Discussion of “Evidence of differing market responses to beating analysts’ targets through tax expense decreases”

Gleason and Mills (2008, Review of Accounting Studies) extend prior research investigating whether investors detect obvious earnings management. They improve on previous efforts to answer this question by examining firms with a clear motivation to manage earnings and by investigating a specific earnings management tool. They investigate firms that fall short of analysts’ expectations when income tax expense is based on the third quarter effective tax rate but meet expectations by reducing the fourth quarter tax expense below predicted tax expense. Their results suggest that investors are sophisticated enough to identify a transparent earnings management tool and that they discount the fact that firms meet expectations using such an obvious tactic. Specifically, the authors find evidence suggesting that the reward for meeting analysts’ expectations is 86% lower when managers use the tax expense as an earnings management tool to meet expectations. The puzzling feature of their results is that, although it is diminished, investors still reward firms for meeting expectations when they can only do so through an apparently obvious manipulation of tax expense.     

The decision to outsource risk management services

We apply transaction cost economics to identify factors influencing companies’ decision to internally generate or outsource risk management services. A unique sample is used which combines publicly available data with private information supplied by 281 Australian listed companies. We find that expenditure on research and development, greater technological uncertainty, more competitive environments, more overseas sales and transaction frequency are associated with less outsourcing of risk management services. Uncertainty due to environmental diversity is associated with more outsourcing of risk management services. Companies that outsource risk management services also have lower staff turnover and provide more specialised training and longer contracts for risk management suppliers.     

Marketing as auto‐communication

In contemporary culture, marketing has defined itself as the beneficial institution par excellence, concerned primarily with the needs of society and its members. Through elaborate systems of communication, the marketing institution claims to link organizations with markets and publics and, thus, to foster openness and sensitivity to different voices. Against this image, this paper demonstrates that although marketing‐oriented organizations are heavily engaged in external communication activities, they often communicate primarily with themselves. Marketing may, in other words, be described as a system of auto‐communication, that is, a set of self‐referential communication practices through which the organization recognizes and confirms its own images, values and assumptions; in short; its own culture.     

The tools of cooperation and change

Employers can choose from lots of tools when they want to encourage employees to work together toward a new corporate goal. One of the rarest managerial skills is the ability to understand which tools will work in a given situation and which will misfire. Cooperation tools fall into four major categories: power, management, leadership, and culture. Choosing the right tool, say the authors, requires assessing the organization along two critical dimensions: the extent to which people agree on what they want and the extent to which they agree on cause and effect, or how to get what they want. The authors plot on a matrix where various organizations fall along these two dimensions. Employees represented in the lower-left quadrant of the model, for example, disagree strongly both about what they want and on what actions will produce which results. Those in the upper-right quadrant agree on both dimensions. Different quadrants call for different tools. When employees share little consensus on either dimension, for instance, the only methods that will elicit cooperation are "power tools" such as fiat, force, and threats. Yugoslavia's Josip Broz Tito wielded such devices effectively. So did Jamie Dimon, current CEO of J.P. Morgan Chase, during the bank's integration with Bank One. For employees who agree on what they want but not on how to get it--think of Microsoft in 1995--leadership tools, such as vision statements, are more appropriate. Some leaders are blessed with an instinct for choosing the right tools--Continental Airlines' Gordon Bethune, General Electric's Jack Welch, and IBM's Lou Gerstner are all examples. Others can use this framework to help select the most appropriate tools for their circumstances.     

Disruptive innovation for social change

Countries, organizations, and individuals around the globe spend aggressively to solve social problems, but these efforts often fail to deliver. Misdirected investment is the primary reason for that failure. Most of the money earmarked for social initiatives goes to organizations that are structured to support specific groups of recipients, often with sophisticated solutions. Such organizations rarely reach the broader populations that could be served by simpler alternatives. There is, however, an effective way to get to those underserved populations. The authors call it "catalytic innovation." Based on Clayton Christensen's disruptive-innovation model, catalytic innovations challenge organizational incumbents by offering simpler, good-enough solutions aimed at underserved groups. Unlike disruptive innovations, though, catalytic innovations are focused on creating social change. Catalytic innovators are defined by five distinct qualities. First, they create social change through scaling and replication. Second, they meet a need that is either overserved (that is, the existing solution is more complex than necessary for many people) or not served at all. Third, the products and services they offer are simpler and cheaper than alternatives, but recipients view them as good enough. Fourth, they bring in resources in ways that initially seem unattractive to incumbents. And fifth, they are often ignored, put down, or even encouraged by existing organizations, which don't see the catalytic innovators' solutions as viable. As the authors show through examples in health care, education, and economic development, both nonprofit and for-profit groups are finding ways to create catalytic innovation that drives social change.     

