exporting firms in this Melitz-like model hampers full agglomeration by weakening the forward and backward linkages and fortifying market-crowding effect. Gradual trade liberalisation causes gradual agglomeration rather than the catastrophic agglomeration that economic geography models have long suggested. Also, trade liberalisation produces divergent welfare effects with the periphery losing and the core gaining; even costless trade fails to equalise welfare in the core and periphery due to non-exported intermediate inputs.     

The Effects of Technology Changes on Sectoral Trade Patterns*

We develop a model in which sectoral trade patterns depend on both the technology common to all sectors and the technologies specific to each sector. Changes in the common technology level affect sectoral trade patterns through their impact on intertemporal optimization behavior, while changes in the sector‐specific technology levels affect sectoral trade patterns by influencing comparative advantage. The model shows: (1) unexpected increases in the common technology level worsen sectoral trade balances, but expected increases in the common technology level improve them; and (2) given other countries’ sectoral technology levels, an increase in a sector‐specific technology level relative to other sectors improves sectoral trade balances through its operation on comparative advantage. Using Japanese data, the empirical results reported in this paper support the model’s predictions.     

Welfare criteria for tax reforms : An extension

Pazner and Sadka (1981) offer simple sufficient conditions for accepting or rejecting tax reforms based on the theory of index numbers. We provide not only sufficient conditions but also necessary conditions for the validity of tax reforms. Thus, a complete characterization of tax reforms is obtained.     

The golden rule and the Ramsey rule at a second best solution

This paper shows that even at the second best solution the golden rule and the Ramsey rule hold if all the effective non-lump sum taxes are available in the context of an overlapping generations model.