Evolution in Bayesian games II: Stability of purified equilibria

We study the evolutionary stability of purified equilibria of two-player normal form games, providing simple sufficient conditions for stability and for instability under the Bayesian best response dynamic.     

Effect of Business Education on Women and Men Students’ Attitudes on Corporate Responsibility in Society

This article describes a survey among Finnish business students to find answers to the following questions: How do business students define a well-run company? What are their attitudes on the responsibilities of business in society? Do the attitudes of women students differ from those of men? What is the influence of business education on these attitudes? Our sample comprised 217 students pursuing a master’s degree in business studies at two Finnish universities. The results show that, as a whole, students valued the stakeholder model of the company more than the shareholder model. However, attitudes differed according to gender: women students were more in favor of the stakeholder model and placed more weight on corporate ethical, environmental, and societal responsibilities than their men counterparts – both at the beginning and at the end of their studies. Thus, no gender socialization effect of business school education could be observed in this sense. Business school education was found to shape women and men students’ attitudes in two ways. Firstly, valuation of the shareholder model increased and, secondly, the importance of equal-opportunity employment decreased in the course of education. This raises the question whether the educational context is creating an undesirable tendency among future business professionals. The results further suggest that the sociocultural context can make a difference in how corporate social responsibility is perceived. The article also discusses possible ways to influence the attitudes of business students.     

Large deviations and multinomial probit choice

We consider a discrete choice model in which the payoffs to each of an agent?s n actions are subjected to the average of m i.i.d. shocks, and use tools from large deviations theory to characterize the rate of decay of the probability of choosing a given suboptimal action as m approaches infinity. Our model includes the multinomial probit model of Myatt and Wallace (2003) [5] as a special case. We show that their formula describing the rates of decay of choice probabilities is incorrect, provide the correct formula, and use our large deviations analysis to provide intuition for the difference between the two.     

Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs

We consider a simple model of stochastic evolution in population games. In our model, each agent occasionally receives opportunities to update his choice of strategy. When such an opportunity arises, the agent selects a strategy that is currently optimal, but only after his payoffs have been randomly perturbed. We prove that the resulting evolutionary process converges to approximate Nash equilibrium in both the medium run and the long run in three general classes of population games: stable games, potential games, and supermodular games. We conclude by contrasting the evolutionary process studied here with stochastic fictitious play.     

The Gates Hillman prediction market

The Gates Hillman prediction market (GHPM) was an internet prediction market designed to predict the opening day of the Gates and Hillman Centers, the new computer science complex at Carnegie Mellon University. Unlike a traditional continuous double auction format, the GHPM was mediated by an automated market maker, a central agent responsible for pricing transactions with traders over the possible opening days. The GHPM’s event partition was, at the time, the largest ever elicited in any prediction market by an order of magnitude, and dealing with the market’s size required new advances, including a novel span-based elicitation interface that simplified interactions with the market maker. We use the large set of identity-linked trades generated by the GHPM to examine issues of trader performance and market microstructure, including how the market both reacted to and anticipated official news releases about the building’s opening day.     

Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation

We study the implementation of efficient behavior in settings with externalities. A planner would like to ensure that a group of agents make socially optimal choices, but he only has limited information about the agents’ preferences, and can only distinguish individual agents through the actions they choose. We describe the agents’ behavior using a stochastic evolutionary model, assuming that their choice probabilities are given by the logit choice rule. We prove that there is a simple price scheme with the following property: regardless of the realization of preferences, a group of agents subjected to the price scheme will spend the vast majority of time in the long run behaving efficiently. The price scheme defines a game that may possess multiple equilibria, but we are able to obtain a unique and efficient selection from this set because of the stochastic nature of the agents’ choice rule. We conclude by comparing the performance of our price scheme with that of VCG mechanisms.     

Secrecy versus patenting

We develop an equilibrium search model of innovation with the possibility of multiple independent discovery. We distinguish innovations from ideas, and we view patents as probabilistic property rights that are constrained by the innovators' option to keep the innovation secret. We find that the patent system can simultaneously stimulate innovation, information disclosure and welfare. An optimal patent may provide more or less protection than secrecy, and in many cases, it provides less, suggesting that its main function is information spreading rather than rewarding the costs of the innovative activity.     

The relationship between regional value-added and public capital in Finland: what do the new panel econometric techniques tell us?

This article applies recently developed panel estimation techniques to estimate the elasticity of private production with respect to public capital in a regional framework. We use the widely applied production function approach and regional data from Finland for the 1975–2004 period. In contrast to many previous studies about the productivity of public capital, we focus especially on panel estimation techniques, showing that the results from commonly applied fixed effects OLS are probably biased and sensitive to a change of estimator. To get more reliable results, we use the panel DOLS and panel DSUR estimators. The results suggest that public capital has had a positive impact on private production.     

Incomplete contracting in an R&D project: the Micronas case

Systematic empirical evidence on the consequences of incomplete contracts is meagre, because contracts are often classified as business secrets, and are accordingly difficult to obtain for research purposes. In this study we employ the extensive information from the life of a Finnish research joint venture, Micronas, during 1980–1992 to cast light on this issue. Of particular interest is the principal-agent relationship between the owners and the management of the research joint venture. Our investigation confirms the strong message of the incomplete contract theory. Hold-up problems are pervasive in R&D projects, and the allocation of power and ownership is important to the success of the projects.     

Stable games and their dynamics

We study a class of population games called stable games. These games are characterized by self-defeating externalities: when agents revise their strategies, the improvements in the payoffs of strategies to which revising agents are switching are always exceeded by the improvements in the payoffs of strategies which revising agents are abandoning. We prove that the set of Nash equilibria of a stable game is globally asymptotically stable under a wide range of evolutionary dynamics. Convergence results for stable games are not as general as those for potential games: in addition to monotonicity of the dynamics, integrability of the agents' revision protocols plays a key role.