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81.
Toshihiro Ihori 《Economics Letters》1981,8(1):89-93
This paper shows that even at the second best solution the golden rule and the Ramsey rule hold if all the effective non-lump sum taxes are available in the context of an overlapping generations model. 相似文献
82.
Mixed oligopoly, foreign firms, and location choice 总被引:4,自引:1,他引:4
We investigate a mixed market in which a state-owned, welfare-maximizing public firm competes against n domestic private firms and m foreign private firms which are all profit-maximizing. A circular city model with quantity-setting competition is employed. We find that the equilibrium location pattern depends on m. All private firms agglomerate in the unique equilibrium if m is zero or one. Two foreign firms induce differentiation between domestic and foreign private firms. More than two foreign firms yield differentiation among the foreign firms. Regardless of n and m, agglomeration of all domestic private firms appears in equilibrium. We provide several conditions in which eliminating the public firm from the market enhances social welfare. We extend the basic model and investigate three issues concerning multiple public firms, inefficiency of the public firm, and entries by private firms. We obtain some additional implications of welfare and equilibrium locations. 相似文献
83.
Equilibrium number of firms and economic welfare in a spatial price discrimination model 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
We examine welfare implications of the equilibrium number of entering firms in a spatial price discrimination model. In contrast to Salop [Salop, S., 1979. Monopolistic competition with outside goods. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 141–156.], the equilibrium number of firms can be either excessive or insufficient from the normative viewpoint. 相似文献
84.
The privatization neutrality theorem states that the share of public ownership in a firm does not affect welfare under an optimal uniform tax‐subsidy policy. We revisit this neutrality result. First, we investigate the case in which the private firm is domestic. We show that this neutrality result does not hold unless public and private firms have the same cost function. Next, we investigate a case in which both domestic and foreign investors own the private firm. We show that the optimal degree of privatization is never zero, and thus, the neutrality result does not hold, even when there is no cost difference between public and private firms. 相似文献
85.
Toshihiro Matsumura Noriaki Matsushima Giorgos Stamatopoulos 《Journal of Economics》2010,99(3):267-276
It is known that if exogenous cost heterogeneities between the firms in a spatial duopoly model are large, then the model
does not have a pure-strategy equilibrium in location choices. It is also known that when these heterogeneities are stochastically
determined after firms choose their locations, spatial agglomeration can appear. To tackle these issues, the current paper
modifies the spatial framework by allowing firms to exchange the cost-efficient production technology via royalties. It is
shown that technology transfer guarantees the existence of a location equilibrium in pure strategies and that maximum differentiation
appears in the market. 相似文献
86.
We investigate a desirable role of public enterprise in mixed oligopoly in free-entry markets. We compare the following three
cases: (a) a public firm produces before private firms (public leadership), (b) all firms produce simultaneously (Cournot),
(c) a public firm produces after private firms (private leadership). We find that private leadership is best and public leadership
is worst, in contrast to the cases without entries and exits of private firms. We also investigate the welfare implication
of privatization. We find that some important results shown by existing works do not hold under private leadership. 相似文献
87.
The international trade literature confirms that the average productivity of exporters is higher than that of nonexporters, while economic geography studies establish that urban firms tend to be more productive than rural ones. By introducing region‐specific transportation costs in a Melitz‐type heterogeneous‐firm trade model, the theory predicts that the minimum threshold productivity level for export is higher but that for survival by serving the local market is lower in the periphery region than in the core. Using Japanese plant‐level panel data, we find evidence supporting the theoretical prediction that exporters in the peripheral regions, especially those distant from the core, have large productivity premiums. 相似文献
88.
89.
90.
This paper starts out from the observation that the export ratios of firms (export to sales ratios) vary greatly among firms and that they are systematically higher for larger exporters. We relate the difference in export ratios to firm‐level differences in transport costs. In accordance with the data, we assume that freight rates are a function of firm‐level export volumes. We test our model using Japanese manufacturing firm‐level data. We first estimate the elasticity of the freight rate with respect to firm‐level export volumes at the sector level. When feeding these estimates back into the model, it can explain more than 50% of the variation in firm‐level export ratios. 相似文献