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91.
    
This paper examines the effects of a common currency on the quality of traded goods. For this purpose, we construct a quality‐based heterogeneous firm trade model to incorporate the formation of currency unions and the ensuing elimination of exchange rate volatility. Our main hypothesis is that a common currency enables low‐quality (low marginal cost) firms to commence exporting to the common currency's member countries, which causes the average export price to fall. We empirically test this hypothesis for the euro and the eurozone using Harmonized System 8‐digit traded product data for European Union countries.  相似文献   
92.
We examine the welfare effects of a central government's subsidy for a local public good in a Nash equilibrium model with two types of public goods. We first show that the welfare effect depends on the substitution and evaluation effects. We also investigate the optimal subsidy rate in a second-best framework and explore how the optimal subsidy scheme depends on the relative evaluation of the two types of public goods. Received: August 20, 1998/accepted: February 12, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to John Quigley, Minoru Kunisaki, Tom Panella, Andy Haughwout, Steven Craig, William Hoyt, Michael Ash, Konrad Stahl, Amihai Glazer, David Wildasin and two referees for helpful comments and suggestions, An early version of this paper was presented at a seminar at University of California, Berkeley and at conferences at JAEE Annual Meeting in Japan, North American Meetings of The RSAI in Washington, WSAI conference in Hawaii, Public Choice Meeting in San Francisco.  相似文献   
93.
94.
Strategic Auditor Behavior and Going-Concern Decisions   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
This paper analyzes a game-theoretic model in which a client can potentially avoid a going-concern opinion and its self-fulfilling prophecy by switching auditors. Incumbent auditors are less willing to express a going-concern opinion the more credible the client's threat of dismissal and the stronger the self-fulfilling prophecy effect. Similarly, the client is more willing to switch auditors the more likely it is that auditors' reporting judgments will differ and the stronger the self-fulfilling prophecy effect. Further, with greater noise in the auditor's forecast of client viability, the auditor tends to express fewer going-concern opinions.  相似文献   
95.
    
The international trade literature confirms that the average productivity of exporters is higher than that of nonexporters, while economic geography studies establish that urban firms tend to be more productive than rural ones. By introducing region‐specific transportation costs in a Melitz‐type heterogeneous‐firm trade model, the theory predicts that the minimum threshold productivity level for export is higher but that for survival by serving the local market is lower in the periphery region than in the core. Using Japanese plant‐level panel data, we find evidence supporting the theoretical prediction that exporters in the peripheral regions, especially those distant from the core, have large productivity premiums.  相似文献   
96.
This paper analyses a Cournot duopoly model with finitely repeated competition. Each firm is allowed to hold inventories for a period. When there are more than two periods, inventory-holdings encourage firms to take collusive actions. By holding large inventories, a firm can commit to large sales in the next period, giving inventories a strategic value. When a firm deviates from collusion, the strategic value of inventories allows the non-defecting firm to become the Stackelberg leader in future markets, forcing the defecting firm to become the Stackelberg follower. Collusive sales can be attained with this threat of punishment.  相似文献   
97.
98.
    
I investigate an asymmetric duopoly where a public enterprise must supply the demand it faces, while a private enterprise has no such obligation. I show that such an asymmetric regulation yields the first-best outcome (Walrasian equilibrium).  相似文献   
99.
    
This paper starts out from the observation that the export ratios of firms (export to sales ratios) vary greatly among firms and that they are systematically higher for larger exporters. We relate the difference in export ratios to firm‐level differences in transport costs. In accordance with the data, we assume that freight rates are a function of firm‐level export volumes. We test our model using Japanese manufacturing firm‐level data. We first estimate the elasticity of the freight rate with respect to firm‐level export volumes at the sector level. When feeding these estimates back into the model, it can explain more than 50% of the variation in firm‐level export ratios.  相似文献   
100.
Using the spatial price discrimination framework, the relationship between the locations of firms and their ability to collude is investigated. Gupta and Venkatu (2002) show that in a duopoly model agglomeration at one point is the most stable location. We find that agglomeration stabilizes the cartel when there are three firms, too. When there are more than three firms, however, agglomeration of all firms is never the most stable location. With four firms, the following location pattern produces the most stable cartel: two firms at one point and the other two at the farthest point from the first two.  相似文献   
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