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排序方式: 共有105条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
91.
We revisit works by Pal and Matsushima, which, respectively, present different equilibrium locations. We consider nonlinear transport costs and show that Pal's result (dispersion) is more robust than Matsushima's (partial agglomeration). Pal's result holds true for any transport cost function, while Matsushima's does not hold under strong concavity or convexity of the transport cost function. If we consider sequential move of location. Pal's result holds for any transport costs. On the other hand, Matsushima's does not hold except for linear transport cost. We also discuss welfare and show that nonlinearity of the transport cost function yields rich welfare implications. 相似文献
92.
Using the spatial price discrimination framework, the relationship between the locations of firms and their ability to collude
is investigated. Gupta and Venkatu (2002) show that in a duopoly model agglomeration at one point is the most stable location.
We find that agglomeration stabilizes the cartel when there are three firms, too. When there are more than three firms, however,
agglomeration of all firms is never the most stable location. With four firms, the following location pattern produces the
most stable cartel: two firms at one point and the other two at the farthest point from the first two. 相似文献
93.
94.
Toshihiro Matsumura 《Economics Letters》2012,115(1):94-96
I investigate an asymmetric duopoly where a public enterprise must supply the demand it faces, while a private enterprise has no such obligation. I show that such an asymmetric regulation yields the first-best outcome (Walrasian equilibrium). 相似文献
95.
This paper considers the optimal size of government deficits compatible with the optimal economic growth under the assumption that government expenditures and taxes are endogenously chosen. If it is desirable to decrease the government expenditure-GNP ratio, it is also desirable to decrease the deficit-GNP ratio during the transition. We find that recent fiscal reconstruction movement in Japan may be justified from the viewpoint of the long-run macro I-S balance. This paper clarifies normative implications of the deficit as a policy variable to adjust the divergence between the exogenous savings and the desired investment. 相似文献
96.
This paper investigates the dynamic properties of intergovernmental financing during a fiscal reconstruction process by analyzing the dynamic game among local governments, which operates with soft budget constraints because of concessionary region-specific transfers from a central government. The existence of intergovernmental transfers induces the free-riding behavior of local governments, thereby bringing considerable deficits to the central government. Raising local and/or national taxes is desirable for fiscal reconstruction, but is unable to attain the Pareto-efficient fiscal reconstruction. Taxes on lobbying activities, combined with uniform transfers, induce earlier concession and can attain the Pareto-efficient outcome in the long run. 相似文献
97.
98.
Toshihiro Matsumura 《Australian economic papers》1999,38(3):189-202
This paper analyses a Cournot duopoly model with finitely repeated competition. Each firm is allowed to hold inventories for a period. When there are more than two periods, inventory-holdings encourage firms to take collusive actions. By holding large inventories, a firm can commit to large sales in the next period, giving inventories a strategic value. When a firm deviates from collusion, the strategic value of inventories allows the non-defecting firm to become the Stackelberg leader in future markets, forcing the defecting firm to become the Stackelberg follower. Collusive sales can be attained with this threat of punishment. 相似文献
99.
We examine the welfare effects of a central government's subsidy for a local public good in a Nash equilibrium model with
two types of public goods. We first show that the welfare effect depends on the substitution and evaluation effects. We also
investigate the optimal subsidy rate in a second-best framework and explore how the optimal subsidy scheme depends on the
relative evaluation of the two types of public goods.
Received: August 20, 1998/accepted: February 12, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are grateful to John Quigley, Minoru Kunisaki, Tom Panella, Andy Haughwout, Steven Craig, William Hoyt, Michael
Ash, Konrad Stahl, Amihai Glazer, David Wildasin and two referees for helpful comments and suggestions, An early version of
this paper was presented at a seminar at University of California, Berkeley and at conferences at JAEE Annual Meeting in Japan,
North American Meetings of The RSAI in Washington, WSAI conference in Hawaii, Public Choice Meeting in San Francisco. 相似文献
100.
Toshihiro Matsumura 《The Japanese Economic Review》1997,48(1):81-89
This paper analyses the Cournot duopoly model which has two production periods before the market clears. As shown by Saloner (1987), if inventory costs are zero, many outcomes including both Cournot and Stackelberg outcomes are subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes. However, if small inventory costs are introduced, the Cournot outcome is no longer found in equilibrium and the equilibrium outcomes are only of Stackelberg-type. This suggests that more attention should be paid to the Stackelberg model than to the Cournot model. 相似文献