Side constraints and non-price attributes in markets

In most real-world (electronic) marketplaces, there are additional considerations besides maximizing immediate economic value. We present a sound way of taking such considerations into account via side constraints and non-price attributes, and show that side constraints (such as budget, limit on the number of winners, and exclusive-or) have a significant impact on the complexity of market clearing.     

Equilibrium in Auction and Bargaining Markets When Agents Can Wait and Search

The paper studies two market structures and two modes of trade. The agents, buyers and sellers, can choose whether to stay or search. The meetings take place randomly, and trades are consummated by auction or by bargaining. There are altogether four possible markets but in equilibrium at most two markets are active simultaneously. There is almost always a unique evolutionary stable equilibrium which consists of an auction market when the numbers of buyers and sellers differ greatly, and two simultaneous auction markets when the numbers are relatively close.     

Assessing systemic risks and predicting systemic events

The paper develops a framework for assessing systemic risks and for predicting systemic events, i.e. periods of extreme financial instability with potential real costs. It contributes to the literature on the prediction of financial crises mainly in two ways: first, it uses a Financial Stress Index for identifying the starting date of systemic financial crises. Second, it uses discrete choice models that combine both domestic and global indicators of macro-financial vulnerabilities to predict systemic financial crises. The performance of the models is evaluated in a framework that takes into account policy maker’s preferences between missing crises and issuing false alarms. Our analysis shows that combining indicators of domestic and global macro-financial vulnerabilities substantially improves the models’ ability to forecast systemic financial crises. Our framework also displays a good out-of-sample performance in predicting the ongoing Global Financial Crisis.     

Management Control of Project Portfolio Uncertainty: A Managerial Role Perspective

This article presents empirical results on different managers’ viewpoints regarding the sources and management of project portfolio uncertainty. As a key result, this study demonstrates the versatility of uncertainties experienced by managers, the limited degree of perceived control over them, the use of an almost complete management control package in managing uncertainties, and the necessity of managers’ cooperation in the skilled use of the management control package when managing uncertainties. In addition, a further research agenda is proposed.     

Gender Differences in Educational Attainment: Evidence on the Role of Tracking from a Finnish Quasi‐experiment

In this paper we study the relationship between the timing of tracking of pupils into vocational and academic secondary education and gender differences in educational attainment and income. It is argued that in a comprehensive system, where students are tracked into vocational and academic schools relatively late (age 15–16), girls are more likely to choose the academic track than boys. We exploit the Finnish comprehensive school reform of the 1970s to analyse this hypothesis. This changed the Finnish school system from a selective to a comprehensive structure and postponed tracking from the age of 10–11 to 15–16. Since the reform was not implemented at the same time throughout the country, we can observe members of the same cohorts under both systems. The shift to a comprehensive system was found to increase gender differences in the probability of choosing an academic secondary education and of continuing onto academic tertiary education. Moreover, the reform decreased the gender wage gap in adult income by four percentage points.     

Preventing Systemic Crises through Bank Transparency

The banking system is known to be vulnerable to self‐fulfilling crises that are caused by depositors' co-ordination failure. We show that transparency regulation may prevent certain types of systemic crisis by eliminating the possibility of coordination failure.
(J.E.L.: G21, G28) .     

Negative Externalities and Evolutionary Implementation

We model externality abatement as an implementation problem. A social planner would like to ensure efficient behaviour among a group of agents whose actions are sources of externalities. However, the planner has limited information about the agents' preferences, and is unable to distinguish individual agents except through their action choices. We prove that if a concavity condition on aggregate payoffs is satisfied, the planner can guarantee that efficient behaviour is globally stable under a wide range of behaviour adjustment processes by administering a variable pricing scheme. Through a series of applications, we show that the concavity condition is naturally satisfied in settings involving negative externalities. We conclude by contrasting the performance of the pricing mechanism with that of a mechanism based on direct revelation and announcement dependent forcing contracts.     

Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing

We consider an implementation problem faced by a planner who manages a roadway network. The problem entails both hidden information and hidden actions. We solve the planner's problem by introducing a new class of mechanisms and a new notion of implementation. The mechanisms, called price schemes, attach transfers to the available routes; they do not involve direct revelation. The method of implementation is evolutionary, requiring that players who follow any reasonable myopic adjustment process eventually learn to behave as the planner desires. We show that efficient behaviour can be guaranteed using simple, decentralized price schemes.     

Tactical Service Failure: A Case Study on Public Funding as a Marketing Issue

This article analyzes the ways in which public-sector service providers may use service-delivery failure as a way of securing resources. In tactical service failure, an organization tactically delivers nonadequate service, so as to project a media image of being harmed by its funding cuts. Analyzing this process enables new insight into both public funding and provider-to-funder (P2F) marketing and selling. This research uses a single case study method to confirm the existence of the phenomenon first detected through long-term media analysis. To explore the single case, the authors interviewed a former city official who participated in tactical-service-failure processes and their marketing. The article shows how and why service providers may opt for this tactic and the potential gains and pitfalls of utilizing it. New insight is offered into how media connections are used to influence public-funding decisions.