Justice and Financial Market Allocation of the Social Costs of Business

Regulation is often applied to business behavior to ensure that the social costs of doing business are included in the cost and pricing structures of the firm. Because the consumer benefits from the transaction that generated the social costs, asking the consumer to bear the burden imposed by the transaction is fair. However, there may be a lack of Justice m the internal and external distribution of the social costs of doing business if consumers are the only party bearing that burden, or if the costs are being shifted to employees or taxpayers when a closer stakeholder is also benefiting from the transaction – the stockowner. A social justice perspective requires that those benefiting from a transaction share in the burdens of it. We propose that a Tobin-like tax on stock transactions might be a just means of achieving greater justice in the distribution of the social cost burden.     

Growth and government: Is there a difference between developed and developing countries?

I examine the role of government in the growth of 64 industrialized and developing countries, considering both expenditure and financing aspects of government. Recognizing that there may be differences between the two country groups, I estimate both standard OLS and dummy variable regressions. The general conclusion is that although most fiscal variables are not significantly related to economic growth, the means of financing matters more than government spending. I find that seigniorage and the budget surplus are important for growth, but the LDCs is the group that drive the results in all regressions.     

The Effects of Uncertainty on the Informativeness of Earnings: Evidence from the Insurance Industry in the Wake of Catastrophic Events

This study examines the effects of uncertainty associated with large-scale catastrophes on the informativeness of earnings announcements by property and casualty insurers. It contributes to the literature on the effects of uncertainty on the informativeness of earnings announcements by distinguishing between: (1) uncertainty due to exogenous events that obscure the firm's future prospects, and (2) uncertainty due to noise in earnings. Results suggest that heightened uncertainty associated with exposure to catastrophe losses is significantly positively associated with the market's response to earnings reports, even after controlling for uncertainty due to noise in earnings. This implies that during periods of high uncertainty, investors find earnings information more useful in assessing the future prospects of the firm.     

THE MEASUREMENT OF U.S. REAL CAPITAL INPUT, 1929–1967

The purpose of this paper is to develop methods for the measurement of real capital input. These methods are based on perpetual inventory estimates of capital stock and corresponding estimates of capital service prices. Stocks and service prices are adjusted for relative utilization of capital. The resulting estimates represent a separation of income from capital into price and quantity components. Estimates of capital input in current and constant prices are constructed for corporate business, non-corporate business, and households and non-profit institutions in the United States for the period 1929–1967. These estimates are prepared in a form suitable for integration into the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts.     

Do managers use earnings guidance to influence street earnings exclusions?

Despite the apparent importance of “street earnings” to investors, we know relatively little about the process through which this earnings metric is determined. The limited evidence in the extant literature provides analyst-centric explanations, suggesting that analysts’ abilities and incentives influence which line items forecast-tracking services exclude from GAAP earnings to arrive at street earnings. We propose an alternative explanation: managers actively influence analysts’ forecast exclusion decisions via earnings guidance. We test this explanation by examining how earnings guidance influences two aspects of analysts’ exclusions: (1) special item exclusions (i.e., nonrecurring items) and (2) incremental exclusions (i.e., recurring items). We find that for firms with no special items in the previous year, when managers guide, analysts exclude almost all current-year special items, whereas when managers do not guide, the proportion that analysts exclude is significantly lower. More importantly, we that analysts’ incremental exclusions are significantly higher when managers guide than when they do not guide. Overall, our evidence suggests that managers play an active role in influencing the composition of street earnings via earnings guidance.