Population growth and the transfer paradox in an overlapping generations model

This study investigates whether the transfer paradox (donor enrichment and/or recipient impoverishment) occurs when a donor and a recipient have different population growth rates by using a one‐sector, two‐country overlapping generations model. We show that if the population growth rates differ, neither donor enrichment nor recipient impoverishment occurs in the steady state under dynamic efficiency. This result is in stark contrast to the existing results that the transfer paradox might occur when a donor and a recipient country have different marginal propensities to save, assuming that both have the same population growth rate. Furthermore, we present the condition for the transfer problem to occur on the transition path and show that the transfer paradox is less likely to occur as the economy converges to the steady state. Our result shows that the prevailing finding that the transfer paradox can occur in an overlapping generations model is limited to the special case of countries having the same population growth rate.     

On Market Integration and Product R&D: A Monopoly Case

Applying a monopoly model with endogenous quality choice to the case of multiple national markets, we consider the effect of market integration on product R&D incentives (i.e., quality-improving), profit, and consumer surplus. We demonstrate that the effect of market integration depends on the difference in income distributions between two countries and the level of trade cost. In particular, if the difference in income distributions between two countries is large (small) and/or trade cost is low (high), market integration can decrease (increase) the level of product quality and social welfare in the two countries.     

Dynamic Interactions in Trade Policy in a Differential Game Model of Tariff Protection

This paper develops a two‐country dynamic game model of tariff protection to reconsider optimal trade policies and their implications for welfare. The authors show that an import subsidy is optimal in the feedback Nash equilibria, which results in a curious possibility that the domestic market is monopolized by the foreign firrm. However, welfare comparisons among Nash equilibria, free trade, and autarky reveal that feedback Nash equilibria involve higher welfare than both autarky and free trade, i.e. dynamic noncooperative choices of policy serve as tacit policy coordination and ensure larger trade gains relative to free trade.     

On the effects of emission standards as a non-tariff barrier to trade in the case of a foreign Bertrand duopoly: A note

Employing a model of an environmentally differentiated product market, we analyze how an emission regulation as non-tariff barriers to trade affects imports, the environment, and welfare in the case of a foreign Bertrand duopoly. Related to this issue, we reconsider the result of Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero [Moraga-González, J.L., Padrón-Fumero, N., 2002. Environmental policy in a green market. Environmental and Resource Economics 22, 419–447] that a strict emission standard on a dirtier product degrades the environment and reduces the net social surplus associated with the valuation of environmental damage, if the marginal social valuation of environmental damage is larger. On the other hand, we show that a strict emission standard on a cleaner product always improves the environment and the net social surplus associated with the valuation of environmental damage.     

Strategic Product R&D Investment Policy under International Rivalry in the Presence of Demand Spillover Effects

Abstract

We develop a model of product (i.e., quality-improving) research and development (R&D) investment competition in a horizontally differentiated duopoly. In particular, based on a third-country market model, we consider the optimal product R&D investment policy under international rivalry in the presence of demand spillover effects associated with improving the quality level of a product. We show how the optimality of a non-cooperative and a cooperative R&D investment policy depends on the strength of demand spillover effects. Furthermore, we consider the same issues in the case of heterogeneous consumers and alternative utility functions.     

Learning program for enhancing visual literacy for non-design students using a CMS to share outcomes

This study proposes a basic learning program for enhancing visual literacy using an original Web content management system (Web CMS) to share students’ outcomes in class as a blog post. It seeks to reinforce students’ understanding and awareness of the design of visual content. The learning program described in this research focuses on to address how to create meanings of visual content that is important to express information visually, and includes three exercises based on perception, visual variables, and signification. The Web CMS to publish student works and share in class helps enhance students’ reflection. We also developed a rubric as an assessment device for students’ outcomes. The content of the learning program and its implementation are described with the support of observational data.     

Strategic Trade Policy and Network Compatibility

We consider strategic trade policy for information and communication technology (ICT) product markets with international rivalry. Usually, ICT products exhibit network externalities and product compatibility (i.e., network compatibility). We demonstrate that the optimal strategic trade policy depends on the degree of network compatibility of ICT products. Furthermore, using an endogenous decision game for strategic variables (i.e., quantity and price), we consider the relationship between the optimal strategic trade policies and the endogenous mode of competition.     

Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly With Network Compatibility Effects

We consider the efficiency of price and quantity competition in a network products market, where we observe product compatibility with network externalities (hereafter, network compatibility effects). In particular, if network compatibility effects between firms are sufficiently asymmetric, the Cournot equilibrium is more efficient than the Bertrand equilibrium in terms of larger consumer, producer and total surpluses. Then, we consider an endogenous choice of the strategic variables, price and quantity. If the degree of network compatibility effects of the rival firm is larger (smaller) than the degree of product substitutability, then choosing prices (quantities) is a dominant strategy for the firm. Thus, if the network compatibility effects of both firms are larger (smaller), the Bertrand (Cournot) equilibrium arises. Furthermore, if the network compatibility effects between the firms are sufficiently asymmetric, the firm with a larger (smaller) network compatibility effect than a certain level of product substitutability chooses quantities (prices). In this case, the Cournot–Bertrand equilibrium arises, which is less (more) efficient than the Cournot equilibrium in terms of consumer (producer) surplus.     

Third-degree price discrimination,quality choice,and welfare

Employing an endogenous quality choice model, we reconsider the effect on welfare of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination. We prove that price discrimination always enhances welfare, mainly because the quality improvement owing to price discrimination increases consumer surplus. Moreover, we show that third-degree price discrimination benefits all parties, including consumers in the higher priced market if the preference differences between markets are sufficiently large.     

Compatibility Under Differentiated Duopoly with Network Externalities: A Comment

Chen and Chen (J Ind Compet Trade 11:43?55, 2011) analyze the effects of compatibility under system product Cournot competition with network externalities. They show that a firm’s optimal strategy is to set an incompatible system standard, even though perfect compatibility is socially optimal. In this case, a social dilemma arises. However, their result depends on a specific assumption about the network size. We use the framework of Shy (1995) to modify this assumption, and hence show that the social dilemma identified by Chen and Chen (J Ind Compet Trade 11:43?55, 2011) does not arise.